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lOutline of the Study.
In the present study consisting of six separate papers we examine some
aspects of prices and values in incomplete markets and the economic
efficiency of profit- or value-related decision criteria for production
decisions in incomplete market economies.
An economy with incomplete markets is an economy where the set of
existing markets - the market structure - is effectively constraining
the opportunity sets for consuæer s . The market structure will always be
incomplete if markets do not exist for all commodities entering into the
preference structure of consumers (as in the case of quantity rationing).
More generally, the market structure will be incomplete if all points
in the consumption set for consumers cannot be generated as linear com-
binations of market goods. This will generally be the case if market
goods (objects of trade) differ from the ultimate objects of consumers'
satisfaction (objects of preference) such that the set of market goods
does not span·the whole consumption set for consumers.
It may be instructive to give some examples of situations with incomplete
markets:
Ci) Commodity bundling and tie-in sales, i.e., cases where firms sell their
goods in packages. Examples are numerous: sporting and cultural organizations
offer season tickets, restaurants provide complete dinners consisting df many
separate dishes, travel agencies offer inclusive tours, etc, ... More generally,
markets trading in composite goods will be incomplete if the set of composite
goods does not span the commodity space.
(ii) In financial market theory under uncertainty one starts from the
premise that consumer preferences over financial assets (objects of trade)
are derived from preferences over certain basic characteristics of asset
returns (objects of preference); e.g. their means and variances, or the
asset returns under each state of nature, etc. If there are more different
characteristics than assets with linearly independent return characteristics,
t~e financial market structure is likely to be incomplete.
(iii) Allowing for variable product quality and product differentiation,
it seems natural to assume that there are certain aspects, or characteristics,
embodied in market goods entering into consumers' preferences so that a
market good of a given quality may be considered as a package of such
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characteristics. The most extreme ln this respect is the "hedonic"
approach to consumer demand theory which is built on the premise that
it is exclusively the characteristics of goods rather than the good
itself which are the ~ltimate objects of consumer satisfaction. Thus,
ifthere are more characteristics than market goods with linearly in-
dependent characteristics, the market structure will be incomplete in
the sense that it will constrain the choice of consumers in the space
of characteristics. /
(iv) A problem related to the completeness of markets arises in the
theory of local public goods. Consider a set of communities (or clubs)
offering a certain package of local public goods to their members. If
there were many communities with differentiated local public services to
their members, an individual may obtain a vector of public goods close to
his likings by sharing his time between several different communities
("voting by feet"). Clearly, the individual opportunity sets will be
larger the larger is the number of communities with different public
goods supply.
Incompleteness of markets will of course in most cases be due to increasing
returns to scale relative to market size. In that respect, fixed marketing
costs will be as important as indivisibilities in the production technolo-
gies. In some cases one may find that firms use commodity bundling and
tie-in sales in order to extract consumers' surplus. In such cases fixed
costs of merchandising may serve as barriers to entry conserving the in-
complete market structure.
One has to be somewhat careful in defining the efficiency concept under an
incomplete market structure. The market allocation of resources and market
goods may be efficient relative to a given and possibly incomplete market
structure. Hypothetically, one might, however, obtain an allocation being
better in the Pareto sense if one could reorganize the market structure
in such a way that consumers' range of choice were increased. Hence, one can
\define efficiency in a constrained - or second best - sense, i.e., relativelto a given incomplete market structure. This will also be the approach
taken in the present study, that is, we shall restrict the efficiency con-
cept to the set of attainable allocations given by the nature of existing
markets. Hence, the market mechanism will be said to allocate goods and
resources efficiently if it can do as well as a central planner aiming at
Pareto efficiency and being constrained to allocate goods and resources
3through existing markets. If fixed marketing costs and costs associated
with organizing and running markets were explicitly considered, the
second best allocation relative to an incomplete market structure may
not be so far from the maximum maximorum after all.
When the incompleteness of the market scnucture is effectively constraining
theopportunity set forconsumers, the particular market structure becomes
part of the infrastructure of the economy and decisions affecting the
incomplete structureof markets willbe in the nature of infrastructural
decisions. In the present study we shall explore some economic aspects of
such infrastructural decisions in different-contexts.
The assumption of price-taking behaviour is basic to the efficiency of
decentralized market behaviour. However, if production decisions affect
the incompleteness of the market structure, the notion of price-taking
market behaviour becomes somewhat blurred as production decisions may
change consumers' opportunity sets even for given commodity prices. In
that case a production decision will create market opportunities not
previously available in the market and it is not clear what price-caking
should mean in that context as che market valuation of these new oppor~uni-
ties will be known to the producer only after the decicion is made.
There is a close analogy between the presence of many close substitutes
and the presence of many commodities relative to the number of characteris-
tics. In particular, with as many linearly independent commodities as
characteristics (complete markets) there would exist market opportunities
representing a perfect substitute for any new commodity or newmodels of
old commodities. In that case the market valuation of the corresponding
perfect substitute could serve as the competitive price. In incomplete
markets such perfect substitutes may not exist.
Indeed, one may look at incompleteness of markets as a market failure
caused by non-convexities and increasing returns to scale in the production
and marketing of goods. With economy-wide decreasing returns to scale
there would exist a market for any good in posicive demand so that the
incompleteness of markets may be considered as just another example of the
fact that increasing returns to scale choke off competition. It may,
therefore, at the outset seem somewhat paradoxical to look for workable or
meaningful definitions of competitive behaviour in incomplete markets as
the very reason why markets are incomplete may be due to non-convexities
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and absence of perfect competition. This is also confirmed in the present
study where we show that if firms' production decisions change the
attainable set of market opportunities spanned byexisting market goods,
there does not in general seem to be any meaningful definition of
price-taking' behaviour for profit- or value-maximizing firms.
More specifically, the present study deal~ with some !,roperties of
market values in incomplete markets and with the efficiency of the market
mechanism based on profit- or value-maximizing behaviour by firms.
In the first two papers we examine the exchange of risky returns in compe-
titive financial markets trading in risky securities. Risk is in this
context defined in terms of uncertainty about the economic environment
(nature). Assuming a finite and discrete state space a risky security is
characterized by a return vector with components being the returns under
each state of nature. The objects of preference are in this context state-
contingent returns while the objects of trade are shares or claims to
risky return vectors. Thus, if there are fewer securities with linearly
independent returns than states of nature, the financial market structure
is incomplete.
In this model firms' financial decisions will change the incomplete nature
of the market structure - and hence be of an infrastructural kind - if there
is thereby created securities with return vectors not previously obtainable
as linear combinations of existing securities. In the first two papers we
examine the possibilities for aggregation of risky securities in financial
markets and we show that if the conditions for global aggregation are
satisfied, financial decisions affecting the incomplete nature of financial
markets will have no effect on equilibrium prices and values.
In the third paper we focus attention on the efficiency of value-related
investment criteria under uncertainty, and we show that if financial markets
are incomplete, there will in the general case be external effects associated
with firms' investment decisions under uncertainty which will not be fully
reflected in changes in firms' stock market values pointing to likely in-
efficiency of decentralized market behaviour based on stock market value
maximization. These external effects will occur if firms' investment
decisions change the feasible range of choice for portfolio returns
spanned by the existing financial assets. We show, however, that if the
conditions for global aggregation in financial markets are satisfied, these
externalitites will be evaluated equally by all shareholders.
5In that case shareholders will be unanimous as to the social value of a
given investment and we can endow the firm with the preferences of an
arbitrary shareholder and the market value of an investment computed
at prices equal to the marginal rates of substitution for that shareholder,
will capture the true social value of the investment.
The model of firms' investment under uncertainty lends ~tself quite naturally
to the study of quality choiceand product differentiation under certainty.
Indeed, a unit of a commodity of a given quality may be considered as a
vectorof characteristics - or attributes - and we postulate that consumer
preferences are basically defined on the set of such characteristics and
that firms' production technologies allow for substitution between charac-
teristics. This idea is introduced in paper 4 and elaborated further in the
last tw~. In paper 4 and 5 we assume a linear relationship between bundles
of market goods and bundles of characteristics while the last paper is ex-
tended to non-linear relationships.
Clearly, if there are many more characteristics than market goods, the
market structure will be incomplete so that the number of commodities and
their particular characteristics will effectively constrain cons~~ers'
range of choice in the characteristics space. Thus, if the characteristics
composition of any one good is changed, this will in general change this
common range of choice for all consumers so that decisions on product
quality will have external effects which may not be fully reflected in
firms' marginal revenues with respect to product qualities. The last
three papers are devoted to the study of the efficiency of the market
mechanism guided by the profit motive in determining product quality and
product differentiation. It is shown that quality choices set under the
pressure of market forces will in general not be in the consumers' interest
and in paper 5 and 6 we derive sufficient conditions for profit-maximizing
quality choices to satisfy the necessary conditions for P.areto efficiency
under linear and non-linear relationships between market goods and
characteristics, respectively.
6.
ON THE ADDITIVITYOF ~~T VALUATIONOF RISKY INCOME S~~S.
Io this paper we shall examine under what circumstances the equili-
brium market value of a sum of risky income streams will be equal to
the sum of the market values of the constituent risky income streams
in a competitive stock market. Some aut~ors in the field of business
finance seem to believe t~at the stock market values of risky income
streams will always be additive in the above sense regardless of the
structure of preferences and the nature of expectations in the market.
See [4], [6] and [7]. However, the additivity property of market
values in a competitive stock market does not hold in general. Hare
precisely, the additivity property only holds, for a special class of
preferences, the generality of which depends upon whether there exists
a risk.less income stream in the market and moreover, homogeneous expec-
tations are necessary for the additivity of stock market values to obtain.
We shall use the following notation:
n = the set of possible states of the world
asn ~ a typical element of Q.{6} is a finite parti don of the state
space Q and we assume that s is the finite dimension of Q, i.e.,
s is the number of possible states of the world.
7..(6) ~ the discrete subjective probability density function defined onl.
Q for the i-th individual C i=l, ..., m), i.e., we allow for the
possibility of heterogeneous expectations.
X (6) h . k . l). (' l ) W 'dj . = terl.S y ancome strream J, J=, .•. ,n. e cons i, er a one-
period model such that the risky incomes are supposed to materia-
lize a~ the end of the period. Xj(6) is of course to be inter-
preted as the income of income stream j if state e occurs so that
l)The term "income stream" is not quite appropriate here since we are con-
sidering a one-period model. However, to generalize the results to
income streams stretching over more than one period would be technically
st't'aightforward. The crucial thing is that the model is static in
the sense that t't'adetakes place once and for all at the market date.
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each risky income will be a vector with at most s non-zero
components. We assume that all such income vectors are
linearly independent and the s-component vector
(x. (l),
J
..., X.(s)] will be denoted x.(a)
J J
s - {Xl (8), ..., Xn(8)} = the set of exogeneously given risky
income streams.
W. (6)
l
= the initial endowments of the i-th individual, i.e., the W.(9)
l
represent the initial distribution of income prior to trade.
q(6) = the price as of to-day for a unit of income in state 6.
2(6)
m
r
i=l
w. (6) =
l
the total social endowment in state 6.
v = the market valuation functional which is a mapping from
the vector set S to the positive real line. That is
V(X.(8» _ V. where V. is the market value of income stream
1. J Jx. (6).
J
We shall first examine the additivity property of the market valuation
functional V in an Arrow-Debreu market, i.e.,a market where risky incomes
are traded by exchange of Arrow-Debreu securities. We are interested in
laying down necessary and sufficient conditions for V to be additive in
terms of properties of the individual preferences along their demand
schedules. After that we shall examine what kind of restrictions, if
any, we have to impose on the preferences in order for the conditions
for additivity to be met in a competitive stock market.
The objects of exchange in an Arrow-Debreu market are claims to income
in different states of the world, i.e., state-contingent claims, the
basic units of which, so-called Arrow-Debreu securitiesl), are defined
such as to pay one unit of income to the holder if a particular state
occurs and nothing otherwise. Clearly, there are as many Arrow-Debreu
securities as there are states of the world.
l)See for instance Arrow [l].
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We consider a pure exchange economy so that the total amount traded must
be equal to the total social endowment, i.e.,
n
EX.(6)=
j=l J
m
EW.(6),
i=l lo
6e:n
By definition of value the market value of a risky income stream in an
Arrow-Debreu market is given by V. = V(X.(S)) = Eq(6)X.e6).
J J 6 J
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the market valuation func-
tional to be additive in an Arrow-Debreu market is obviously that the prices
of income in different states be unchanged when income streams are added
together or linearly combined in the market. We shall argue that this is
trivially true in an Arrow-Debreu market.
We let d.(6) denote the i-th individual's demand for income in state 6.
l
Each individual's demand pattern for income in different states is a
vector withs components. We denote the set of all feasible demand
vectors by T, i.e.,T is the set of feasible trades in the market. The
set of feasible trades is determined by the social endowment vector or
more precisely, T = {d(6) Ide6} ~..Z(6), 6e:~:n. The Arrow-Debreu securi-
ties defined as the s unit vectors e(S) where ece) gives one unit of income
if and only if state 6 occurs, will clearly span the set of feasible trades
so that any feasible trading point in T can be obtained as a linear combi-
nation of the Arrow--Debreu securities. Since the set of feasible trades
only depends on the social endowment in each state, the individual oppor-
tunity sets will be independent of the operation of combining income
streams in the market implying that demands and prices must remain un-
changed.
Assuming that individuals ra~k risky income streams according to expected
utilityl) , the individual demand functions are determined by
Max E
6
'IT. (6)U. (d. (6))
l lo], i=l, ..., m
l)The individual utility functions are assumed .to be strictly quasi-concave
so that the first-order conditions define a maXl.mum.
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subject to the budget constraints
Eq(6)[d.(6) - W1..(6)]= 006 1.
The first-order maximumconditionsare given by
(l) 'IT.(6)U! (d,(6» =~A.q(6)~ for all 6d2~ and for all 1.1. 1. 1. 1.
where A. is the Langx'angianmultiplier which of course has the usual
1.
interpretation of expected marginal utility of initial wealth.l)
Condition (l) can be restated in terms of marginal rates of substi-
tution between income in different states, say rand s:
(2)
'IT.(r)U!(d.(r» ( )
1. 1. 1. = ~, for all 1..
'IT.(s)U!(d.(s» q(s)
1. 1. 1.
(2) says that along the individual demand schedules the marginal rate
of substitution between income in different states of the world be
equal for all individuals and equal to the relative prices.
Regardless of the structure of preferences and the nature of expectations,
the market valuation functional will have-a very simple general- form in
an Arrow-Debreu market. To see this observe that Eq(6) = qo is to-day's
6
price for a unit of certain income at the end of the period (qo -
where r is the rate of interest)2) so that A. =
1.
l
E 'IT.(6)U!(d.(6»/qO.
6 1. 1. 1.
This gives
qo'IT.(6)U! (d.(6))
1. 1. 1.q(6) = ------ for all i.
E'IT.(6)U! (d , (6»
6 1. 1. 1.
l)We assume non-satiation so that A. > O for all i.1.
2)This means that the riskless income stream yielding l+r in each state
of the world is a numeraire good in this economy.
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U!(d.(9))l. l.Define Hi (9) - -------
E7I'. (9)U! (d. (9))91. l. l.
Considering the risky l.ncome stream x.ca) its market value is defined
J
by
vex. (a)) -
J
Eq(9)X. (9) =
9 J
qo E71' • (9)ti. (9)x. C9).9 l. l. J
Observing that L7I'.(9)M.(9) z l and recalling qo - l/(l+r) we have9 l. l.
v. - V(x.ca)) = -11 {E.[X.(9)] + Cov.[~1.(9), X.(9)]} for all i,
J J +r l. J l. l. J
where E. and Cov. are the ex-pectation and covariance operators for thel. l.
i-th subjective probability distribution and where we have utilized the
fact that Cov(X, y) = E[XY] - E1æY. Consequently, in an Arrow-Debreu
market the equilibrium value of a risky incoce stream can always be ex-
pressed as a function of its discounted expected value and a risk term
depending on the covariance between the risky income and a market variable
M. (8) in general different for different individuals.
1.
When restricting exchange of risky income streams to other market structures
than the Arrow-Debreu market, it is clearl) that a necessary and sufficient
condition for market valuation of risky income streams to be additive under
a given market structure, is that individual marginal rates of substitution
-between income in different states depend only on total income in each
state and not on the particular pattern of risky income streams. That means
that individual exchange optima must remain unaffected when risky income
streams are linearly combined as long as total social endowment in each state
remains unchanged. But this can only be true if the equilibrium allocation
in an Arrow-Debreu market is attainable under the specific market structure
given. Thus, for the market value to be additive in the sense that the
l) S ff·· . b'· .u l.cl.encyl.So Vl.ouS and necessl.ty follows from the fact that lf
individual demand prices for income in different states (for a given
numeraire) depend on the pattern of risky income streams, tnese indi-
vidual demand prices for state-contingent incomes would change when
risky income streams are merged and hence market values would
change too.
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value of a sum of risky income streams equals the sum of the values
of these incomes, the market must generate the same price and demand
structure as would an Arrow'-Debreu market for a given set of prefer-
ences and expectations.
We formalize this in a theorem which for the sake of reference will be
called the Market Valuation Theorem:
A necessary and sufficient condition for the market valuation
functional to be additive is that the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between income in different states be the same for
all individuals and remain equal to the relative prices.
This is indeed an aggregation property since we can always form aggre-
gates if relative prices remain constant.
We shall now examine the properties of the market valuation functional
V in a competitive stock market, i.e., a market where the exchange of
state-contingent incomes is restricted to take place by means of
trading in shares of the existing income streams. We let ~.. denote
~J
the proportion of income stream j held by the i-th individual. First
of all we note that the objects of exchange in a stock market are not
income in different states but shares of income patterns across the
states of the world. By the same token we could think of the various
income streams as composite goods where the constituent commodities
are income in different states.
We make the rather realistic assumption that the dimension of the
state space n is larger than the number of linearly independent in-
come streams (s > n). But this means that the set S of income vectors
X.(6) cannot possibly span the s-dimensional space T of feasible trades
J
defined above. Consequently, some feasible trades in an Arrow-Debreu
market will be infeasible in a stock market, i.e., there exists vectors
[d.(l), •.., d. (s)] which are inexpressible as a linear combination of
1· ~
the risky income streams.l) ·Restricting exchange of income streams to
l) .If s<n, we see that a stock market would generate the same set of
feasIble trades as an Arrow-Debreu market and the two market struc-
tures would in fact be equivalent.
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trading in stock markets may therefore mean a considerable narrowing down
of the set of feasible trades, the extent of which depends upon the maxi-
mum number of linearly independent lncome vectors compared with the dimen-
sionality of the state space. Therefore, there should be no a priori
reason to believe that the additivity of the market valuation functional
should be preserved in a stock market since merging income streams in
the market reduces the set of feasible trades and consequently leaving
less room for diversitication of the individual portfolios.
We now pose the question under what conditions the market valuation func-
tional will in fact be additive in a competitive stock market trading in
shares of risky income streams. From our Market Valuation Theorem we
derive
.Corollary l:
If there are more states of the world than linearly independent
income streams, the market valuation functional de.fined on the
set of risky income streams traded in a competitive stock market
will be additive if and only if there are homogeneous expectations
in the market and the individual utility functions satisfy the
following conditionsl)
(i) If a riskless income stream does not exist,
-l
U!(x) = xY
l
for all i
(ii) If a riskless income stream does exist
u .'(x) =
l
-l
(S. + yx) y
l
for all l
l)These utility functions are of course unlque only up to increasing
linear transformations.
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Proof:
We know that the market valuation functional is additive if and only
if the premises for the Market Valuation Theorem are satisfied. But
that means that the optimality conditions (l) or (2) must be satisfied
in the stock market. Consequently, the i-th individual's demand for
income in state 6 must be expressible as a linear combination of the
available ~ncome,stre~s, i.e.,
(3) d . (6) =
~
n
L (l ••X.(6)
. l ~J JJ=
+ m.~ for all 6En
where (l •• is the optimal proportion of the risky income stream j
~J
held by the i-th individual and mi is the i-th individual's demand
for riskless income (m. and (l •. are of course independent of 6).~ ~J
From the first-order conditions (l) we have that for the market valuation
functional to be additive in the stock market it is necessary and suffi-
cient that the utility functions satisfy
(4) f-'I1'.(6)U!(d.(6)) =~'I1'1(6)Ui(dl(6)) for all 6En and for all l.
i ~ ~ L l
where d.(6) must be of the linear form (3) and where the A. are expected
~ L
marginal utility of initial wealth. First of all we note that (3) and
(4) cannot hold true unless '11'.(6)are the same for all i so that homo-~
geneity of expectations is clearly necessary for the additivity property
to hold true in the stock market. We can demonstrate this by means of
a simple counter-example. To keep things as simple as possible, assume
one risky income stream X(6), one riskless income in the amount of M and
three states of the world, 6=1, 2, 3. Moreover, assume there are two
individuals and let individual l hold the share a of X(6) and the amount
m of the riskless income. The other is then holding (1-a)X(6) and M-m.
Assume (3) and (4) hold for heterogeneous expectations. That means
f- 'Il'1(6)Ui(aX(6) + m) = ~ 'I1'2(6)Ui«1-a)X(6) + M - m), 6 = 1,2,3.
l 2
This is a system of three equations ~n two variables a and m and con-
sequently overdetermined so that it does not have any solution unless
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all equations by chance should intersect åt the same point. This can
always be avoided by a suitable choice of subjective probabilities, For
if the above equations are satisfied for some class of utility functions
and some set of probability distributions possibly different for the two
individuals, then the above equations must be satisfied for any set of
Iprobability distributions for this particular class of utility functions
since otherwise probabilities and preferences would not be separable,
Consequently, we are free to choose any subjective probability distribution
and let us assume that ITl(l) > ITl(2) > ITl(3). Assume moreover that
X(l) < X(2) < X(3). Decreasing marginal utility implies that
"
,
Choosing ITi(l) = rr2(2) = e/2, IT2(3) = l - e, a < ~ < l, then we will have
for sufficiently small e that
.!C Ui «(l-a.)X(3)+M-m» > TI:- Ui «l-ct)X(2)+M-m)
2 2'
contradicting condition (4). This counter-example demonstrates the neces~
sity of homogeneous expectations for (3) and (4) to hold true for all sen.
Consequently, condition (4) reduces to
(5) k.U!(d.(S» = Ul'(dl(S» for all sen and for all i
1.1. 1. _
where the proportionality factor ki is given by Al/Ai'
In an Arrow~Debreu market prices and demand will only depend on total
social endowment in each'state and not on the particular pattern of risky
income streams making up the total endowment. That means in particular that
any zero~sum redistribution of income among risky income streams must
leave individual demand and prices unchanged if total social endowment
and the initial distribution of income remain unchanged. But this can
generally be true if and only if a .. are the same for all j. Hence, if
l.J
the necessary conditions for exchange optima as given by (l) are to hold
true in a stock market, the equilibrium demand vectors must be of the form
(6) d.(S) = a.Z(S) + m. for all i and for all sen.
1. 1. 1.
is.
If the valuation functional is to be additive in the stock market,
(S) and (6) must hold for any distribution of total social endowment
and for any initial distribution of income. To generate the para-
meters of the utility functions satisfying (S) and (6) we differentiate
these conditions with respect to total social endowment Z(8) and with
respect to the proportionality factor k. since the Lagrangian multi-~
pliers will be continuously differentiable functions of initial wealth.
This gives
for all 8en and for all ~,
k.U'.'(d.(8»a. = U'1'(dl(8»al and~ ~ ~ 1.
U! (d.(8» + k.U'.'(d.(8))[a .. Z (8) + m ..]
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~1.
where a and m denote partial derivatives of a and m with respectrs rs r r
to ks• Substituting from the first equation into the second, using
the fact that Z(8) = [d.(8)-m.]/a. and rearranging gives
1. 1. ~
(7)
U!(d.(8»~ ~ = y.d. (6) + S.
~ ~ 1.U'!(d.(8»~ ~
where y. _ k. tii _ali)
1. ~ ai al
If no riskless income stream exists lonthe market, the constant term
S. in (7) is clearly restricted to zero and except for a constant of~
integration the only solution of the differential equation (7) is given
by
(8)
-l/y.
U!(d.(8» = (d.(8» ~
~ ~ 1.
If a riskless income stream does exist, S. will be unrestricted and~
(7) will have the following solutions
16.
l- -- d.(6)S. ~~
(9) U!(d.(6)) •~ ~ -l/y.~CS. + Y·d.(6))~ ~ ~ otherwise
for y. = O~e
i
This concludes the necessity part of the proof. As for sufficiency, .
assume that we have homogeneous expectations and that the utility
functions belong to the class (8) or (9). It is then easy to verify
that,(S) and (6) are satisfied if and only if the S. is the same for~
all i and this completes the proof.
Consequently, we see that if no riskless income stream exists, the only
utility functions yielding additive valuation functionals in the stock
market are the constant relative risk aversive utility functions.l)
If a riskless income stream does exist, this class is enlarged to contain
all the linear risk tolerance utility functions which include the constant
relative risk aversive and the constant absolute risk aversive utility
functions as special cases.2) Also, we observe, not surprisingly, that
the utility functions listed in (i) and (ii) are those for which the stock
market brings about an unconstrained Pareto-optimal allocation of risk.3)
Homogeneity of expectations is, however, also necessary for this to hold.
What makes trouble for the additivity property of the market valuation
functional to be preserved in the stock market is the fact that if the con-
ditions (i) and (ii) of Corollary l are not satisfied and/or different in-
dividuals have different probability assessments for the various states of
the world, the market will not in general equate the marginal rates of
substitution between income in different states of the world for different
individuals implying that relative prices for state-contingent income
common to all individuals in the market do not exist. Individual exchange
optima are ~n that case constrained in various ways by the particular
pattern of the risky income streams and merging risky incomes will affect
l)The relative risk aversion function is defined as -U"Cx)x/U'(x).
2)The absolute risk aversion function is defined as _~r(x)/U'(x) and the
risk tolerance is defined as the inverse of the absolute risk aversion.
3)see i.a. Borch [2] and Mossin [6].
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the individuals' relative demand prices for state-contingent income
which indicates that aggregation is not possible. In that case
there should be no reason to expect that the value of a sum of two
income streams should be equal to the sum of their values unless
they are perfectly correlated.
From (6) we havethat for the class of preferences defined in
Corollary l, each individual will in equilibrium hold the same share
of all risky income streams. If all risky income streams were added
to form a mutual fund, the set of feasible trades would shrink down
to scalar multiples of the social endowment vector Z(8).
However, all individuals can obtain precisely the same pattern of
income across the states of the world as before by holding a. of the
l
shares of the mutual fund. In this case shares of the various income
streams can be considered as being perfectly complementary. To take
an analogy from the market for consumer goods, the equilibrium prices
for pairs of shoes should not change if rigttand left shoes were sold
separately in a perfect market with no transaction costs.
Portfolios consisting of equal shares of all risky lncome streams may
be called perfectly balanced portfolios. Clearly, the equilibrium
portfolios will be perfectly balanced if and only if there are homogeneous
expectations and the utility functions belong to the class given by (i)
and (ii). Consequently, the market valuation functional will be addi-
tive if and only if the equilibrium portfolios are perfectly balanced.
This result can be proved in a more direct way than Corollary l by just
studying the effects on the individual opportunity sets from adding
or splitting up risky income streams. Certainly, if adding or splitting
up risky income streams in the market shall have no effect on their
equilibrium prices, the individual demand vectors must be left unchanged.
Let us assume that two risky income streams are merged into one.
That means that the set of feasible trades shrinks down to a hyper-
plane in the n-dimensional Euclidean space. If the individual demands
shall be independent of merging two arbitrary income streams, the
individual demand vectors must be contained in the intersection of all
such hyperplanes formed by adding two arbitrary income streams. It is
18.
intersection of all such hyperplanes doesn _
the form A E X.(S), where A is some scalar.
j=l J
Hence the individual portfolios must be perfectly balanced. Certainly,
the same applies if the set of feasible t;rades is mapped into a sub-
trivial to verify that the
only consist of vectors of
space of dimension n - k + l by merging an arbitrary number
. . l . k . . l)or1g1na r1S y 1ncome streams 1nto one.
k of the
As for splitting up the existing risky income streams into substreams,
it is clear that if the splitting up were carried far enough, we would
end up with as many linearly independent incomes as there are states of
the world in which case the additivity property holds trivially in the
stock market. Otherwise, the above reasoning still applies. That means
if a risky income stream is split up into an arbitrary finite number of
substreams, the sum of the equilibrium values of the substreams will
equal the equilibrium value of the original stream if and only if the
equilibrium portfolios are all perfectly balanced.
We may also define additivity of the market valuation functional in a more
local sense by restricting it to a subset of the risky income streams. For
example V(aXjC6) + s~(e» = aV(Xj(6) + SV(~(6» for arbitrary scalars
a and S, if and only if the income streams j and k enter all individual
equilibrium portfolios with equal shares. Again, if the market value is
to be additive on the whole set of risky incomes, all the risky incomes
must enter the individual equilibrium portfolios with equal shares, that
is, perfectly balanced portfolios.
The property that all relevant market opportunities can be spanned by
the riskless income and an aggregate of all risky income streams (a
mutual fund) such that each individual can obtain his most preferred
pattern of income over states of the world by holding a certain share of
the aggregate risky income stream and the rest of his initial wealth in
the riskless income, is known as the market separation property.
I)A more general formulation would be to reorganize the original risky
incomes into, say, m mutual funds (m < n) and the equilibrium value
of the mutual funds would be equal to the equilibrium values of the
constituent risky incomes (assets) if and only if the equilibrium port-
folios are perfectly balanced.
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Separation in the individual's portfolio choice means that the optimal
portfolio decisions can be broken down into two stages: First one
determines the optimal asset proportions of the risky portfolio (which
will be independent of initial wealth) and then one allocates initial
wealth to the riskless asset and the risky portfolio in an optimal
way. Clearly, linear risk tolerance and homogeneous expectations are
necessaryand sufficient conditions for market separation to obtain.l)
Also market separation implies separation in the individual portfolios.
In order to see this, let o .. be the share of initial wealth W. allocated~J ~
to the risky portfolio, that individual i allocates to the j~th risky
asset (j-th risky income stream). That is,o .. = a ..V.!(W.-m.) where V.
~J ~J J ~ ~ J
is the market value of the j-th risky income (with the riskless income
as numeraire). The asset ratios in individual i's risky portfolio are
then given by o ../o·k = a ..v./a·kvk.~J ~ ~J J i.
brium portfolios must be perfectly balanced and hence
Assuming market separation equili-
o .. lo .k = V. /Vk~J. ~ J
for all i. That means that asset ratios in the risky portfolio must
be equal to the market value ratios of the risky assets. Hence, asset
proportions in the individual risky portfolios must be the same for all
individuals and thus independent of initial wealth. That means also
that in this case the price structure of risky assets must be independent
of the distribution of initial wealth.
Letting a .. be the demand for risky asset j by individual i in terms of
~J
the numeraire, it is clear that asset shares in the risky portfolio will
be independent of initial wealth if asset demand functions take the
form
a .. = lJ •• + 11..w.
~J ~J ~J ~
where lJ·. and 11·. are independent of W. and lJ .. 11·k = lJ.k11.. for all j~J ~J ~ ~J ~ ~ ~J
and k and as shown in [3], asset demand functions linear in initial wealth
is also necessary for separation. In that case asset shares in the risky
portfolios are given by
l)For a more detailed discussion on market separation, see Cass and
Stiglitz [3].
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1.J
a ..
Ol l.J Ol
Ea'k
k l.
n.. (u, . /n .. +W. )
l.J l.J l.J 1.
En. k (~.l.kIn. k+W' )kl. l. 1. l.
11 . • J.l..
= ..2:.L Ol ..2:.L
En'k EJ.l·kkl. kl.
Moreover from the fact that equilibrium portfolios must be perfectly
balanced we have that
and hence the parameters J.l •• and n .. mus~ be independent of i. Thus,
l.J l.J
market separation implies that asset demand functions are of the form
(10) a .... J.l. + n·W,
l.J J J l.
wi th u ,n, ..u, n ' . Hence, if ].1- = a for one j , it has to be zero for allJ ~ ~ J J
J and the same must hold for n· . Thus, linear asset demand functions ofJ
the form (10) is a necessary condition for market separation and hence
also for additivity of stock market values and together with homogeneous
expectations it can also be shown to be sufficient. l) vIe can then state
necessary and sufficient conditions for additivity of stock market values
in terms of properties of asset demand functions.
,
Coro llary 2:
If there are more states of the world than linearly independent
income streams, it is necessary for additivity of stock market
values that individual asset demand functions are linear in ini-
tial wealth and taken together with homogeneous expectations this
is also sufficient.
l)If n. == O for all J, demand for risky assets wil1 be completely wealth-
J
inelastic and the utility function must exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion. If J.lj = a for all j, demand for risky assets has a unitary
wealth elasticity and the utility function must exhibit constant re....
lative risk aversion. In the general case it can be shown (see (3])
that asset demand functions linear in initial wealth implies that
utility functions must exhibit linear risk tolerance.
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As noted earlier, additivity of stock market values may be considered
as an aggregation property and in particular, linear risk tolerance
utility functions will imply homogeneous separation in the risky assets
in which case we already know from conventional consumer theory that
two-stage budgeting will be optimal which in the portfolio context is
the same as portfolio separation. Also, the conditions of Corollary 2
correspond to the general conditions for aggregation over consumers
in commodity markets, namely, linearity and equal slope of individual
Engel curves.
Finally we would like to point out yet another implication of our
Market Valuation Theorem:
Corollary 3:
If there are more states of the world than securities with
linearly independent returns, the market values of firms in
a competitive market for stocks and bonds will be independent
of their capital structures in case of default risk if and only
if there are homogeneous expectations in the market and the
conditions (i) and (ii) of Corollary l are satisfied.l)
Proof:
Consider gross earnin~as being divided into two risky income streams,
one going to the shareholders and the other to the bondholders. Corollary
l implies that the total market value of a firm is independent of how
the gross earnings are split up into the two substreams and the result
is immediate.
The widely held opinion2) that in a perfect capital market the market
values of firms are independent of their capital structures is therefore
l)This is the Modigliani-Miller theorem for the case of a non-zero default
risk in each firm. See [5].
2)See La. Fama and Miller [4], Hossin [6] and Schall [71.
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not correct in general. From a theoretical point of view the perfect
capital market assumption is not sufficient to make market values of
firms independent of how they have been financed. In fact, homogeneous
expectations and condition (i) and (ii) of Corollary l are taken to-
gether both necessary and sufficient for the market values of firms to be
independent of their capital structures in the case of risky debt.
The set of feasible trades in a market for stocks and risky bonds and
thus the individual opportunity sets will be dependent on the financial
arrangements in the various firms. It follows from this that in general
the productive and financial decisions of a firm cannot be separated.
More precisely, homogeneous expectations and condition (i) and (ii) of
Corollary l are necessary and sufficient for separation of financial and
productive decisionSin the case of a non-zero default risk in each firm.l)
To give an intuitive explanation- for- this, we recall the fact that if.
there are homogeneous expectations in the market and (i) and (ii) of
Corollary l are satisfied, each individual fNill in equilibrium hold the
-same share of all the risky assets in the market (including risky bonds).
Then it is ob.vious that the.relevant individual opportunity sets must De.
independent of tne specific capital structures in tna various
firms. That means that in this case each individual can obtain his pre-
ferred distribution of income over the states of the world for any set
of financial arrangements so that changing the firms' capital structures
will not chang~ the individuals' demand for income in the various states
of the world and consequently prices and values must remain unchanged.
It follows from this that, however determined, the market value of a
particular firm must- be independent of its specific capital structure.
As is well known, if one imposes the restriction of a zero default risk
in each_ firm for all relevant debt levels, the irrelevancy of capital
structures for the market values of firms in perfect capital markets will
hold quite universally without imposing any restrictions on the structure
of preferences and the nature of expectations. This result can be given
a very intuitive explanation within the context of the present paper.
l)The separation theorem of Fama and Miller [4] is therefore not generally
correct unless one imposes the quite restrictive conditions or
Coro llary 1.
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With no default risk a fixed amount is sliced off from the gross
earnings in each state of the world for each firm and distributed as
a riskless income. We assume again that the vectors of gross earnings
X.(S) are linearly independent. The maximum debt liability of firm j
J
is given by Min{X.(6)}. Assume that the j-th firm is increasing its
6e:n J
debt level by ~d., that is, firm j is converting ~d. of its stock into
J J
debt. That means that we are slicing off the additional amount (l+r)~d.
J
from each component of X.(6). (r is the rate of interest). This will
J
not change the set of feasible trades in the market. So by a suitable
readjustment of the individual portfolios the individuals can obtain
precisely the same income distribution over the states of the world
as before. For the i-th individual there is a unique way of reproducing
his income distribution, namely by increasing his bond holdings by
~ ..~d. while keeping the proportions he owns of the firms' stock un-
lJ J
changed (~.. is the proportion individual i owns of the shares of the
lJ
firm j). For the stock market to clear this requires that the indi-
viduals must reduce their share holdings ln the firm j by the same
amount, i.e., ~.~~d .. Consequently, in the new market equilibrium
1J J
the market value of firm j's stock has been reduced by r~.. ~d. = ~d.
i lJ J J
while the market value of firm j's bonds has been increased by the
same amount leaving the total market value of the firm unchanged. The
same holds if the j-th firm converts debt into stock so that the
above reasoning may be considered as a simple proof of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem [5]. However, as has been shown in the present paper,
if we relax the non-default risk assumption we have to impose quite
severe restrictions on the individuals' market behaviour for the
Modigliani-Miller theorem still to obtain.
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Default Risk, Homemade Leverage, and the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem: Note
By KÅRE P. HAGEN*
In the March 1974 issue of this Review
David Baron uses a stochastic dominance
argument in an attempt to prove that the
Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem is gener-
ally valid even in case of default risk. For
this purpose he uses the familiar two-firm
paradigm where both firms have identical
probability distributions for gross returns,
and one firm has some debt in its capital
structure whereas the other firm is financed
entirely by equity capital. II all equity in-
vestors in the levered firm also hold bonds in
that firm or if all investors can borrow at the
same nominal interest rate as firms, then he
shows that in equilibrium both firms must
have the same total market value.
Although there is nothing formally wrong
in his arguments, Baron does not prove what
he sets out to prove. What he proves seems
to be the (fairly obvious) fact tha.t at an
equilibrium in a perfect capital market two
firms with identical probability distributions
for gross returns must have the same total
market value. This does not imply, however,
that the equilibrium value of a firm is in-
dependent of its capital structure. In fact,
the common market value of the two firms
will in general be dependent on the debt-
equity ratio in the levered firm. To show
this a simple counterexample will suffice.
I
The conventional one-period model where
investors invest at the beginning of the
period while returns materialize at the end
is used with the following notations:
XiC8):IIgross returns in firm j if state
of the world 8 obtains, 8En,
where n is the state space
Rj(8) == returns to equity in fum j in
state 8
* Assistant professor of economics, The Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration.
Bi(8) == returns to bondholders in firm
j in state 8
Dr- total debt liability in firm j
(principal plus interest pay-
ments due at the end of the
period)
aii ==the fraction investor i holds of
the shares of firm j
l3ii= the fraction investor i holds of
the bonds issued by firm j
Sj-market value oi firmj's equity
Bj-market value of firmj's bonds
Vj-Sj+Bj= total market value of firmj
Yi(8) == investor i's final wealth in
state 8
Wi==investor i's initial wealth
1I"i(8)= investor i's probability assess-
ments
Ui(Yi(8» =investor i's utility function
(strictly concave)
Clearly,
R;(e) =- Max [O, Xj(8) - DjJ
Bj(8) == Min [Dit Xj(8)]
and Xj(8) == Rj(8) + Bj(8) for all 8 E n
Two firms with identical gross return pat-
terns over states of the world are assumed,
i.e., X(8):II Xj(8) for a.ll8En, j == l, 2. Firm l
is financed entirely by equity capital such
that Vi-51, while the total debt liability in
fum 2 is D,. Short selling of stocks and bonds
is generally possible. If l3,j< 0, investor i
is issuing bonds with the same return char-
acteristics as those issued by firm j. More-
over, riskJess lending and borrowing are
available to the investors at a zero interest
rate. Each investor owns initially a fraction
Oi of each firm and investors are assumed to
rank portfolios according to expected utility
of final wealth.
Define n(D2) _ (8 E ni X(8) ~ D2t
and n(D:) _ f:l\n(D:)
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i.e., !l(.o,) are the states of the world in
which firm 2 goes bankrupt.
Using the budget constraint, final wealth
can be written as (la) if 8En or (lb) if 8En.
(la) Yi(6) - W.+a.t(X(8)- Vt)+a'2(X(6)-S~)
-!3iz8z+(8i2-aiZ) D~
(lb) Y.(8) - W.+CX1I(X(8)- VI)
+J3iz(X(8)-8z) -a'~2
where W.= 6i(VI+ Vz).
The first-order conditions for optimal
portfolios for all i can be written as:
(2) V l - 2: w;(6) X(8)
HæQ
(3) S2 -. 2: wi(8)(X(8) - D2)
IEl1(Dt)
(4) 82 == 2: wi(8)D2
fE!iC.Dtl
+ 2: wi(8)X(8)
fEQ(Dtl
11'.(9)li;( Y,(8»
where wi(8) 51 -=--~_.;.~-2: 1I'i(8)U: (Yi(8»
HæQ
The conditions (2), (3), and (-t) together
with the market-clearing conditions 2:, aii =
1, 2:, (3,j == 1 for all i, characterize an equili-
brium in the capital markej,
The term wi(9) is investor i's marginal
rate of substitution between a unit return in
state 8 and a unit of riskless return. Hence,
wi(8) can be interpreted as the implicit price
in terms of the riskless asset investorYls
willing to pay for a claim to a unit return
contingent on state 8. As the price ai a unit
of riskless return is 2:fEQ wi(8) - 1, the risk-
less asset is a. numeraire,
As can be seen from (2), (3), and (4),
VZ-S:+B2- VI so that the two firms will
in equilibrium always have the same market
value. But this common market value will in
genera.l depend on the debt level in the
levered firm unless wi(8) is independent of
D2 for all 8 and for all i. Hence we have the
immediate result that the market value of
the two firms is independent of the leverage
in the levered firm if and only if wi(8) does
not dependon Dz for all 8 and for all i.
I
If the market structure were complete,
i.e., there are as many securities with linearly
independent return patterns as states of the
world, the return pattern on the optimal
portfolios would be independent of the return
. structure of the individual securities in which
.I case wi(8) would clearly be independent of
Dz• Moreover, irrespective of the complete-
ness of the market structure, if O(D'!) == q, for
any relevant .o, (no default risk), then 82-
.o, from (4) sa that .o, drops out of (1) which
again would imply w.(9) to be independent
of .0,.
In general, with incomplete markets and
default risk in the levered firm, w.(8) will be
independent of Dz if and only ii !3iz=aiz for
all i as can be seen from (1). Hence, in an
economy with incomplete markets for risk,
a sufficient condition for firm values to be
dependent on leverage is a nonzero default
risk and that investors in equilibrium hold
different fractions of the equity and bonds
ai the levered firm (a;2~Pil).
II
A numerical example may be in order to
illustrate the above point. Assume two inves-
tors each of .whom ownsinitially SO percent
at each firm, i.e., Wt==W2-0 ..5Vt+O.5V~.
The utility functions are assumed to be given
by Ut(Y1):II Yt-Yf/i30 and U2(Y1) = Y1
- Y~8iO. First it is assumed that both
firms are financed entirely by equity capital
so that Vj-Sj,i=:l, 2. Riskless lending and
borrowing at a zero interest rate are avail-
able for both investors. There are three
differen t states of the world labelled 1, 2,
and 3. It is postulated that the following data
are given:
8 2 3
XI(8) -X,(8)
TI(8)
",,(8)
300
1/4
1/2
lS0
1/2
1/4
200
1/4
1/4
It is fairly easy to verify that the equilibrium
solution is given by au=au= 1/3, au=a~==
2/3, Vt- Vz= 193.8.
The above example is now modified such
that the firm labelled 2 is financed both by
equity and debt. In all other respects the
relevant data are the same as above. It is
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assumed that D~"'"160. Clearl y D~/Bt will be
the gross nominal interest rate on firm 2's
bonds. Investors are assumed to be able to
issue bonds on the same terms as firms. That
means that investors can issue bonds with
the same return characteristics as those of
firm 2 at the same nominal interest rate. A
personal bond issue takes place if {3i2<O.
Moreover, riskless lending and borrowing at
a zero interest rate are still available.
The total returns to shareholders and
bondholders of the two firms will now be as
follows:
2 3
XI(B) -RI(B)
R,(B)
B,(B)
Xz(B)
ISO
O
ISO
150
200
40
160
200
300
140
t60
300
As can be seen from the table, firm 2 goes
bankruptin state 1 so that there is a positive
probability for bankruptcy for both inves-
tors. It is assumed again that each investor
holds initially 50 percent of each firm, that
is, 50 percent of the shares of firm l and 50
percent of the shares and bonds of firm 2.
After some tedious calculations, it is
found that an equilibrium is characterized
by
Vl-Sl - 195
S! - 40
B2 - 1.55
V% - s, + B~ = 195
(Xu =- - 6 - {3u
(Xu - (20 + 3(312)/3
{312 - arbitrary
(Xu - 7 + {312
(Xu - - (17 + 3{3u)/3
{322 - 1 - {3u
As can be seen, the optimal portfolios are
not unique. This is due to the fact that there
are four securities with different return pat-
terns (including the riskless opportunity)
and just three states of the world. Only three
of these return patterns are linearly inde-
pendent. Hence, the investors can obtain
their most preferred pattern of final wealth
over states of the world by combining these
four securities in an infinite number of ways.
Note, however, that for any choice of {312,
(X;2.a{3i2, i-l, 2. For example, for ;312""'-6,
the solution is:
(Xu = °
(X12 - 2/3
{312 = - 6
(Xn = 1
(Xu = 1/3
{3~: = 7
The nominal interest rate on risky bonds,
(D~/B'l-1) 100, is 100/31 percent. Investor 1
issues six times the amount of risky bonds
issued by fum 2 with the same return char-
acteristics at the same nominal interest rate.
The individual transactions corresponding to
the above portfolios are summarized below:
Borrowing ( - )/
Shareholdings Lending (+)
Finn 1 Finn 2 Riskless Risky
Investor 1
Investor 2
Total
o
195
195
80/3 3295/3
40/3 -3295/3
40 O
-930
1085
1.55
The notable point in the above example is
that although VL== V~=195, this common
value is different from the case where both
firms were- financed by equity capital only.'
III
Consider in general a one-period exchange
economy with s states of the world and n
firms with gross returns denoted by .;(1(8),
8E~1Investor i's income pattern over states
of the world at the end of the period is given
by
(5) "Yi(8) "" L (X,jRi(8)
i-l
"+ L {3ijBj(8) + rm«, 8 E n
i-l
where mi denotes riskless lending or borrow-
ing and r is one plus the riskless rate of inter-
est. If {3ii< 0, investor i is issuing risky bonds
I In fact, if the levered finn in the above example
borrows at least as much as to make the default risk
positive, the values of the two firms will be independent
oi the particular debt level in the levered finn because
we then have as many linearly independent securities
as states of the world (complete markets).
I
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EFFICIENT CRITERIA FOR DECENTRALIZED INVESTMENT DECISIONS
IN A STOCK MARKET ECONOMY 1)*)
1. Introduction
In the present paper we shall examine the efficiency properties of the
stock'market allocation of investment in an economy with stock value
maximizing firms and where the only source of uncertainty is the stochas-
tic relationship between input and output, so-called technological un-
certainty.
Clearly, efficient allocation of investment resources will depend on
the possibilities in the economy for redistributing risk associated with
production which in turn depends on the institutional structure of the
capital market. As shown by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959), if there exist
perfect markets for claims on incomes contingent on states of the world,
i.e., complete markets, all the efficiency properties of the competitive
economy under certainty will carry over to the uncertainty case.
In the absence of a complete set of markets - one market for each contin-
gency - the market structure is said to .be incomplete if the existing
market opportunities do not span the market opportunities in the corre-
sponding Arrow-Debreu economy. One such example which will be examined
here is the stock market trading in risky securities, or claims to return
patterns over states of the world. As is well-known, if there are fewer
securities with linearly independent returns than states of the world, some
feasible risk allocations in an Arrow-Debreu economy will be infeasible in
the stock market economy. Hence, the stock market allocation of risk may
be inefficient in the Arrow-Debreu sense.
As tÆ stocknarket;will in geæral provide an incomplete set of instruments for
redistributing risk associated with production, efficiency in the Arrow-
Debreu sense will not be a particularly useful criterion by which to evaluate
1) This paper is a substantially revised version of Discussion Paper 09/74
with the same title.
*) The author is indebted to Karl Borch and Jan :lossin for useful comments"
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allocation of resources in such cases. It seems more useful to define alloca-
tive efficiency relative to the risk distributive ins:ruments in fact available.
In the present paper we shall follow Diamond (1967) and define Pareto
efficient allocations of investment resources in a stock market economy
subject to the constraint that risky returns have to be distributed to
consumers through a stock market trading .in shares of risky firms.
nHs is certainly a constrained optimum o'ra second-best allocation
subject to the institutional structure of the capital market. It has,
however, the advantage that we are comparing the market allocation with
what is in fact attainable, i.e., we restrict the efficiency concept to
the set of attainable allocations.
Diamond (1967) is the seminal paper on allocative efficiency of
a decentralized stock market economy where it is shown that for a parti-
cular structure of technological uncertainty value maximization wO.uld
guide competitive firms to choose efficient investment plans. This
result was later critid:zed by Stiglitz (l972a), Jensen and Long (1972)
and Fama (1972) vbc demonstrated in a mean-variance framework that stock
value maximization w~uld not lead to allocative efficiency in the invest-
ment market. These resu~ts lead some authors to question value maximi-
zation as a sound basis for firms' investments since it might not be
consistent with the shareholders' interests. In particular, Ekern and
Wilson (1974), Leland (1974a) and Radner (1974) claimed that value
maximization might not be unanimously supported by a firm's shareholders.
In the present paper we shall argue that the fundamental obstacle to
efficiency of the competitive market mechanism under technological un-
certainty is the fact that investment decisions will in the general case
have external effects in incomplete markets for which there do not exist
well-defined market prices. In such cases there do not even seem to be any
natural definition of competitive behaviour in the investment market. More-
over, we shall argue that in the presence of externalities shareholders will
typically disagree on the desirability of any investment plan including the
'Pareto optimal one. On the other hand, when these externalities are absent
or do not affect shareholders' optima, value maximization by competitive
firms is well-defined and will lead to allocative efficiency and shareholders
will always support value maximization which, of course, is what one should
expect from conventional welfare theory.
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The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some
properties of exchange equilibria in complete and incomplete markets,
and in section 3 we establish under what conditions value maximization
will lead to Pareto efficiency in the investment market and in section 4
these results are discussed in some more detail within the mean-variance
framework. Section 5 is devoted to the problem of finding under what
conditions unanimity will prevail among the shareholders about the
desirability of a firm's investment plan and under what conditions per-
ceived and actual value maximizationare in the shareholders' int~rests.
II. Market allocations of risky returns
We start out with a brief discussion on some well-known properties of the
market allocation of risky returns. First some notation and assumptions.
There are assumed to be J firms indexed j and S different states of the
world indexed s and firm j is characterized by gross returns z. ~n state
JS
s which are supposed to materialize at the end of the period. There are
hH consumers indexed h and consumer h receives an income amounting to c
s
on his portfolio in state s, and portfolio returns are assumed to be the
only source of income. The set of income vectors ch = (ch,..•,c~)' are
supposed to be completely ordered by expected utility ~ p~(c~) ~ Eh(Uh),'
where ph is consumer hIs subjective probability for state s to obtain and uh
s his hIs utility function defined on the set of income patterns c .
each h, Uh is supposed to be strictly quasi-concave with aUh/dch æs
For
Uh > 0,
s
s=l, •••,S •
If there were a complete set of markets, the feasible income space, or
the set of attainable income vectors, would be an S-dimensional rectangle
in the positive orthant of the S-dimensional Euclidean
the total returns in each state of the world. Letting
as of now for a unit income in state sand wh initials
consumer h in state s, a pure exchange equilibrium in
space bounded by
~ denote the prices
endowment for each
an economy with a
complete set of markets is given by consumer optimum for each h,
subject to
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and market clearing in each state,
t ch = r z. ,
li s j JS
s=L, .•• ,S
First-order conditions for interior consumer optima are given by
(l)
where Ah is expected marginal utility of initial wealth.
As usual for exchange economies without money, the market determines rela-
tive prices only and we normaliz~by fixing a price of l for a riskless
return pattern yielding r units of income in each state. This is equi-
riskless rate of interest at r - l per cent, i.e.,
normalization (l) can be rewritten as
valent with fixing the
r 'IT = lir. With thiss s
huh
(2)
Ps s
'IT=r hUhr ss Ps s
The left-hand side of (2) is the marginal rate of substitution between
income in state s and the riskless income for consumer h - or alternatively,
consumer hIs G~rshallian) demand price for a unit of income in state s in
terms of the numeraire. In equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution
are equated to the equilibrium prices for all consumers and hence the equi-
librium allocation in an Arrow-Debreu market economy is Pareto-efficient
in the unconstrained sense.
Turning to the stock market economy we assume that riskless lending and
borrowing are available at the riskless rate of interest. We let
ah = (a~, .•.,a~)1 denote the vector of shareholdings of consumer h with
a~ denoting the number of shares held in firm j by consumer h.
J
x. = (X.1' •.• ,X.S) denotes the vector of state-dependent returnsper shareJ J J
in firm J, i.e., X. = z. Ia. where a. is the total number of shares issued
JS JS J J
by firm J.
hLetting m denote the amount of riskless bonds bought (issued, if nega-
tive) by consumer h, an attainable.income pattern in a stock market economy
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will be given by
(3) h h hc = rm + E a. X.
s j J JS
or in matrix notation
(3' ) h h h(c )' = rm el + (a ) IX
where X is a (JxS)-matrix',with rows consisting of the J return vectors
X. and e is the unity vector (l, ..•,1)' (transposed vectors denote row
J
vectors) .
The rows of the matrix X will be assumed to be linearly independent.
Together with the strict quasi-concavity of Uh, this will ensure that
expected utility Eh(uh) will be strictly quasi-concave in the de~ision
. bl h hvar~a es m , a ..
J
It is clear from (3') that the set of attainable income patterns in a
stock market economy generates a linear subspace, the dimension of which
is determined by the humber of linearly independent rows of X. Conse-
quently, if there are more states of the world than linearly independent
return patterns, some attainable income patterns in an economy with a
complete set of markets will not be attainable in a stock market economy
in which case the stock market is said to be incomplete.
Letting the vector v = (vI' •.•,vJ)' denote share prices, a stock market
exchange - or financial - equilibrium is determined by consumer optima
subject to the budget constraints
(ah) IV = wh (= initial wealth),
a
and by the market clearing conditions
hE a. = a.,
h J J
j=l, •..,J.
Substituting the budget constraint into \31) and ignoring the fact that
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h. . bl d i f . . l)a. are lnteger varla es, necessary con ltlons or lnterlor consumer
J
optima are given by
(4) -rv. E phUh + E phuhx. = O
J s s s s s s JS
vector (-rvl,·.·, -rvJ)' ash h~h hcomponents u = E p-~ , u-o s ss-s
order conditions in matrix notation as
If we define the (JxS+l)-matrix (-rv,X) as the matrix X augmented by the
the first column and the (lxS+l)-vector uh with
= P~ u~, s=l, ••.,S, we can write the first-
3Eh(Uh) h---~--'- = (-rv, X) ;! = O
3ah
We define the (S+l)x(S+l)-matrix £h by
(4' ) (a column vector)
h hPl UIS
E Phuhls s s
r h Uh
s Ps s5
By strict quasi-concavity of uh and full row rank of X, the (JxJ)-matrix
of second-order derivatives2)
(5) 3
2Eh(Uh)
3ah (3ah),
= h(-rv,X),!! (rv,X)'
is negative definite and the second-order maximum condi tions are therefore
satisfied.
h h hIf we define n = (nl, •..,nS) as the vector of marginal rates of substitu~
l) We shall in this paper ignore possible constraints on shortselling.
2) If x and yare column vectors, 3x/ay' will denote the matrix with entry
3~/aYl in k-th row and the l-th column.
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tion between incomes in the various states of the world and the numeraire
asset (the riskless asset yielding r units of income in each state), i.e.
we have from (4) for each consumer
(6) E rrhx.s s JS = v.J
or alternatively in matrix form from (4')
(6') hXrr - v
Clearly, - E rr~.s s J s for all h .
Thus,. condition (6) implies that at a stock market equilibrium, the indi-
vidual marginal rates of substitution between shares are equated to their
relative prices for all consumers and hence, the stock market allocation of
shares, or claims to risky return patterns, is Pareto efficient. In general.
however, condition (6) does not imply equalization of marginal rates of
substitution between state-contingent income so that the stock market
allocation may be a constrained optimum.
There will, however, be special cases where the stock market allocation
is Pareto efficient in the unconstrained sense. Clearly, this will be the
case if the equilibrium allocation in an Arrow-Debreu economy is attainable
in a stock market economy. This will obtain if and only if at least one
of the following two conditions are satisfied.
(i) There are as many securities with linearly independent return
patterns as states of the world.
(ii) There are homogeneous expectations (ph are the same for all h)
s
and the consumers' utility functions exhibit the separation
property.
Condition (i) is obvious since in that case the attainable income space
in an Arrow-Debreu economy is spanned by the rows of X and the riskless
income. Condition (ii) means that all consumers can obtain their most
Ja.
preferred income patterns by allocating their initial wealth to the risk-
less asset and a risky portfolio with asset proportions independent of
initial wealth (portfolio separation) and with homogeneous expectations
the asset proportions in the risky portfolio will be the same for all indi-
viduals. That implies that in equilibrium each consumer will hold the
same share of the total amount of every risky asset and thus all risky
assets can be aggregated or pooled into a,.mutual fund without changing the
r~levant individual opportunity sets and hence the incompleteness of the
market st;ructure will not constrain the consumer behaviour in the stock
market. If all consumers are ranking portfolios according to expected
utility, it can be shownl) that this aggregation property will obtain for
any state-distribution of risky returns if and only if consumers have identi-
cal probability distributions over states of the world and their preferences
exhibit linear risk tolerance with equal slope for all consumers. On the
other hand, if we restrict probability distributions for risky returns to
be jointly normal, portfolio separa.tion, and hence the aggregat ion property,
will obtain without any restrictions on preferences.
The results of the present paper are stated without' any a priori restric-
- tions on probability distributions for risky returns. It is, however, clear
that all results which are dependent on utility functions exhibiting the
separation property, will also be valid for arbitrary preferences if we
restrict probability distributions for risky returns to be jointly normal.
The marginal rate of substitution rrhfor consumer h - or his e1arshallian)s
demand price for income in state s - will be called consumer h's implicit
price for
come is Es
income in
income in state s. The implicit price for a unit of riskless in-
h
TT * lIr for all h since the riskless asset yielding r units ofs
each state is used as a numeraire. Clearly, if the different
individual implicit prices for state-contingent income associated with a
stcck market equilibrium were imposed on consumers in an economy with a com-
plete set of markets, the resulting equilibrium allocation in the Arrow-
Debreu market would in fact coincide with the competitive stock market allo-
cation if the distribution of initial wealth were the same in the t~o situa-
tions. This follows from the uniqueness of consumer optima as the budget
stock market equilibrium the budget
= E rrh(rmh + E a~X. ) = E rrhch = wh,
s s ] ] JS S S S o
constraints would be the same since at a
constraint can be written as !Ilh E h+ a.v.
j ] ]in view of (6) •
l) See i.a. Cass & Stiglitz (1970) and Mossin (1977) for a proof and more
detailed discussion on separation.
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Clearly, if the stock market allocation is Pareto efficient in the uncon-
strained sense, the bnplicit prices must be the same for all consumers
and identical with the corresponding Arrow-Debreu market prices.
III. Efficiency criteria for finns'investment in a stock market economy.
Most models of stock market allocation of investment resources are of the
-two-period typewhere the consumer in the first period decides how much
to consume in that period and allocates the rest of his resources to the
various firms in exchange for shares and bonds which in turn determine
his second-period consumption pat tern over states of the world. We shall,
however, stick to our one-period model andassume that first-period con-
sumption decisions have already been made such that the total amount of
resources available for investment is given. Suppressing first-period
consumption decisions means simply that the riskless rate of interest cannot
be endogeneously determined.
Some economistsl) have argued that competitive firms should maximize stock
market values as a criterion for optbnal investment. That is, firms should
use stock market prices when calculating the values of marginal return
patterns on new investment. It is well known2) that under certainty and
with perfect capital markets efficient allocation of investment requires
that firms maximize present values regardless of the owners' preferences.
The same must clearly hold true under uncertainty in an economy with a com-
plete set of markets. It is, however, by no means obvious that this kind
of separation of productive and distributive efficiency should carryover
to the uncertainty case in a stock market economy with an incomplete set of
markets. In fact we shall see that the concept of competitive behaviour
becomes somewhat blurred when security markets are incomplete. Also, in
that case firms' investment decisions will have certain external effects
in the market pointing to likely inefficiency of decentralized market
behaviour.
3)We assume throughout the paper that the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds
l) See i.a. Diamond (1967) and Mossin (1969), (1973).
2) See Fisher (1930).
3) See Miller and Modigliani (1958).
40.
so that firms' equilibrium values are independent of how they finance their
investments. If not, the market value of a firm would depend on the way it
distributes its investment returns in the capital market as the setof
attainable income patterns over states of the world might change wit.h
different financial policies of the firm displacing consumers'
optima in the stock market. This would work very much like an externality
in. the market indicating inefficiency of the competitive market mechanism.
It.is well knownl) that if firms borrow under default risk the tfudigliani-
Miller theorem will obtain under the same conditions as those under which
the stock market allocation of risky returns is efficient in the unconstrained
sense. Thus, strictly speaking, separation of financial and production
decisions is legitimate only if the relevant individual opportunity sets are
unaffected by the firms' financial decisions which will be the case with
complete markets or if consumers have identical beliefs and utility functions
exhibiting the separation property. If there is no default risk, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem is of course always valid.
As the market values of firms are supposed to be independent of their
capital st~uctures, we can with no loss of generality assume that firms
finance their investments by issuing new shares. Firms are supposed to
maximize the market value of initial interests, i.e., V.-I. with V. æ a.v.
J J J J J
(or equivalently, the price per share for initial shareholders) where 1. de-
J
notes the amount of investment measured in terms of the numeraire and v. ~s
J
total market value divided by the number of outstanding shares.
If we let Z. (I.) æ a.X. (I.) denote firm j's total return in state s when
_. JS J J JS J
the åmount of investment is 1., we have from (6) that the eauilibrium value ofJ •
firm j is given by
(7) h . hV. æ a ;v. = l: 71'a.X. (I.) æ E 71'z. (I.),
J J J s s J JS J S S JS J
h=l, ...,H.
Firms are supposed to behave as price takers which in this context will be
understood to mean that the firm takes the implicit prices for state-contingent
income, 71'h,as given and independent of its investment decisions. This corre-s
sponds to Leland's definition of a comoletely competitive capital market (Lelandl
1) See La. Hagen (1976), Stiglitz (1969).
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(1974b» and in view of (6) it implies that the firm considers the price
per share with a given return distribution as independent of its invest-
ment decisions and hence also of the number of outstanding shares. which
seems to be a natural behavioural requirement in a competitive capital
market. Also. the above definition of price-taking implies that the
firm considers its market value to be linearly homogeneous in state-
contingent returns. That means that if the return pattern of some firm
is scaled by some scalar, the firm believes that its stock market value
is scaled by the same scalar since this can be seen as scaling (by the
given scalar) the amount sold of shares with a given return distribution.
With the above definition of price-taking, maximization of stock market
value of initial interests yields the first-order conditions
(8) r rrh z~ (r.) = l for all hs s J s J
and assumingthat all feasible investment plans (I..z.l(I.) ..... z.5(1.»).J J J S+l J. J,belong to a closed and strictly convex nroduction set in R , the second-
order conditions for a maximum are also satisfied.
Condition (8) says that firm j should increase investment until the market
value of the marginal return pattern for each consumer equals marginal
investment cost (recalling that investment is a numeraire) • The trouble
with the investment rule (8) from an applied point of view is that.i.tpre-
supposes that the firm knows or is able to compute the implicit prices rrh•s
However, in the general case these prices are not revealed in the stock
market or cannot be computed from stock market values unless the matrix X
is quadratic in which case rrh= X-Iv from (6').
Turning to efficiency and restricting return distribution rules to the
linear form (3) (constrained efficiency), a Pareto efficient allocation
can be determined as a solution to the following constrained maximization
problem.
Max
h hm ,{a,},r,
J J
subject to the constraints
h(A are arbitrary positive weights)
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h h h s=l, .•.,Sc = rm + E a.X. (I.)s j J JS J
E h Om =
h
h Market clearingr a. = a. j=l, ...,J conditions.h J J
t L E -h dh. 'th amount of= I l.S e
J J h investment resources
supplUd by consumer h
- a given constant) •
First of all we note that although the individual utility functions are
strictly quasi-concave in a~, they need not be jointly quasi-concave in
h J ha. and I. since the equation defining c need not be jointly concave in
~ J s
a· and I.. Hence, a global optimum may not be reached through partial mar-
J J
ginal variations of the decision variables and the first-order maximum
conditions may only define a local optimuml) (excluding the possibility of
a stationary point being a saddlepoint).
The first-order optimum conditions are given by
a) AhE hUh = CL h=L, ... ,Hs Ps s r
(9) b) A~ phuhx. (I.) = S. j=l, .••,Js s s JS J J h=L, •.. ,H
c) h h hx' h j=l, ...,JE A E p U . (I.)a . = yh s S s JS J J
where CL, S. and yare the relevant Lagrangean multipliers associated with
J
the market clearing constraints. Since the first-order conditions are
linearly homogeneous in Ah and the Lagrangean multipliers, we normalize2)
by choosing y/CL=l. Thus,from (9a) and (9c) the I.-order condition for
(locally) efficient investment in the risky firm j can be written as
(lO) hE a. E
h J s
E a~ r 'Tl"hx: (I.) =
h J s s JS J E CL~ z 'Tl"h Z: (I.) = lh J s s JS J
h h h/ .were CL. = a. a. l.S the fraction of the total number
J J J
allocated to consumer h so that E CL~ = l for all j.
h J
of shares in firm j
l) See Dreze (1972) and (1974) for a detailed discussion on the problem
of non-convexity in this context.
2) That means, we consider the particular Pareto efficient allocation for
which y/a=l.
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The term r ~~: (I.) may be interpreted as consumer h's marginal rate of
s s JS J ,
substitution between claims to the marginal risky return vector Xj(Ij)
and claims to the riskless return yielding r units of income in each
state (the numeraire) . Hence, Pareto efficiency requires that the weighted
sum over all consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between,
claims to X.(I.) and claims to returns on the riskless opportunity be
J Jequated to unity (marginal social investment cost) where the weights are
the shares of the j~th risky return allocated to the various consumers.
It is easily verified that if the necessary conditions (8) for stock
value maximization of initial interests are satisfied for all h, the
market allocation of investment will satisfy the necessary conditions
for constrained Pareto efficiency as given by (10). On the other hand,
conditions (8) are not necessary for Pareto efficiency.
It is, however , not clear whether there for given 'Tn .will exist any feasible
investment pLan cr.. Z'l"'" Z.S) maximizing r rrh Z. - I. for all h ,
J J.. J s s J 5 J
Indeed, if the technology allows for the possibility of adjusting produc-
tion plans continuously so as to increase or decrease the returns condi-
tional upon a certain state independently of those conditional upon other
states (provided the investment level is suitably adjusted), then for
any h, the value maximizing investment plan would be given by the point
on the efficiency frontier in (S+l)-space having a tangent plane with
the (5+1)-dimensional normal (~h, -1), and in view of strict convexity
of production technologies, tangent planes with different normals would
correspond to different points on the efficiency frontier (different
investment plans). Hence, it is clear that if ~h are different for
different h, there will not exist a common investment plan maximizing
r ~h Z. - I. over the production set for each h unless one imposess s J s J
certain restrictions on substitution possibilities between output condi-
tional upon different states. In that respect, the production technology
specification implicit in (8) represents an extreme case in that it does
not allow for any substitution between returns in different states.
In any case, the market investment rule as given by (8) is not meaningful
or applicable for the individual firm to the extent that it presupposes
that the firm knows the individual implicit prices rrh which are generally
not available or computable from capital market data. Indeed, from (6')
the implicit prices compatible with a stock market equilibrium will for
each h lie in an affine subspace of dimension S-J. On the other hand,
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if the left-hand side of (8) were independent of individual utility charac-
teristics (implicit prices) at a stock market equUibrium, the decentralized
competitive market mechanism based on stock value maximization would be well-
defined in the sense that the firm could check the optimality conditions (8)
without having further information than that given by stock market equili-
brium prices. Some such cases will be considered below.
" 11k l)"f h "l ""As LS we - nown , L t e margLna return pattern on a new Lnvestment Ln
a particular firm is linearly dependent on return patterns of some subset of
firms in the economy, then the individual shareholder's valuation of this
marginal return pattern will be the same for all h at a stock market equili-
brium. That is, if there exist technological coefficients y "kCI.) such that
J J
(11) Z! (I.) = ~ Y "k(I.) Zk(Ik)JS J K J J s = 1, ... ,S
then we have
(12) z 1Th Z! (I.) = E Yok(I.) Vks s JS J k J J for all h
by condition (7) for a stock market equilibrium. Thus, the competitive stock
market value of the marginal return pattern (11) is simply the same linear
combination of the stock market values of the firms on whose returns it LS
linearly dependent. This may seem as a natural extension of the notion of
price-taking in capital asset markets, namely that claims to identical return
patterns have the same price regardless of firms' investment levels. If
firms' technologies satisfy condition (11), the market allocation rule (8)
is well-defined in the sense that competitive and value maximizing firms
only need to know the technological coefficients Y'k(I,) and the stock market
J J
values of the firms for which Y 0k(Io) * o.
J J
In terms of returns per share (11) implies that. the marginal return vector
on firm j's investment is contained in the row space of the matrix X and
this technological property is therefore called spanning as the attainable
set of portfolio return vectors after the investment is made, is spanned by
the return vectors corresponding to the initial allocation of investment.
Hence, if firms' stochastic technologies satisfy this spanning property,
1) See i.a. Ekern and Wilson (1974) and Leland (1974a, b) .
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the diversification opportunities in the stock market will remain
unchanged when investment resources are reallocated among firms.
The seminal study of efficiency implications of value maximizing
firms in a stock market economy is that by Diamond (1967). He postulated
a stochastic technology where the random component enters the firm's
return function in a multiplicative manner. A stochastic technology
of the Diamond type is thus given by
Z. (I.) = 1~. (1.)<,1). ,JS J J J JS s = 1, ... ,S; IP ~ > O,J IP '.' < O,J
where~. is a stochastic variable independent of the investment level.JS
Clearly,
s = 1, ... ,5
which satisfies the spanning property as defined by (11). Hence, in an
economy with stochastic technologies of the Diamond type, the competitive
stock value maximization rule (8) is well-defined in terms of stock
market prices and Diamonn's well-known result that competitive stock
value maximization leads to Pareto efficiency in the investment market
follows immediately from (8) and (10).
Turning to the general case where the return patterns on new investment
are not obtainable as linear combinations of return patterns already
present in the market, price-taking with respect to shares makes no sense
as the shares of a firm after the investment is made will represent claims
to a new and unique return pattern not previously present or attainable
in the market. 1) In that case stock value maximizing firms would have to
know the individual marginal rates of substitution rrh in order to choose
investment plans consistent with Pareto efficiency. Indeed, the existence
of a particular investment opportunity in firm j as characterized by the
marginal return pattern Z! (I.) has in the non-spanning case the property
J s J
of a public good as can be seen from (10) where the socially optimal
trade-off between claims to the marginal risky return vector Z~ (I.) and
J s J
claims to the riskless return is given by a weighted average of the con-
~umers' individual marginal rates of substitution with the consumers'
1) The problem is analogous to that of a firm under certainty with the
quality of the firm's product chan~ing with the scale of the firm.
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fractional shareholdings in firm j as weights. The reason for this public
good property of investment is that increased investment in firm j will in
the non-spanning case have external effects in the sense that it will change
the set of attainable trades or more precisely, the linear subspace of
attainable income vectors spanned by the return vectors in the market.
Hence, the feasible range of choice for portfolio return patterns will
Ichange for all shareholders, which will ~learly be in the nature of an
external effect. Moreover, if the incomplete nature of the market is
effectively constraining shareholders' optima in the stock market, implicit
prices will differ among shareholders and they will evaluate this change
in the attainable set differently.1) This is reflected by the fact that
r. ~h Z~ (I.) may be different for different h at a Pareto optimum.~ s JS J
w~ might define some sort of quasi-equilibrium2) by instructing firms to
use a weighted average r a.~ 'Tl'hof individual implicit prices when computing
h J s
the value of marginal investment projects. The quasi-equilibrium allocation
would of course satisfy the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency.
One has, however, still to face the problem of computing implicit prices as
they are not revealed by market prices.
For the special case that shareholders have identical beliefs and preferences
satisfying.the separation property, implicit prices would be the same for all
shareholders at a stock market equilibrium. In that case all shareholders,
would be in agreement as to the compet1t1ve stock market value of any invest-
ment plan in the sense that the perceived market value r 'Tl'h Z ~ (I.) (at givens s J s J
implicit prices) would be independent of h. In that case the investment
plan satisfying condition (8) and hence also condition (10) for P&reto effi-
ciency, could be chosen by a unanimous vote or alternatively, by associating
the firm's prices for state-contingent returns with the implicit prices for
an arbitrary shareholder - e.g. the manager.
We summarize this in a proposition
Proposition 1
Given completely competitive capital markets, if there exists a feasible
1) See Dreze (1972) and (1974) for a detailed discussion on the public
goods property of investment under uncertainty.
2) See Malinvaud (1969).
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investment plan maximizing the stock market value of initial
interests for each shareholder's implicit prices, then it will
satisfy the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency. The
required price information for computing the competitive stock
market value of a given investment plan will, however, generally
not be provided by competitive stock market prices unless
(i) firms' stochastic technologies satisfy the spanning
1)property
On the other hand, regardless of firms' technologies, all share-
holders would at a stock market equilibrium be in agreement as to
the competitive stock market value of any given investment plan if
(ii) shareholders have identical beliefs and utility functions
exhibiting the separation property.
The fact that the firm needs information about shareholders' preferences
other than that reflected by shareprices in order to choose a Pareto
e~ficient investment, demonstrates that investment under uncertainty
has external effects which are not explicitly priced in the capital
market. In such cases the decentralized competitive market mechanism
is not well-defined since the market behaviour of competitive and value
maximizing firms is not uniquely determined in terms of technologies and
market prices. One exception is, however, the case where a firm's
technology satisfies the spanning property. In that case the competitive
market value of an investment plan with a given return pattern would be
given by the stock market value of a corresponding feasible portfolio
with the same return pattern. If spanning does not obtain, there do not
exist feasible market portfolios replicating the return pattern Z! (I.)
J s J
on a new investment. However, with identical beliefs and utility functions
exhibiting separation, all consumers would be in agreement as to the
competitive (or perceived) market value of any given investment plan.
Thus, in both these cases the unanimously agreed upon change in the com-
petitive stock market value resulting from a given investment, will
correctly reflect the social value of undertaking that investment and
1) The spanning property will always obtain if there are as many risky
securities with linearly independent returns as states of the world.
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Pareto efficiency calls for equating this social value to marginal invest-
ment cost (normalized at unity).
The reasou why shareholders are in agreement on the competitive market
(and social) value of investment plans in these cases is that in case of
spanning the investment will have no external effects since diversification
opportunities will remain unchanged, and in case of separation the external
effects of investment will be evaluated equally by all shareholders as
implicit prices will be the same. In the latter case changes in diversifi-
cation opportunities will have no effect on the relevant opportunity sets
for shareholders so that in equilibrium each shareholder will hold the same
fraction of all risky assets and hence only total returns in each state will
matter.
It seems fair to concludethat as to market allocations of investment under
uncertainty the competitive benchmark based on stock value maximization
does not seem to be well-defined unless spanning or separation obtains. In
case of spanning the firm can rely on market prices in order to choose
investment plans maximizing competitive stock market values, while in case
of separation competitive value maximizing investment will depend on utility
characteristics common to all shareholders which would in principle be easy
to check. If the conditions for spanning or separation are not satisfied, it
seems more fruitful to examine alternative equilibrium concepts such as
quasi- or Lindahl equilibria as in Dreze (1974) or various kinds of voting
equilibria as in Gevers (1974).
IV. -·The mean-variance examp le.
Much work on the efficiency properties of stock market allocations of invest-
ment has been within the mean-variance framework. Jensen and Long (1972),
Stiglitz (1972a) and Fama (1972) have shown that if competitive firms behave
such as to maximize the stock market value of the initial owners' interests,
the equilibrium allocation of investment will be inefficient even in the con-
strained sense. This may seem surprising in view of proposition 1 and it will
be shown here that it is due to an inadequate specification of price-taking
behaviour. Indeed, if shareholders are ranking portfolios according to
means and variances of returns, preferences exhibit separation and together
with identical beliefs implicit prices must be the same for' all shareholders
and competitive value maximization at these prices will lead to Pareto
efficiency.
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t.Teassume an economy with consumers ranking portfolios according to ex-
h h 2 hpected value of quadratic utility functions U (x) = x - K x, K > 0, and with
identical probability assessments.
From the equilibrium value relation (7) we have
(13) a.X. CI.)
J JS J
Factoring out 2Kh and summing the numerator
the market clearing conditions r mh • O and
h
Z. (I.) il a.X. (I.) for all j, we get
JS J J JS J
and denominator over h, using
r a~ ..ak for all k, and settingh
(14)
r p {r _1__ i:
s s h 2Kh k
V. 2 ------~~---------------------J {r _1__ z
h 2Kh k
Zk (L) }Z. CI.)s K . JS J
where u, (l,) deno tes~ ~o il __~ l~ _
r _l-h - z \.lk(Ik)
h 2K k
expected total returns in firm k. Defining
and Cov (Z. (I.) ,Z, (Ik) s a'k (I., Ik) as the cova-J J l< J. J
rianee between total returns in firm j and k (which 'Nill depend on the
investment level in both firms), (14) can be rewrit:en as
(15)
l
V. = -{ u.cr.: - sz a.k(I.,Ik)}Jr JJ kJ J
where o is usually interpreted as a risk discount factor.
In ~me~ariance model one has usually defined price-taking with respect
to the riskless rate of interest r and the risk discount factor 01) . With
price-taking with respect to implicit prices firms would behave as if the
market value were linearly homogenous in state-contingent returns, i.e.,
behave as if V(AZ) .. AV(Z) where V(Z) is the market value of the return
pattern (21, ...,25) and A is some scalar, and it is easy to show that this
does not follow from price-taking with respect to rand c. Scaling the
return pattern Z. of firm j by a scalar A > l and assuming that the firm
J
uses the valuation function (15) and takes r and O as given, we get
oA(l-A)a ..
V(AZ.) = \V(Z.) +---__... ....
J J r
l) Stiglitz (1972a) quite explicitly states that in a mean-variance m~del
we can think of the firm as "selling two commodities, mean and varloanee
which have prices lir and -Mr respectly".
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where o .. 1S the own variance of the return pattern Z.. By assumption the
JJ J
last term is negative such that price-taking with respect to rand 8 UnDlies
that V(AZ.) < \V(Z.)!) Hence, from an efficiency ooint of view the firm
J J .
would underestimate the increase in its market value from increasing its
scale. If we assume that one of the firms is riskless, we can immediately
conclude (as in Stiglitz (1972a))that in the mean-variance framework maximi-
zation of stock market values taking rand 8 as given will imply that too
small amounts of investment will be allocated to risky firms as compared with
a Pareto optUnUIn.
Jensen and Long (1972), Stiglitz (1972a) and Fama (1972) argue that this
inefficiency is due to a kind of externality in the capital market as in-
creased investment in a particular firm will affect the riskiness of other
firms through thecovariance terms. It is, however, clear that this kind
of inefficiency will arise also in the spanning case where all external
effects from investments will vanish, so that the ineffi-
ciency of the market. allocation based on stock value maximization as demen-
strated in the works cited above, is due to an inadequate specification of
price-caking behaviour. Indeed, what is priced in the stock market are
shares - or claims to risky return patterns - rather than means and variances,
and price-taking ~~th respect to means and variances does not imply price-
taking with respect to shares, namely, that shares with identical return
distributions have the same prlce. This can be seen from rewriting (15) as
l
vj ::a r {E (X j) - c~ ~ Cov (X j ,~) }
which implies ~j = - .i Var(X.)<O, where E(X.) and Var(X.) are expected return
ea j r J J J
and variance of returns per share, respectively. Hence, price-caking with
respect to rand 8 implies that the firm will act as if the price of shares
with identical returns is a decreasing function of the number of outstanding
shares which explains why stock value maxUnizing firms taking rand 8 as
given will underinvest from an efficiency point of view. 2)
As can be seen from (14), if firm j takes implicit prices as given, this
implies that
l) Clearly, firms' investment under stochastic technologies of the Diamodd type
satisfies this scaling assumption with A=l+~!/l~., and as is clear from·pro-
position 1, if Zi denotes pre-investment ret~rn~, efficiency calls for evalua-
ting post-investment returns according to the 9roportionality rule
V ( (1 +!jJ! /Ili. )Z .) = (1 +~! /1jJ. ) V (Z . ) .
JJ J J J J
2) This point is also noted in Nielsen (1977).
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0:_1_ -E Zks(Ik)}h 2Kh k l c(16) iT '"P ,. p {L: - - E Zks (Ik)} -;s s
{L: _!_ s h 2Kh k- ~ ).Ik(Ik)}rh 2Kh
must be considered as independent of firm j's investment decisions. We may
note that only aggregate returns in state s matter for the implicit price
iT which is a consequence of the separation property.s
From condition (10) it follows that Pareto efficient investment in firm j
is given by the condition
,
Z, (I,) '" l
JS J
which can be rewritten as
(17) l {).I:(I ,) - cL: 0':k (I,,L )} = l
r JJ kJ JK
where c is the risk discount factor defined above, ).I:(I,)is the expected
J, J
marginal return on new investment in firm j and Cov (Z,(I,), Z, (Ik» iii cr"k (I.,I,)
J J icC .. J. J K
is the covariance be tt..een the iJlaraoinalreturn pattern Z ~ (I.) and the total
- J s J
returns in firm k. Scecifically, 0': ,(I"I.) is the covariance between the
~ J J J J
marginal returns on new investment in firm j and the pre-investment returns
in that firm. It is clear from (17) that in a mean-variance framework the
social desirability of an investment project with a given marginal return
pattern is independent of which firm undertakes the project. This follows
from the more general fact that if separation obtains, only aggregate
returns under each state will matter for social welfare and hence the social
desirability of a given project is determined by its contribution to aggregate
returns under each state.
Comparing (15) and (17) we see that efficiency requires that stock market
value maximizing firms taking r and C as given should valuate the marginal
returns on a new investment project as if it were a separate firm with risk
measured by E O'!k(I.,L) so that the firm should pay no attention to the own
k J J K
variance of the marginal return pattern Z: (I.).
J s J
The efficient investment rule (17) may be rewritten as
(18) ).I:(I.) = r + cL: a:k(I.,L)
J J k J J K
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Specifically, (18) implies that if the marginal returns on new investment
in firm jare uncorrelated with the returns of other firms as well as with
the pre-investment returns in firm j, the firm should increase investment
until U:(I.) :o r, i.e., until the expecterl marginal return on new invest-
J J 1)ment equals the riskless rate of interest .
The efficiency requirement that the firm should neglect the own variance
of the marginal return pattern Z~ when calculating the value of a marginal
JS
investment is due to the fact that we are /considering infinitesimal changes
in the investment level in firm j so that at the margin the own variance of
marginal investment projects will vanish. Considering finite changes ~I.
J
in the investment level and assuming that Z. (I.+~r.) - Z. (I.) ~Z~ (!.)~I.
JS J J JS J JS J J
as a first-order approxi-for snaIL finite changes ~I.
J
mation~ we have from (15) (when r and a are considered as constants)
(19) lV.(I. +~I.) -V.(I.) :o_{ lJ~~I.-orE Cov(Z~,Zk)~I. +Cov(Z~,Z.)~I.
JJ J JJ r JJ k J J JJ J
?+ Var(Z~) (~I.)-]}
J J
where the arguments Ik are omitted. on the right-hand side of (19) for ease
of notation.
For infinitesimal changes we get at the margin
(20)
av.
___l =ar.
J
lim
~I....a
J
V.(I.+~I.)-V.(I.) 1
] J J J J = - { u~- a (E Cov (Z~ Z_) + Cov (Z! Z.»)}
~I. r J k J ' K J' J
J
which is ecpa:l to the derivative of (15)with respect tn 1.. If we assurne that the
J
finite change in investment ~I. takes the economy to a Pareto optimum in one
. J
step, the social value of the finite investment project with returns
Z! ~I. is given by
JS J
(21)
o: _J_h - E Zk - Z ~ ~ I.)
h 2K k s JS J
1E -h - E lJk- lJ~~I.
hZK k J J
Z! ~I. = 1:. {l.!!~I.- o' (E ce-rz: z. )~I.
JS J r J J k J'K J
2+ Var(Z!) (~r.) )}
J J
where å' ;a LICE _J_h - E lJk-l.!~~r.)
h2K k J J
l) This result corresponds to the well-known investment rule by Arrow
and Lind (1970) although they did derive it for an economy with a
complete set of markets. This is, however, not very surprising
because with quadratic preferences and homogeneous expectations the
stock market allocation of risky returns will be Pareto efficient
in the unconstrained sense.
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Dividing (21) by ~Ij and letting ~Ij go to zero, the ewn variance term vanishes
and we are left with (17). Comparing (17) and (20), and (19) and (21), re-
spectively, we see that both in the infinitesimal and finite case the invest-
ment rule based on maximizing V. - r. taking rand 8 as given - henceforth
J J
referred to ås conventional value maximization - places twice as much
weight on the covariance between the firm's marginal return pattern and its
pre-investment returns as compared to the efficiency rule. This implies
also that the profitability of an investment project with a given return
pattern will depend onwhich firm undertakes it which is clearly inconsis-
tent with Pareto efficiency in case of separation.
In the following we shall run through a few examples known from the
literahure where we shall compare the efficiency rule (17Y with the con-
ventional value maximizing rule.
First we assume a stochastic technology of the Diamond type with independent
returns across firms. Total returns in firm
We denote the variance of the return pattern
J are given by Z. (I.) =tf.J. (I.)qj ..
2 JS J . J J JS
cp. by IJ,... •
J S '¥ j
The conventional value-maximization rule gives
while Pareto efficiency requires
-rl{UJ~ - 8Cov(1jJ.q,. ,1jJ~<P.)} "'!(U!-81jJ.1jJ!O:) = l
J JS J JS r J J J ~j
where we have omitted the argument r. for ease of notation. Thus we see
J
that the conventional value maximization rule places twice as much weight
on the firm's variance as compared with the Pareto efficient rule.
We next assume dependent returns across firms and specifically, that returns
in firm j can be written as
Z. er;.) = U. (I.) + g. (I.) s. + m. (I.)M
JS Il J J J J JS J J s
where s. is a random factor specific to the firm while M is a random market
J s s
factor common to all firms ("The state of business"). We assume
1: p E. = 1: p M = a
S s JS s s s '
1:p~=l.s s s
z p E. M = o,s s J s s
2!:oE. =1,s - s J s
Plugging this into the market value function (15) we get
122
V. = - { u , - o(g. + m. + m. Em.).}
J r J J J J k*j K.
and the conventional value maximization rule gives
1. { u ~ - 0(2g.g~ + 2m.m! + m. E ~)} = lr J J J J J J k*j
Z ~ (I.) = u ' , + m:M , , ICleat:ly, + g.E. such that cr .. ,.g.g. + m.m. and
J s J J J JS J s JJ J J J J
Then from (17), Pareto efficiency requires
l { I I I ,- ~. - o(g.g. + m.m. + m. E m.)}" lr J J J J J J k*j K
such that again the conventional value maximizing firm places twice as
much weight on its own risk component cr:. compared to what it should.
JJ
The two examples above are adapted from Stiglitz (l972a) and we have
gotten the same results as he did. We have, however, shown that if
firms measure the riskiness of new investment according to E cr:k, effi-k J
ciency requires that the firm should increase investment as long as the
value of marginal investment returns exceeds marginal investment costs.
We conclude with the example analyzed by Jensen & Long (1972) and later
by Merton & Subrahmanyam (1974). Assume an economy with n firms wi th
stochastic return patterns Z. which have means u , and covariances cr
J
.k.JS J
Moreover, there is an investment project with constant stochastic returns
to scale available to all firms. We let p be the stochastic return pers
unit investment in the project and the expected return per unit investment
is denoted P. I. denotes firm j's investment in the project which yields
J
total returns I.p in state s. Since all firms are facing the same pro-
J s
ject, the distribution of p is independent of the firm which means thats
the returns on the project are perfectly correlated across firms. If
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firm j invests I. in the project, its total returns will be Z. + I.p .
J J s J s
Plugging this into the valuation function (15) we get
where a . is the covariance between p and the pre-investment returns Z.
pJ 2 JS
in firm j and ap 5 Var(p).
If firm j takes·investments of.other firms as.given and maximize V. - 1.,
J J
we get the investment rule
.!{ p - O O:: a k + a . + E L a2 + I .a2)} == l.r k p pJ k Ik P J P
The marginal returns Z~ on new investment in firm j are p. From the effi-
J s s
ciency rule (17) firm j should increase investment in the project up to
the point where
and this is indeed the Pareto efficiency rule as derived by Jensen & Long,
and we see that it is different from the conventional value maximizing rule.
The difference is again given bY.£ Cov(Z!,Z.) =.£ Cov(O,Z.+01.) = .£(a . + 1.a2).r J J r J J r OJ J P
As Merton & Subrahmanyam (1974) have pointed out, if firm j takes the aggregate
investment in the project as given and independent of its own investment
decisions, then the conventional value maximization rule will be efficient.
This can be seen from differentiating (22) with respect to I. under the con-
l) Jstraint that aElk/aI. = O. Merton & Subrahmanyam then conclude that ak J
"correct" definition of price-taking should imply that firms consider aggre-
gate investment in the project as given.
The reason why the conventional value maximizing rule gives Pareto efficient
investment decisions if firms behave as if the aggregate investment in the
project is fixed, follows from constant stochastic returns to scale and the
fact that the returns on new investment are assumed to be perfectly correlated
across firms. Assuming constant aggregate investment in the project implies
l) This corresponds to what Fama calls the "reaction principle" in Fama (1972).
~b.
in that case that the total returns in each state are fixed. Hence, the
implicit prices for state-contingent income will remain unchanged since
they will only depend, on aggregate returns in each state in case of
separation. Thus the capital,market is completely competitive in the
Leland sense and the result follows from our proposition l.
In tha general case where returns on new inyestment are not perfectly
cørrelated across firms or with non-constant stochastic returns to scale,
aggregate returns in state s will depend on the distribution of invest-
.
ment across firms and hence the implicit prices TI will depend on the in-s .
vestment distribution too. In that case competitive behaviour with respect
to r and o together with assuming constant aggregate investment would not
be sufficient for ensuring efficient investment decisions by value maxi-
mizing firms. Generally, efficiency in a mean-variance model requires
that firms valuate marginal returns on new investment according to the
valuation rule (17) or (21) in the infinitesimal and finite case, respectively.
V. Value maximization, Pareto efficiency and unanimity.
As shown in proposition l, in the absence of external effects on the attain-
able set of income patterns (spanning) or if external effects from invest-
ment are evaluated equally by all shareholders (separation), stock value
maximization taking implicit prices as given may be considered as well-defined
at the level of the firm and will lead to local efficiency in the investment market.
On the other hand, Wilson (1972), Ekern and Wilson (1974) and Leland (1974a)
have questioned the adequacy of value maximization on the ground that share-
holders may not unanimously support value maximizing investment decisions
and in fact, Ekern and Wilson (1974) show in a mean-variance context that
all shareholders would disprove of the investment decisions of a conventional
value maximizing firm.
This seems rather confusing in view of proposition l above and we argue
here that this disparity of results is partly due to an inadequate specifi-
cation of price-taking (conventional value maximization) and partly to some
confusion over what is really meant by value maximization. Proposition l
only establishes that if firms know the individual implicit prices
and behave as if (believe or perceive) these
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prices are constant, stock value maximization at these prices will
lead to local efficiency. But this does not imply that efficient invest-
ment decisions will maximize actual equilibrium values in the stock market
and it is equally clear that actual stock market value maximization may not
be in the shareholders' interest. This is so because a change in invest-
ment will have two equilibrium effects: a wealth effect due to the change
in the market value of the firm and aconsumption effect due to the change
in the implicit prices for state-contingent income. These two effects may
act in the same or opposite directions and in the latter case it is a priori
impossible to say which one will dominate. It is, however, quite possible
for. the relative importance of these effects tO,differ among shareholders
in such a way that some shareholders are made better off by a change in a
firm's investment and others are made worse offl) •
The analogy with conventional welfare theory is perfect in this case: in
the absence of externalities, profit maximization by price-taking firms will
lead to Pareto efficiency. It may, however, not be in the owners' interest
to maximize actual equilibrium profits if the firm is able to manipulate
prices, i.e., has some monopoly power, since this will affect the owners'
budget sets in the capacity of consumers (pecuniary externalities).
Returning to the mean-variance example for a while, we see from (16) that
with price-taking with respect to r and å the firm will act as if
aTI laI. = -p Z~ (I.) ålr and the economy will not be completely competitives J s JS J
in the Leland sense. The true effect on implicit equilibrium prices from
a partial change in the investment in firm j is
1aTI laI. ,.p {-Z~ (I.) + ll~ (I.) [ E h - E
k
Zks(Ik) lå} Mrs J s JS J J J h 2K
so that conventional value maximization does not imply that the firm is
maximizing actual stock market value, that is, takes full account of the
effect partial changes in the investment level will have on implicit prices.
For the special case that consgmers have constant absolute risk aversion
utility functions tf (x) = -e-S x and jointly normally distributed risky
returns, we have that2) E(uh) = -exp(-ShECch) + (Sh)2 Var(ch)/2). In that
case it is easily seen that equilibrium valuation functions take the form
l) This point is also observed in Hart (1977).
2) See Stiglitz (1972a).
V. = 1. { u . CI.) __ 1-::--
J r J J r..L
h Bh
r cr. k Cl. , L ) }
k J J K
so that the risk discount o depends solelyon the individual absolute risk
aversions and hence it is constant. In that particular case, price-taking
with respect to r and o would be consistent with actual value maximization
implying that a conventional value maximizing firm would take full account of
!
its monopoly power in the capital market. Implicit prices are in this case
given by 7rs=P tfCch)/r p tf(ch)r and efficiency requires that 'firms behave ass s s , s s -if these prices were g~ven.
We shall now examine in some more detail the effect on the welfare level
of an individual initial shareholder from a partial change in the investment
level of firm j. The budget constraint for an initial shareholder h is
given by
(23) h h -h -h -hm + ~ a..V. = m + ra.. CV. - I.) + I
J JJ J J J J
h hwhere a. = a.Ia., and barred variables denote initial values. Differentia-
J J J
ting (23) with respect to I· yields
J
(24) am
h
aI. +
J
Moreover, we have
hac:s
-- =aI.
J
o.~Z~ CI.)
J J s J
hand substituting for am lar. from (24) yields
J
(25)
hac,
sar. =
J
+ r
k
hc, Z ~ (I.)
J J s J
-h
- Ct.. r
J
Rence, we have
(26) " hUh {~-h h avk h +h~ p (Ct.k - Ct.k) ~ r + Ct.. z~ (I.) - a.. r}s s s ol. J J s J J
J
since all terms involving ao.~/aljvanish from the first-order conditions
(4) for shareholders' optima. Rewriting (26) gives
(27)
aEh (lf) laI.
Eh (Uh)r
s
+ L: TIha~ Z~ (I.) - ~~
s s J JS J J
where the left-hand side of (27) can be interpreted as the change in the
welfare level of shareholder h measured in terms of the numeraire good.
From (7) we have
aTIh
~ ar~ Zks (Ik) k * JaVk J(28) al. =
J aTIh
E dIs Z. (I.) + L: TIh Z~ (L), k~·'=Js . J s J s s JS J
J
and inserting (28) into (27) yields
aEh (Uh)I al. -h - ~)
aTIh
TIh Z~ (I.)s -h(29) = L: (ak L: ar Zk (\) + a. (L: - 1)Eh(Uh)r k s . s J s s J s Js J
The first term on the right-hand side of (29) is clearly the consumption
effect from a partial increase in investment infirm j while the second
term is the wealth effect on the welfare level of shareholder h, by condi-
tion (8).
We shall now examine in this partial equilibrium context under what con-
dition (i) shareholders will all agree on the desirability of a new invest-
ment in firm j, and (ii) shareholders will unanimously support that the
firm maximizes its stock market value. In the previous literature on this
subject one has distinguished between two unanimity concepts. Ekern and
Wilson (1974) and Leland (1974a) have studied ex post unanimity which means
that ~nanimity with respect to a particular investment plan occurs when
shareholders are currently holding portfolios which are optimal given current
investment plans, i.e., the impact on the welfare level of shareholder h is
h -hevaluated at a. = a. for all j. Radner (1974) has discussed unanimity in
J J
the ex ante sense whichmeans that ex ante unanimity occurs when shareholders
holding initial equilibrium portfolios not necessarilY optimal given current
plans, all agree to a particular investment plan.
From (29) the following proposition is obvious.
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Proposition 2. 1)
Considering a partial change in the investment level of firm J, we have
that
i) Ex post unanimity will obtain if at least one of the following
two conditions is satisfied
a) the firm's technology satisfies the spann~ng property
b) all shareholders have identical beliefs and utility functions
exhibiting the separation property.
ii) Ex ante unanimity obtains if we in addition to condition a) or b)
make the assumption that firms are believed to be unable to affect
implicit prices (completely competitive capital markets)."
Thus, we see that if firms' investment decisions have no external effects on
the attainable set of income patterns or if such external effects are equally
evaluated by shareholders, all shareholders W'ill agree on the des ira-
bility of a given investment plan in the ex post sense, and if the capital
market is completely competitive, also in the ex ante sense.
The last term on the right-hand side of (2.9) can in view of (7) and (8) be
. -h aW'rl:ttenas CL. ~(v.-I.) , that is, the share. of the increase in
J a j J J "lT~constant
stock market value of initial interests.in firm j accruing to initial share-
holder h computed at h's (given) implicit prices. Thus W'ehave
Proposition 3.
If initia12) shareholders believe that firm j is'u.nable to affect implicit
prices and take investment levels in firms other than j as given, each
initial.shareholder will support maximization of stock market values of
initial interests at his own implicit prices. As implicit prices may
differ among initial shareholders, they may, however, not agree on W'hat
investment decision W'hich will maximize stock market value of initial inte-
rests in firm j unless spanning or separation obtains.
In a recent paper Hart (1977) has shoW'U by a "limit argument" that if one lays
l) ia) is essentially Ekern and Wilson's result on ex post unanimity W'hile ii)
is Radner's result on ex ante unanimity.
2) It is easy to show that unanimity among initial shareholders W'ill Unply
unanimity among ex post shareholders as well. However, as noted by
Radner (1974), ex post shareholders W'ould W'ish the firm maximizes total
stock market value V. which follows from the fact that for an ex oostJ •h h -h -hshareholder the budget cons traint takes the form m + r (J..V = m + E (J..V..
j J J j J J
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down sufficient conditions for implicit prices to be independent of a
firm's investment decisions, then all shareholders will be unanimous
over the choice of a firm's investment decision whether or not the
spanning condition holds and for arbitrary consumer preferences. At
first glance, Hart's result may seem to contradict the above propositions,
but the following argument will indicate that this conclusion may be too
rash. If firms are unable to affect implicit equilibrium prices in a
stock market economy where the consumer optima are effectively constrained
by the lack of complete markets, this must imply that firms' investment
decisions have negligible effects on the attainable set of state-contingent
income and hence, "in the1lirilit"the externality effect will vanish and
ex ante unanimity will obtain.
If we take into account the general equilibrium effects a change in the
investment level of firm j may have on the investments in firms other than
j, we get by a way of reasoning parallel to that underlying (29), that the
general equilibri~ effect on the welfare level of initial shareholder h
takes the fom
(30)
aEh (Tf) /sr. -h h a'll'h aI2. ;::h (" 7Th Z' CI )-') aI,~s
EhCtf1h
"E(~-C£.) Er. dI.z_ Zks C~) a I. ...Z ~i ~ I 2. i i n.k K s£ 2. ' s s ss J J
..
where aI.z_/aljis the general equilibrium effect a change in the investment
level of firm j has on the investment level of firm 2.. Hence, we see that
if firms 2. * j for which dI.z_ldlj* a are assumed to be completely competitive and
at the investme~L.levels maximizinsz stock market values of their initial
interests at the implicit prices of all shareholders, proposition 2
and 3 remain valid also when general equilibrium effects of changed
investment are considered. If firms other than j remain at an investment
level not satiSfying condition (8) for maximizing competitive stock
.. ~rket valuesof initial interests, proposition 2 on unanimity on firm
j's inv~stme;t piaiis~y not be generallytrue when-general equilib-rium effects
are taken into æcount , Ex ante ani ex post tnanimitywill mwever, still obtain i n a
general equilibrium context if shareholders have identical beliefs and pre-
ferences exhibiting separation. In that case implicit equilibrium prices
are the same for all h and moreover, for any h th h -h '11 b hesares ~£ w~ ete same
for all .z_if the initial allocation represents a stock market equilibrium and
hence the last term on the right-hand side of (30) will be of the same sign
for all shareholders h. As for proposition 3 on the desirability of stock
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value max~ization, if condition (8) is systematically not satisfied for
all firms, it leaves open the possibility that even if shareholders
believe that firms are unable to affect ~plicit prices, an initial share-
holder h of firm .i will think he will be better off by an investment decision
decreasing the perceived market value of initial interests in firm j if
the perceived market value of his total initial interests is thereby ~n-
creased .1)
If the investment levels in firms other than j are different from those
maximizing the stock market values of initial interests at given im-
plicit prices, this means that the marginal social value of increasing
investment in those firms is different from marginal social cos t of
investment (being equal to one). This will be in the nature of a pe-
cuniary external effect in the sense that the change in the stock market
value of initial interests in firm j wilt for given implicit prices not
even in the spanning case capture the net social value (in terms of the
numeraire) of increased investment because of the reallocation effects
in ~~e investment market. The problem is analogous to that under cer~ainty
when some firms systematically deviate from marginal cost pricing. In that
case changes in competi tive pro.fits of a particular firm may not capture
changes in social welfare because of possible reallocative effects on
firms deviating from marginal cost pricing; or to put it in 'mQre general terms
partial welfare analysis is generally justified only if the.rest of the
economy is optimally adjusted.
For economists approaching the literature on capital market theory from
conventional market and welfare theory, the relationship between Pareto
efficiency and unan~ity may seem somewhat obscure. Recalling that we are
only considering interior optima in the stock market, it goes almost
without saying that unanimity on a firm's investment decision is a suf£i-
cient condition for that investment to represent an improvement in the
Pareto sense. On the other hand, unanimi.ty is clearly no e necessary for
Pareto ufficiency. In particular, in the presence of externalities (non-
spanning) shareholders may valuate investment returns
l) Hart (1977) shows that this possibil ity is e.lImi.nat ed in "large"
economies if for each j a~> O impl ies a~'> O for some h', i.e., there
are shareholders who buy shares in eachJfirm in which h has an ini-
tial shareholding.
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differently at an equilibrium in the stock market (no separation) and hence
there is no reason to expect everybody to agree on a Pareto efficient invest-
ment plan since the capital market will nec provide the individualsharahokie r with
sufficient information for figuring out the true social value of invest-
ment. In such cases Pareto optima may not be attainable through unanimous
decisions. One might therefore cast some doubt on the normative signifi-
cance of the ~animity criterion as an alternative to value maximization
in incomplete markets. On the one hand, given that the rest of the economy
is optimally adjusted, then , if unanimity obtains, all shareholders will
also support competitive stock value maximization when properly defined,
and stock value maximization in a (completely) competitive capital market
will lead to (local) Pareto efficiency. On the other hand, when the com-
petitive market mechanism based on stock value maximization is likely to be
ill-defined in terms of market prices, shareholders will typically dis-
agree on Pareto efficient investment plans so that the unanimity criterion
fails whenever competitive stock value maximization fails in guiding the
economy to a Pareto optimum. In fact, in the presence of externalities,
a Pareto optimum. may not be achieved through decentralized means - a lesson
which is well known from conventional welfare theory.
The above comments on the relationship between unanimity and competitive
value maximization is based on the assumption that the rest of the economy
is optimally adjusted. If this is not so, there is no presumption that
firms should maximize competitive market values. Indeed, from (30) we see
that if separation obtains in completely competitive capitalmarkets, we
can easily imagine situations in which all shareholders would be'unanimous both
ex ante and ex post that firm j should decrease the stock market value
h , aI~
of its initial interests-as long as EO: ITsZ.Q.s(I.Q_)-I)al. > o where of.Q_s J
course E aln/aI. = O. In such a case we are in a second best context as in
~ N J
the conventional economy under certainty where some firms deviate systema-
tically from marginal cost pricing (monopoly pricing, taxation, etc.), and
as is well known from second best theory, in that case competitive profit
maximization may not be optimal in the controllable part of the economy either.
As noted earlier, although all shareholders may agree that firms behaving
as price-takers with respect to implicit prices should maximize stock market
values, this does not mean that maximizing actual stock market values would
be in the shareholders' interests. We shall finally examine this problem
in some more detail, that is, under what conditions would maximization of
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actual stock market values be conduicive to maximal shareholders' welfare.
To answer this question in full generality would require that we were able
to calculate the exact effects on the equilibrium prices nh from adopting a
particular investment plan in a given firm. Generally, this would be a
formidable task which is presently beyond our means (at least mine). We
therefore pose a more limited and hopefully manageable question.
Suppose that by a suitable reallocation of the investment resources among
its investment J!l'r6Jectsfirm j can undertake a costless change in the
return pattern per outstanding share as given by dXj = (dXjl,··· ,dXjS)'
Then we ask under what conditions thiscostless change in the returns per
share will increase excess demand for shares in firm j if and only if this
change is in the interest of its shareholders. Clearly, maximization of
excess demand would be consistent with actual market value maximization under
most reasonable share price adjustment processes.
To find the social value of the infinitesimal change dX. of the j-th row of
J
the return matrix X we first define dmh as the compensatirig variation in risk-
less income that would compensate shareholder h for the change dX .. Up to a
J
first-order approximation this is given by
h __h h h_-h hE p V-rdm + E p-~ a.dX.ss s s s s J JS = O
or
h h h- dm = E a.IT dX.
s J s J s
hClearly, -dm is the value of the infinitesimal change dX. for consumer h
J
evaluated in terms of the riskless asset (numeraire) . Total social value
of that change is then given by
(31) hE -dm
h
h h
= EE a.1T dX.hs J s J s
h h
As a. and X. enter the relation defining c lona bilinear form, the feasible
J JS s
set in the income space will be non-conVex. Hence, (31) is a local measure
of the social desirability of the change dX .. That means that the absence of
J
costless variations dX. generating positive social value as given by (31),
J
is necessary and sufficient for local efficiency (excluding again the possi-
bility of saddlepoints).
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Our problem is therefore to explore under what conditions we have
(32) h hH a.1T dX. > Ohs J s J s
hda.
<==> rr ai- dX. > O
hs js J s
In order to examine the effect on excess demand from the infinite-
simal variation dX. we assumein addition to previous assumptions that'
J
shareholders have initial endowments of state-contingent income so
that consumer h's endowments are given by the (S+l)-dimensional vector
wh = (w~,w~, •••,w~)' and taking the budget constraint into account, con-
sumer:h'sincome in state s is then given by
h h h h hc = rw - r ~ a.v. + w + r a.X.
s o J J J s J J JS
This does not change first-order conditions for interior consumer optima
as given by (4') and restated below for the convenience of the reader.
dEh(Uh) h...;_..~~ = (-rv,X)~ = O
dah
Total differentiation of (4') with respect to dah and (-rdv.,dX.) yieldsl)
J J
(4') (a column vector) .
(-rdv.,dX.)'
J J
= (-rv,X)_~(-rv,X)'dah + {a~(-rv,X)~ + o.(uh)'}(-rdv.,dX.) I
J - J- J J
where o. is the Kronecker delta vector with the j-th component equal to one
J
and all other components equal to zero. Rearranging gives
(33)
h hTotal differentiation of (4') with respect to da and dw gives
l) For the matrix X the row vector X. is understood to be the j-th row
of X, xk is its k-th column and XJk its jk-entry.
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and rearranging yields
(34)
CombininSø (33) and (34) we have
(35) aa
h h aah -~ -l h- a. h h =-{(-rv,X)_![-(-rv,X)'} C
J
.(£)'(-rav. ,ax.) J ( ~_ ':I)
J J rowo'···'ows
(where the superscript J
denotes the j-th column of
the matrix)
This gives the ordinary Slutsky matrix for asset demand functions
(36)
with negative diagonal entries from the negative definiteness of the matrix
of second-order derivatives as given by (5).
Looking at a particular element of (35) and using (36) we have
(37)
a h
~ax.- =
JS
hh aak h -l ha. h-{«-rv,X)U (-rv,X)') }k. u
J aw J -s
s
h
h aak= a. -- -
J awhs
h
h a~ 1 h
a. -h J '11'
J aw S
o
where '11'h :;;
s
p~tfs
\'" h h
t... P U-rs s s
:;;uh I uhr by previous definitions .+s -o
Thu~, the total demand effect from the change of returns per share ~n firm
j can be split up into a wealth effect being proportional to the effect
of an increase in initial endowments of state-contingent income and a
substitution effect being proportional to the net substitution effect of
a decrease in the price per share in firm j.l)
It will be convenient to rewrite (37) in the form
h h h hcak h cak cak h )
cak h(38) ax.- = a. (-- -- 'IT - -- 'ITJ cwh awh s av. sJS s a J
where the first term on the right-hand side of (38) will be referred to as
the general wealth effect on demand for shares in firm k from increasing
returns per share in firm j Ln state s.
h h hWe define n. 5 (ca./av.) (v.la.) as the uncompensated price elasticity of
J J J J J
demand for shares in firm j for shareholder h. Clearly, we have that the
price elasticity of total demand for shares in firm"j is given by
h h hn. = E a.n./E a ..
J h J J h J
We find the effect on aggregate excess demand for shares in firm j from
the infinitesimal variation dXj by aggregating (38) over h for k=j which
after some simple manipulations gives
(39)
hca. h
EE __J_ dX. = Ea. Ehs eX. J s. h J sJS
dX.
JS
- ~ E a~ E 'lThdX.v. h J s s JS
J
The third term on the right-hand side of (39) can be interpreted as aa·
weighted sum (with weights v7 dXjs) of the covariances over consumers between
the implicit prices 'lThand t&e uncompensated price elasticities of demand n?
s J
l) An analogous expression for the effect of a quality change on the con-
sumer demand for commodities is derived in Dreze and Hagen (1978).
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Comparing (39) with (32) we have the following result:
Proposition 4:
Given that shares in firm'j are normal assets (n. < O), a sufficient
J
condition for infinitesimal variations dX. to generate positive excess
J
demand for shares in firm j if and only.'if these variations are local-
ly consistent with the interests of the shareholders, is that the
general wealth effect associated with dX. be zero and that the indi-
. J
vidual implicit prices be uncorrelated with price elasticities of
individual demands.
We note that the covar Lance term will vanish at a stock market equilibrium
if the firm's technology satisfies the spanning property or if the share-
holders have identical beliefs and utility functions exhibiting separation.
In case of spanning there must exist a non-zero vector a = (al'...,aJ)'
such that dX. = a'X and hence ~ ~hdX. = ~ rrh ~ ak~ = a'v and the result
J s s JS s s k -KS
is obvious and in the latter case it follows from the observation that
individual implicit prices must be the same for all shareholders at a stock
market equilibrium.
This suggests that the inefficiency of actual market value maximization due
to the external effects of firms' investment under uncertainty is reflected
in the covariance term while the inefficiency caused by the effect on
implicit prices is reflected in the general wealth effect.
In case of spanning the general wealth effect takes a particular simple
form. To see this, we note that
(40) ( h h)h da. da.a. E _J_ - _J_ ~h dXJ'S dwh dwh s jss o
l)
(-r~,I) ,dX !
J
Substituting (40) into (34) using dX! = X'a by assumption and
J(-rrr,I)'X' = (-rv,X)' by (6), we have that
l) (-rrr,I)is the (SxS) identity matrix augmented by the vector -rrr as
the first column.
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(41) ha. E
J s
7T
h ) dX.
s J s
hx{(-rv,X)~ (-rv,X)'}a h= -a.a.
] J
and the general wealth effect vanishes if and only if a. = o.
JThus we have.
Proposition 5.
Under spanning and given that n. < O, a necessary and sufficient con-
J
dition for maximization of excess demand for firm j's shares to be
locally consistent with the shareholders' interests is that dX. is
]
contained in the row space of X other than row j .
Under spanning all shareholders will agree in the ex post sense on the
desirability of a firm' s invest:nent plan and if they perceive that implicit
prices do not change they will all support stock value maximization. From
proposition 5 it follows, .however, that actual value maximization will not
be in the shareholders' interests unless the marginal return pattern asso-
ciated with the investment plan can be obtained as a linear combination of
existing shares in the market not involving the shares of the firm contem-
plating investment. In that case firm j's monopoly power in the stock
market washes out as there exists a perfect substitute in the market for the
marginal return pattern dXj consisting of a linear combination of shares in
firms other than firm j.
VI. Concluding remarks.
In the presene paper we have explored the efficiency implications of
value-related investment criteria for decentralized investment decisions
under technological uncertainty and the general conclusion is negative
in the sense that except for some special cases, the market allocation of
investment effected through decentralized and incomplete capital markets
is likely to be inefficient. This is so because investment decisions
I
under uncertainty will generally have external effects for which there
do not exist well-defined stock market prices and hence, there does not
in the general case exist any clear or well-defined definition of competi-
tive behaviour based on observable market characteristics in which case the
lU.
competitive benchmark with respect to investments does not seem to be
meaningful. Indeed, in the general case the choice of a Pareto efficient
investment plan in a given firm requires explicit knowledge of consumers'
preferences as one would expect in cases where firms' production plans
have external effects not fully reflected through competitive profits at
market prices.
/
Under certain conditions as to market structure (complete set of markets)
or on the stochastic technologies (spanning) the external effects asso-
ciated with investment under uncertainty will vanish in which case all
welfare-relevant consequences of an investment plan will be fully priced
in the stock market and changes in stock market values at given stock
prices will capture the social value of the plan. On the other hand, if
preferences satisfy the separation property and shareholders have identical
beliefs, all shareholders will evaluate the external effects associated
with any given investment plan in the same way, and hence they will all
agree on the social value of any given investment plan and the Pareto
efficient plan could be chosen by a unanimous vote. Alternatively, the firm
could choose the Pareto efficient plan through relying on. the preferences
of an arbitrary shareholder and formally the efficient plan would maximize
the firm's stock market value of initial interests at the shareholder's given
individual implicit prices for st·ate-contingent income (being the same for
all shareholders in that case).
It follows triviallY that when decentralized value maximization by competi-
tive firms is well-defined and leads to Pareto efficiency, value maximizing
investment decisions will be unanimously approved by all shareholders. The
converse conclusion does, however, not follow, that is a Pareto efficient
allocation may not be obtained through the decentralized market mechanism
with market value maximizing firms as there will in general be externalities
associated with firms' investments ~n incomplete markets. In such cases the
market will not provide adequate price and value signals for shareholders to
compute the social value of investment and hence shareholders may not unani-
mously support Pareto efficient investment plans because of lack of relevant
information except for the case with preferences exhibiting separation and
with identical beliefs in which all will agree.
Most of the examples given in the literature assume implicitly away the pr~ce
information problem in that they are within the mean-variance context and hence
consumers' preferences exhibit separation. It is therefore argued here that
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the controversy between value maximization and shareholders' unanimity
is in these cases caused by an inadequate specification of competitive
behaviour in incomplete markets.
In the first place the conventional value maximizing rule as specified
by i.'a. Stiglitz (1972a), Jensen & Long (1972) and Fama (1972) defines
price-taking with respect to the "wrong" prices as it implies a downward
sloped demmd schedule for shares which are the true objects of choice ~n
incomplete markets. It is therefore not surprising that the market
outcome in that case turns out to be inefficient and in such cases value
maximization would clearly not be in the interest of all shareholders.
Second, one must distinguish between value maximization in the perceived
and in the actual sense. True competitive behaviour requires that
producers do not take into account any relationships between prices and
their own production decisions, i.e. , perceived value maximization. This
is a well-known prerequisite for efficiency of market behaviour in general
and should not be mixed up with the empirical question of whether or not
firms are able to influence prices in the stock markets and do take this
into account.
Some authors1) have stressed the fact that in the case firms' return
patterns are linearly independent, each firm would have a monopoly on
its own return pattern and one would expect this to affect firms' market
behaviour. It has been verified here, however, that in case of spanning
any monopoly power firm j may h~ve will vanish if the ·returns on new
investment is contained in the space spanned by the returns of firms other
than j. In case of separation only aggregate returns in each state would
matter for implicit prices so that a firm's monopoly power would in that
case depend on its marginal contribution to aggregate returns in each
state'. In all other cases firms' investment under uncertainty generates
external effects pointing to likely inefficiency of decentralized market
behaviour. As the market in such cases will not provide adequate informa-
tion for a proper evaluation of theæc ial desirabilityof firms ' investment plans,
there does in su:hcases not exist any market alternative for aggregation of
consumer preferences. In this respect, the allocative problems caused by
the external effects of investment are in a fundamental way different from
those caused by firms' ability to affect market prices which is clearly in
the nature of pecuniary external effects.
1) See ~.a. Mossin (1973).
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lVIARKET SYSTDI IN AN ECONOlYfY WITH
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION*
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Summary
This paper deals with an economy where firms can vary the quality design oi their
products. By postulating that consumers have preference orderings over quality
characteris1:ics. Pareto optimal rules for production. distribution and quality
design are derived. We then examine the price implications oi So Pareto optimal
range ai quality designs and it is mown that, in general, commodity prices will
not provide profit maximizing firms with the correct informa.tion for Pareto.
optimal choices ai quality design.
1. Introduction
The efficiency achieved in the allocaeion of resources through competitive
markets is perhaps one of the most powerful results in economics.! For this
reason a. system of decentralized decision-making through competitive markets
is often considered to be an idea.l wayof organizing economic acitivty.
Despite the completeness and intellectual beauty of competitive market
theory, it certa.inly leaves ma.ny market phenomena. of the real world unex-
pla.ined. One of the most striking features of modern societies is the huge
number of varieties of each basic commodity traded in the market. Tradi·
tiona.lly, product differentiation has been regarded a.a one of the characteristics
of monopolistic competition and consequently, a.a being outside the realm
of the competitive model. Furthermore, since any deviation from competitive
behavior will be detrimenta.l from an efficiency point of view, one might be
tempted to view product differentiation a.a an obstacle to efficiency. This
line of reasoning, however, ma.y be false. The notion of efficiency aa used in
economic theory is merely concerned with production and distribution of a given
list of goods. However, when we allow for a large number of quality variants
of each basic commodity, a qualita.tive dimension is introduced into the
efficiency concept. In addition to whether the economy produces and distrib-
• The author is indebted to Agnar Sandmo for many useful comments.
1 For an excellent survey of the competitive market model. see Essay I in Koopmans [2).
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utes a given commodity in optimaJ amounts, the question may be raised
as to whether the economy produces the right quaJity variants of each basic
commodity. The latter aspect of efficiency may be called quaJitative efficiency.
In this paper, we try to introduce possibilities for product clliferentiation
in a competitive setting. In particular, we look for the existence of efficiency
prices in such an economy. The concept of efficiency prices means that if
consumers maximize ,utilities and firms ma.±i.mize profits, taking these prices
as given. the resulting equilibrium production and distribution of commodities
will be efficient from a quantitative as well as a. quaJita.tive point of view.
FormaJly, product clliferentiation could be introduced into the market
model by considering each possible quaJity variety of a given good as a separate
commodity and consumer preferences could be defined over all conceivable
varieties, including quaJity variants which are technica.1ly feasible but not
yet present in the market. However, it might be difficult to conceive of con-
sumers ranking both existing and possible, but non-existing, goods. Also,
such a model could hardly expla.in why firms clliferentiate their products.
A more natura.l approach to the problem of quality choice, based on Lanca.ster
[3J and (4}, would be to postulate that the ultimate objects of utility are not
commodities, but ra.ther the cha.ra.cteristics or properties which commodities
stand for in the eyes of the consumer. Consequently, a commodity can be
represented by a set of quality indicators, one for each characteristic. ~ given
commodity can thus be considered as a package of quality characteristics.
Consumer preferences are defined over quaJity characteristics which will in-
duce a preference ordering over the commodity spsce.
This is the approach used here. The ma.in advantage of this approach
in the present context is perhaps that it enables us to give a precise and opera-
tion.a.l definition of quality change of a. given good. l A change in quality can
be defined as a. change in the amount of characteristics provided by a unit
of the good. Product clliferentiation possibilities exist for a. given firm if the
firm can change the amount of characteristics contained ina unit of its product.
In this paper we focus particular attention on the qualitative aspects of
efficiency, Le. determination of criteria for a socially optimal degree of product
clliferentiation and the price implications of an optimal quality pattern.
II_ Exchange of Quality Characteristics through Competitive
Commodity Markets
It is assumed that each commodity is defined by a finite number, 8, of quality
characteristics and, given the unit of measurement, these cha.ra.cterlstics are
perceived identically by all consumers. That is, the quality of a commodity
is assumed to be of an objective nature and known to all consumers.
1 A similar approach was also applied by Griliohes (1] in an attempt to incorporate quality
changes in price indexes.
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QuaJity characteristics, rather than the commodity itself, are assumed to
be the ultimate objects of consumer satisfaction. Consequently, consumer
preferences are basically defined on the space generated by the qua.lity charac-
teristics, which will be called the quaJity space or for short, the Q.space.
If there were a market for each quality characteristic, which implies that
each characteristic could be traded separa tely, this exchange economy would
simply be a trivial reinterpretation of the traditional exchange economy
where commodities a.re reinterpreted as characteristics. The set of feasible
trades in such an economy, i.e. the set of obtainable quaJity vectors, to be
denoted n,would be an s-dimensional rectangle in the s-dimensional Euclidian
space bounded by the total amount of each characteristic available. Exchange
equilibrium would be characterized by the marginal rates of substitution
between any pair of characteristics being equal for all consumers and the
equilibrium exchange would of course be efficient in the Pareto sense.
HoweveJ:, quality characteristics will generally not be available in pure form.
They must be acquired through commodity markets where a. particular
commodity represents a.package of quaJity characteristics in fixed proportions.
Since, for the moment, we are studying an exchange economy, the number oi
commodities and the total a.mount of each commodity are fixed. Each ccmmod-
ity will be defined by a quality vector where the components are the amount
of the various quality characteristics contained in a rmili of that commodity.
Notations and assumptions:
g: -(qt •... , q;) !-s the vector of characteristics purchased by consumer
i, i -l, ...,m. ~ characteristics are assumed to be measured in non-
nega.tive terms. ~ superscripts in this paper refer to consumers and
barred va.ria.blesdenote vectors.
UI(it) - the utility function of consumer i defined on the Q.space. The functions
UI(.) are assumed to be strictly quasi-ccncave with strictly positive
pa.rtial first.order derivatives. Tha.t is, we assume no satiation and that
every quaJity characteristic is desirable.
lJ.c =- (qC1' ... , qe.) is the vector in the Q.space representing a.unit of commod-
ity c, c-l, ...,n . .All vectors lJ.c are assumed to be linearly independent,
which means that there can at most be as many commodities as
. characteristics.
Pc - the price of a. unit of commodity c, c-l, ...,n.
if -(:z:t, ... , :z:~)is the commodity vector purchased by consumer i. It will
generally be assumed that if~a for all i.
yf _ (Yl, ... , y~) is the vector of initial holdings of commodities held by
consumer i.
Assuming that quaJity vectors can be added linearly, the vectors of quality
characteristics obtainable for consumer i in commodity markets are given by
SfDed. J. of EetmOm1ca 19;5
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where Q is an (n.x 3) matrix where the rows are the n. quality vectors. Con-
sequently, the mapping from the commodity space (C.dpace) to the Q-space is
linear. The matri::t Q is not indexed. which indicates the unanimity of quality
judgements. We let T(Q) denote the n.-dimeDSional subset of the n-dUnensional
polyhedral cone spanned by the row vectors of Q where the coefficients are
restricted by the ava.ilability coIlStn!.1nts zl:';;; 2:;1 y~, c'"'" l, ...,n.. T(Q) is
clearly the set of quality vectors which can be obtained by trading in com-
modity markets and it is denoted the feasible trading set. Since we have as-
sumed that no commodity can be purchased in negative quantities, the feasible
trading set in the commodity markets will be a. proper subset of the set of
fea.sible trades obtainable with a complete set of qua.lity markets (O). This
applies unless the set of row vectors of the Q-matrIx contains a basis for the
Q-space of the form (ll el' ..., l,l,), where ej is the ith unit vector, which is a.
trivial case because each characteristic would then be available in pure form
and the· economy would be equivalent to the exchange of chara.cterlstics
through a complete set of quality markets, one for each characteristic. There-
fore, it is generaJly assumed that T(Q) is a. proper subset of O.
The situation is depicted in Fig. l where we have assumed two characteristics,
gl and qt. and two commodities whose units are represented by the vectors
å and O. The vectors .Æ..andB represent total amounts of commodity Il and b,
respectively.
If each quality component could be traded in separate markets, the feasible
tra.ding set would be given by the rectangle ODGE. However, when exchange
of quality characteristics is restricted to taJCng place by means of an exchange
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of non-negative amounts of the two commodities, the feasible trading set is
given by the shaded area. OBOA.
For given commodity prices, the obtainable set of quality vectors for each
individual, i.e. his opportunity set. is determined by his budget constraint
2.:-1 Pc(z! -y!) -O. It is easy to show that the individual opportunity sets
in the Q-spa.ce are closed, bounded and convex subsets of T(Q). In particular,
if there are at least as ma.ny cha.ra.cteriBtics as commodities, the budget plane
in commodity space is transformed into an n-dimensional hyperplane in the
Q-space. In Fig. l, the individual opportunity set may be represented by the
area. OB'A'.
The preference ordering defined on the Q-spa.ce induces a preference ordering
over O-spa.ce. This relationship is given by U'(:i1Q) æ F'(:i~) where F'(') may
be interpreted as the induced utility function on C.space for the ith individual.
It is trivial to verify that if U'(·) is strictly quasi-concave on the Q-space,
then the induced function F'(')will be the same on the C-space, so that in-
difference surfaces on the O-space will ha.ve the usual convexity properties.
Equilibrium in commodity ma.r.ltets is determined by utility maximizing:
subject to i-l, ...,m
"2. pc(re -?le) .. O
C-l
Market clearing:
..
2.(re-?le)-O c-l, ...,n
'-l
Necessary conditions for maximum are given byl
,
2. U1(ziQ)Qc1-l'pc c-l, ...,11.
l-l
(1)
where U~(') denotes the partial deri'Vllotive of U'(:i~Q) with respect to the
jth argument and the Lagrangea.n multiplier A.I has the usual interpretation
of ma.rgina.l utility of initial wealth. (l) may be rewritten as:
i-l •...,m (2)
l If there &re more commodities than characteristics, n > I. the system of first-order
conditions would be over-determined. and for & solution to exist. n-I of the first-order
conditions must be expreeeible &8 linear combinatioIlS ai the remaining ones. This implies
that n-I of the prices must be linear combinatioIlS of the , prices oorresponding to the
maz:imum number of linearly independent quality veotars.
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The left-hand side of (2) can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between commodity (quality vector) c and ti, and in equilibrium this is
equal to the relative prices for a.ll consumers. Hence, the equilibrium exchange
of commoditiu is Pareto optimal. It can easily be seen that condition (2)
will not necessarily imply equalization of z:;w.rginal rates of substitution be-
tween quality characteristics over consumers, so that the a.llocation of quality
characteristics effected through commodity markets will not be Pareto optimal
in general. In t,his sense the competitive a.llocation of characteristics in com-
modity ma.rkets will be a. constrained optimum or some kind of second- best
allocation relative to the commodity market structure.
Rewriting condition (1) as
(3)
the £actor j1:~=(l/..tj)UHx~) may be interpreted aa the implicit- price per unit
of characteristic i for consumer i evaluated. at equilibrium in the commodity
markets, Le. n~is the implicit price consumer i is willing to pay for a unit of
characteristic i. Since the equilibrium exchange oI commodities generally
represents a constrained Pareto optimum in the Q-apace, the implicit prices
for characteristics will differ for different consumers.
However, if there are aa many commodities aa characteristics, 17. =8, and
the purchase of commodities innegative quantities is permitted, the equilibrium
exchange of commodities will represent an unconstrained Pareto-optimal
exchange of characteristics since the set of commodities (quality vectors)
will span the s-dimensicnel Q-spa.ce. In this case the implicit prices for charac-
teristics, at an equilibrium in the commodity markets, would be the same for
a.ll consumers and could in principle be computed. from (3) as if' ;=Q-Lp' where!
if-(nl. ...,n;) (the same for a.ll i) and P=-(l'l' ..., p",}.
In general, however, an equilibrium exchange of commodities represents
a. constrained Pareto optimum in the Q-space, in which case the implicit price
vectors for characteristics will be in a. subspece of dimension 8-n. This implies
that there will not be any one-to-one relationship between implicit prices for
characteristics and equilibrium commodity prices .
.As separate markets for each quality characteristic are not likely to exist
in any economy, the equalization of marginaJ. rates of substitution between
quality characteristics is not a particularly useful criterion for exchange effi-
ciency in commodity markets. In the analysis below, the concept of efficiency
in commodity markets refers to efficiency in the sense of condition (2) since
the unconstJ:a.ined Pa.reto-optimal a.llocation is generally not obtainable under
a. commodity market structure.
l Prime denotes tmnspoaition.
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III. Allocation of Resources and Commodities in a Production
Economy with Fixed Product Differentiation
Each firm is assumed to produce a single commodity (quality vector) with
a. single input common to all firms. Thus, the firms' decisions on product
differentiation are suppressed for the time being. All firms behave as price-
takers in the commodity and input markets. Firm c produces commodity c,
a unit of which is defined by the vector ~e-(flel' ..., fle.), c-l, ..., n.
kt: -input of the common factor of production in the cth firm.
~-total endowment of factor k,
r - price for a unit of factor Ie,
%t:-amOlmt of commodity c produced by firm c, and
%t:-"Pe(kt:} is the production function of firm c. It is assumed that tp;(ke} >O,
tp;(ke}<O.
Equilibrium in commodity and factor markets is determined by utility
ma.ximjzing on the consumer side and profit ma.ximjzing by firms. Utility
ma.ximjzing implies
Profit maximjzing implies
tp;(lCt:)Pt: - r or Pc -1'I",,;(ke), c - l, ... ,11,
Fina.lly, commodity and factor markets must clear:
'"L:~-""e(l:c) c-1, ...,n
l-l
By combining the m.a.nmum conditionsabove we get the competitive, alloca-
tion rule
i-l, ... ,m· (4)
The left-hand side of (4) is consumer i's marginal rate of substitution between
commodity c and a,while the right-hand side may be interpreted as the marginal
rate of tra.ns£ormation in the production of commodity c and a. Hence. for
fixed product differentiation, the competitive allocation rule is Pareto-optimal
since the marginal rates of substitution between any pair of commodities are
equalized for all consumers and equated to the marginal rates of tra.ns£orma-
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tion in production. Ågain, this result should be rather trivial, because when
we restrict the efficiency concept to the commodity space, we are leit with
the standard competitive model.
lY. Optimal Allocation of Resoureee ~d Commodities in a
Production Economy with Possibilities for Product
Differentiation
We now make the rather reaJistic assumption that, within limits set by its
technology, a firm can produce a certain range of quality vectors. The set
oi producible quality vectors for a particular firm is called the firm's production
set. All producible quality vectors oi a given firm are assumed to form a
convex polyhedral cone in the Q-space. For fu:ed factor input, the maximum
amount which the firm can produce of the various quality vectors in its
production set is assumed to be given by So concave boundary surface in the
Q-space. The boundary S1ll.'::faceof a particular firm will indicate the substitu-
tion possibilities between the various quality characteristics producible in
that firm with a given input level. We call this the firm's tra.ns:forma.tion snr-
face. It is åssumed that the tra.ns:forma.tion surface in firm c is given by the
implicit function
where Ot; is the convex polyhedral cone representing firm c's production set.
Moreover, we make the simplifying assumption that the boundary function
h.t;(zc·iJc) is a. homothetie function so that all information a.bout the substitu-
tion possibilities is contained in the unit sor.fa.ceh.c(iJc) -o. This means that the
tra.ns:forma.tion suria.ces corresponding to different production scales will be
radial e.rpa.nsions of the unit surface, Le. the substitution possibilities will be
independent oi the level of input. This seemingly rigid assumption is motivated
by the fact that it enables us to sepa.ra.te decisions as to production scale and
product differentiation. Needless to say, these decisions will generally overlap.
However, relaxing the assumption of homotheticity of the boundaryfunctions
h.c( • ) would complicate the formulas without changing the qualitative structure
oi the results.
Since each commodity has a. positive price, a.ll efficient production choices
must be located on the boundary surface for a. profit-maximjzing firm. To
keep things simple, we retain the assumption that for technological reasons,
each firm can only produce one commodity. This means that each firm can
select only one vector from its production set. Thus, we have substitution
possibilities in each firm ez ante but no substitution ez po8t. It is also assumed
that any quality vector in the production set of a particular firm is produced
31D8d. J. of Economie8 1975
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Fig.2
on the basis of the same production function,l Le. z~-"P~(l:~),where Ze is the
&mount produced of quality vector qeEC~
A typical production set is depicted in Fig. 2 for the case of a. two-<iimen-
sional Q-space. We have dra.wn three different tnl.ns:iorma.tion curves, h( 1fJ( le )q) -
0, corresponding to factor inputs le'" > le" > le'. These curves are characterized
by the fact that the derivative dqJdql is constant along any quality ray in
the cone C.
In order to avoid the problem of comer solutions, it is assumed that quality
vectors on a. facet of the convex polyhedral cones C~ will never be optimal.
In the enmple in Fig. 2, this can be ensured by imposing that dqJdql _ - 00
along the my Aqoand dqJdql -o along Nil.
Efficiency in an economy such as this raises two problems: (i) How should an
optUnal quality vector in each production set be selected! (ti) What are the
optimal production and distribution of the set of qualityvectors (commodities)
selected under (i).
(ti) is the traditional efficiency problem in So production economy. Problem
(i), however, introduces a. qualitative aspect into the efficiency concept.
Since each firm. has, within certain limits, an ez ante choice between producing
different quality variants o£ its product, the question arises a.a to how an
optimal pattern of product differentiation should be determined for the whole
economy.
1 '!'hia implies that variati011ll in the quality design of the product do not require resources.
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Pareto-optimal rules for production, distribution and product d.i:fferenti~
tion can be obtained by solving the following constrained max:imum problem: .
'"Max 2: r UI(r Q) (where r,i .. l, o o o, m, are arbitrary positive weights)
l-l
subject to
'"2: ~-'tpe(&:c),o-l, ••• ,7& (commodity a..~bility constraints),
l-l
"2: &:a -&:0 (input availability constraint),
hc(gc) - O,c -l, ... ,7& (quality constraints).
Forming the La.gra.ngean, we have
and the first-order conditions for an optimum are given byl.
3
r 2: ~(rQ) qci -I"c i- 1, ... , m; c'" 1, .... 7&
l-l
(5)
(6)
'"2: r Oj(: Q) ~ -'Vch.~(gc) j = l, ... ,3; c -l ... o, n.
'-l
(7)
wb.ere h~t( o) denotes the partial deriva.tive of he( o) with respect to the ith
argument.
Combining (5) and (6) gives the e.f:ficientallocation rule
(8)
Condition (7) may be rewritten as:
0-1, ...,7& (9)
l Although the individual 1ltility ftmctions are strictly qua.si-ooncave on the Q-apace.
a.ud. also strictly quasi-concave in the 2:; for Et. given set oi quality vectors. the U'( o) will
generally not be jointly qua.si-ooncave in :I)~ a.ud. qet' Thus the finrt-<>rder conditions are
not suificient for Et. global optimum.
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Condition (8) is of course identical with the Pareto-optimal production rule
for a production economy with fixed product differentiation. Condition (9),
however, must be interpreted as a condition for Pareto-optimal product
differentiation or qualitative efficiency. Generally, the left-hand side of (9)
will depend explicitly on the distribution of z~ over consumers. Consequently,
the Pareto-optimal trade-om between quality characteristics may differ for
different firms. A Pareto-optimal degree of product differentiation may
even require that firms with identical teohnologies, Le. identical production
sets and substitution possibilities, produce different quality vectors.
Moreover, the optimal differentiation rule (9) is not equated to any parameter
ratios of the problem and since optimal differentiation depends explicitly
on the optimal exchange of the resulting commodities, this implies that ex-
change efficiency and qualitative efficiency cannot be separated. Thus, it
seems that the separation of productive and distributive efficiency which is
so fundamental to allocation theory ca.nJlot be extended to the case of product
differentiation.
For an economy with product differentiation, Pareto-optimal production
choices will generally not be efficient in the Q-space.1The reason for this follows
from the fact that characteristics have to be distributed through commodity
markets so that there may be a trade-<l£f between the degree of product
differentiation, i.e. the range of choice, and the amount of each characteristic
produced. In other words, there.may be a. trade-<lH between the "width" a.nd
the "length" of the feaaible trading set. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where
two characteristics and two production units have been aæumed.Tbe aJlocation
of inputs to firms is assumed to be optimal and the resulting traDsiormation
curves in the Q-space are given by.d.d" and BB" for the two firms, respectively.
The transformation curve for the whole economy is given by CC" and it is
constructed by adding all points on .d.d" and BE' with equal slope. This is an
efficiency frontier in the sense that for any given point located on this curve,
more of one cha.ra.cteristic cannot be produced without producing less of the
other. The ~ ante feaaible trading set is the collection of aJl (ql' q:)-combina.-
tions which can be obtained in the commodity market with the given sta.te
of technology. In Fig. 3, the ~ ante fea.aible trading set is given by the area
OE'C"C'CÅ.
We assume that the vector .!' is selected from the production set of the
first firm and B' from the production set of the second firm. Then the ~ p08l
feasible trading set is given by the shaded area OEC'.!'. It is clear that pro-
ductive efficiency in Q-space requires that points on the two transformation
curves with equal slope are selected, that is, i:f there were a. market for each
characteristic, only points on the traDsiormation curve CC" would be part
1 Productive efficiency iD the Q'øpace reiers to an &llocation of resources such that the
total amount oi one particular characteristio cannot be increased unless the total amount
of some other characteristio is reduced.
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Fig. ,
.'
oi So Pareto-optimal solution. However, since cb.a.ra.cterlstics are distributed
by means of commodities, we ma.y conceive of situations where it is optimal
to select points on the two tra.ns£orma.tion curves with different slopes. This
may be the case il consumer demands are very dispersed in the Q~ace in
the sense that some consumers have a very strong preference for c.ha.ra.cteristic
~ while others have a. very strong preference for q!l' The widest possible e:z; p08t
tracling set would be obtained by selecting points Å and B" from the two
production sets, respectively. It can easily be seen that total production in
tlUs case will £a.ll short of the efficiency frontier 00", thus confirming our
a.ssert:ion that there will be So trade-off between efficiency in the production
of ch.a.ra.cteristcs and the range of choice for consumers.
We now tum to the question of whether a. Pareto-optimal allocation satisfy-
ing conditions (8) and (9) can be effected through a. decentraJized. competitive
ma.rket system. As noted a.bove, the problem of qualitative efficiency C&llD.ot
in general be sepa.rated from that of distributive efficiency. Hence, there is
no price system common to all economic agents which ensures that profit
maximizing of competitive firms willlead to a Pareto-optimal pattern of prod-
uct differentiation.
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It is not even quite clear what competitive behavior should mean in this
context. For a given choice of quality, price-ta.king certainly requires that
firms behave as if they believe that OpclQr.c-O. However, it is not at aJl clear
what price-ta.kmg with respect to quality variants should mean. A possible
suggestion may be to take the implicit prices for characteristics as given, i.e.
as independent of the decisions of the individual producers. In this case, £inn
a would perceive the relation between its choice of quality and its product
price as given by (apJaqcl)dqcl-n~dqcl. The problem inherent in this approach
is that the implicit prices for cha.ra.cterlstic. are not readilyavailable in com-
modity markets. Moreover, for the case where n <8, the implicit prices will
differ for different consumers so that the outcome would depend on whose
implicit prices are being used,
For the speciaJ. case where n-8, the implicit prices are uniquely determined
by equilibrium commodity prices1 and can in principle be computed £:rom
if' -Q-Ip'. In this particular case, price-taking with respect to quality variants
would be well-defined. It is also clear that a profit-maximjzing quality variant
in £inn a would be chara.cterized by the £act that the marginal rates of trans.
formation between any two characteristics must be equal to their implicit
price ratios, that is
(10)
In this case, the market differentiation rule (10) will be Pareto-optimal.
This can be seen by noting that for n-8, the marginal ra.tes of substitution
between chara.cteristics i and le will in optimum be the same for a.ll consumers.
This implies that the left·hand side of (9) reduces to nt/n" so that the Pareto-
optimal rule and the market rule will be identicaJ.
In the general case where n <8, competitive behavior with respect to quality
decisions and hence competitive equilibrium are not well defined.
The problem of finding appropriate prices for evaluating the social desir-
a.bility of different quality variants of a given commodity would also be en-
countered in a centraJly planned economy. Assuming that a market planner
imposes his own or someone else's implicit prices for quality characteristics
and instructs the firms to behave as price-ta.kers and use the imposed prices
in their profit caJcula.tiOJlS,profit maximizing firms would select points on
their transformation su:da.ceswith equal slope. This will certainly be produc-
tively efficient in the Q-spa.cebut it may not result in a socially optimal quality
range of commodities.
The reason for the general lack of optimalmarket rules£orproduct differentia-
tion is the basic asymmetry of the definition of goods on the consumption
and production sides of the economy. CODSUmerpreferences are basically
1 We note that this may require that commodities can be purchased in negative amounts.
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defined over quality characteristics whereas firms supply bundles of charac-
teristics and it is the bundles which are priced in commodity markets. In
the general case, however, commodity prices will not convey the correct
information to firms about the social desirability of various quality choices.
Nor will the implicit prices be of any help because they differ for different
consumers, thus indicating that a given qua:lity change will affect consumers
in different ways. This amounts to a kind of structural inefficiency since the
market does not provide the necessary information for opti.ma.l quality choices
by firms.
In fact, the notion of quality in commodity markets has much the same
properties as a public good. If a new and unique quality vector is produced,
it will enlarge the range of choice for all consumers since it increases the
dimension of the set of feasible trades in commodity markets. It is not the
commodity in itself, but ra.ther the availability of a unique quality variant
which has the public good property. To illustrate this point, the unique beauty
of, say, a Beethoven Symphony can be enjoyed byeveryone and the pleasure
one particular music lover derives from it is independent of the pleasure Ol
others.1 Once So particular symphony has been composed, however, the record-
ings of it ha ve to be considered !l.S ordinary private goods.
The effect of introducing a new quality variant into the market may also
be regarded as analogous to the effects of technological progress in the classical
model. Technologioal progress, or more specifically, positive slrifts in the
production functions will lower cost, thereby reducing prices, and then
induce positive shifts in the individual budget constrainsa. Therefore, the
problems of es"Gablishingefficient incentives for decentralized quality decisions
are more or less the same as those involved in establishing efficient market
incentives for inventions or the production of new knowledge in Sr wide sense.
As the consumer optimum in commodity markets maY.1.be Sr constrained
optimum in the Q-space, Le. it may be on the boundaries of the feasible trading
set, the desirability of Sr ma.rgin.a.lva.ria.tion in the quality cha.ra.cterlstics of a.
given commodity may be judged differently by different consumers. The
correct measure of the gain in social welfare from varying the quality design
of a given commodity should therefore be some weighted. sum of individual
marginal utilities. This is also confirmed by the Pa.reto-optimal differentiation
rule (9) where a. Pareto optimal quality pa.ttern requires firmc to equate
its marginal rate of transformation between any two characteristics to the
ratio between weighted sums over all consumers of the individual marginal
utilities for the two cha.ra.cteristics, with weights given by the distributional
parameters .' and the amount each consumer gets of commodity c. This is a
very natural requirement because i£ consumer i gets nothing of commodity c,
his preferences should be given no weight in determining the optimal quality
1 Of course, this presupposes that interpersonal preferencea do not emt.
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design of that commodity. For the polar case whereby commodity c is only
consumed by consumer i, the preferences of that consumer alone should
determine its optimal quality characteristics.
In the public good spirit, we can define some sort of pseudo-equilibrium by
instructing firms to use a weighted sum of individual marginal utilities as
prices for characteristics when calculating the profitability of various quality
choices. This would certainly lead to an equilibrium allocation that would
be efficient both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view, i.e. it
would satisfy conditions (8) and (9). As these prices are not reflected by the
market, however, this would require complete knowledge of all individual
preferences.
If firms use the same implicit prices for characteristics and behave com-
petitively with respect to these prices, it may result in a too narrow qual-
ity structure of commodities. .As noted in connection with Fig. 3, optimal
quality decisions may involve a trade-off between quantitative efficiency in
the Q-space and the range of choice, i.e, a trade-off between the "width"
and the "length" of the feasible trading set. If this is to take place in a market
context, di£ferent firms have to use di£ferent implicit prices for characteristics
in their profit ca.lculations. The efficiency properties of the market allocation
are therefore crucially dependent on how firms perceive the relation between
the quality design of a commodity and its market price, i.e, the derivatives
oPe/oqct- Thus it may seem natura.! to raise the question as to whether some
kind of monopolistic competition-among producers might be better in terms of
efficiency, compared to a situation where all producers use the same implicit
prices for characteristics and behave competitively with respect to these prices.
It should perhaps be expected that if some teehnologically feasible and desirable
• quality vectors were not being produced, some producers would see this
opportunityand plug the gap in the Q-space if this were profitable.
It is clear that if di£ferent firms face di£ferent demand schedules for their
products, they would generally perceive the implicit prices for the quality
characteristics of their productsdi£ferently and thus select points on their
transformation surlaces with di£ferent slopes. But it would be difficult to
verify whether this would be in the direction of a Pareto optimum or not.
If firms behave in a monopolistic way, however, they would probably take into
account the downward slope of the demand curves in the commodity space,
i.e. behave as if Ope/azo <0, and thus curtail production of a. given quality
vector below the efficiency level. This may more than outweigh the gains in
other respecta,
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have tried to introduce product di£ferentiation into a com-
petitive setting and we have shown tha.t, for given quality designs, a com-
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petitive economy will produce and distribute these commodities in efficient
amounts. If producers also have to decide on the quaJity design of their prod-
ucts, a competitive equilibrium is defined only in a peeudc-sense.
Admittedly, the simplifying essumpeioaa made as to CODSUmerpreferences
and production technology are rather heroic. Certainly, the results of Section
IV are critically dependent on the behavioral. assumption that consumer
preferences are basica.lly defined over quality cha.ra.cteristics.1 On the other
hand, it is difficult to evaJua.te the importance of the assumption that firms
can produce only one single qua.lity variant in their production sets. However,
a.s long a.s firms only produce a few of the technically feasible quaJity variants
in their production sets, the main conclusions should remain valid.
In genera.l, ei:ficiency prices for cha.ra.cterlstics will not exist in commodity
markets, so that a system of decentralized qua.1ity choices by profit maximjzing
firms is not likely to produce a sociaJly optima.! quaJity pattern of goods.
Prices in commodity markets simply do not perform the dual function of pro-
viding producers with necessary information for optima.l decisions with regard
to both production levels and quaJity choices.
The basic problem is that a Pareto-optimal range of qua.lity designs requires
profit maximizing firms to use different prices for cha.ra.cteristics when evalnat-
ing the profitability of various quaJity choices. This will normally be the case
in an economy with some degree of monopolistic competition and it might
well be the case that the price of having a well-differentiated quaJity pattern
of goods in a market economy must be some loss in quantita.tive efficiency in
the commodity spa.ce.:! However, it is not easy to conceive of any market
system striking the optima.l balance between qua.lity differentiation and pro-
ductive efficiency in the Q-space. Since profits are not likely to be efficient
incentives for decentralized quaJity decisioaa, we should perhaps look for more
efficient ways of organizing economic activity.
•
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CHOICE OF PRODUCT QUALITY: EQUILIBRIUM
AND EFFICIENCY
By JACQUES H. DREZE AND KÅRE P. HAGEN1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to examine the role of prices and to assess the
efficiency of the market mechanism in guiding production decisions with respect
to both product quantities and the qualities of the products produced in
economies with product differentiation.
A rigorous treatment of product differentiaticn requires an operational
definition of product quality and quality changes. For this purpose we shall adopt
the "hedonic" approach to consumer demand theory as developed by Lancaster
[9J. This systematic reformulation of consumer demand theory rests on two
fundamental assumptionsr'
(i) All goods possess objective characteristics relevant to the choices people
make among different collections of goods.
(ii) It is the characteristics, rather than goods. which are the ultimate objects
of consumer satisfaction. The consumers are endowed with preferences for
collections of characteristics and the preferences for goods are indirect or
derived in the sense that goods are required only in order to produce charac-
teristics.
This formulation permits a natural definition of product quality and quality
changes: Given the units of measurement, the quality of a given commodity is
objectively defined by the amount of the various characteristics embodied in a
unit of that commodity. It is implicit in this formulation that all characteristics
are quantitatively measurable and we shall assume that they can be varied
continuously.
The model is closed by introducing objective technical relationships between
quantities of commodities and the characteristics which they possess. The
simplest, and most widely used, specification is the linear technology, fully
described by a "consumption technology matrix" B, relating column vectors of
commodities x to column vectors of characteristics zthrough z = x' B where the
jth row of B represents the amount of the various characteristics embodied in a
unit of commodity j.
The linear technology specification will also be used here, although the
assumption that characteristics can be added linearly may seem rather unrealistic
1The authors are indebted to Donald J. Roberts for helpful comments. which have contributed to
an increase in the quality of the product.
% See Lancaster (9. p. 7].
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in most cases. We believe, however, that this simplified approach will give us'
some insight into the efficiency of the market mechanism in economies with
variable product qualities also under moregeneral consumption technologies. In
particular, sources of inefficiency detected in the linear case will remain present
in the general case as well.
This model has also proved useful to account for quality changes in the
construction of price indexes. In this literature the general presumption is that
the multitude of models and varieties of a particular commodity can be compre-
hended in a much smaller number of characteristics or basic attributes so that
most new models of commodities may be viewed as new combinations of old
characteristics.'
The same approach has emerged naturally in the literature on investment
decisions by firms in physical assets and decisions by consumers investing in
financial assets. The literature on portfolio choices by consumers starts from the
unquestioned premise that preferences among collections of financial assets are
derived from underlying preferences among collections of characteristics. In the
seminal works by Tobin [261 and Markowitz [1.51, only two characteristics are
considered, namely mean and variance of the random return to a portfolio. A
more general model, which is receiving increasing attention. describes the
uncertainty associated with investment decisions in terms of physical uncertainty
about the economic environment (nature). Following Arrow [1] and Debreu [3],
one considers a finite set of alternative, mutually exclusive "states of nature" and
one describes a financial asset by its return under each state. The characteristics
in which consumers are interested are similarly the global returns of a portfolio
under each state and these are naturally defined by a linear technology.
Similarly, a physical asset is described by its return pattern over the states of
nature so that physical investment can be viewed as a characteristics producing
activity.
A sizeable literature deals with the allegedly realistic case where there are
many more states of nature (characteristics) than financial assets (commodities)
and one studies conditions under which competitive markets for financial assets
(the-stock market) provide adequate signals to guide the physical investment
decisions by firms."
Situations with fewer commodities than characteristics (Le., incomplete
markets) in the traditional framework of certainty' are of course due to
economies of scale (relative to market size). The fixed costs of merchandising
additional commodities are as relevant in this respect as economies of scale in
production or indivisibilities in the commodities.
3 See Griliches (8, p. 4J.
ol See, for instance, the "Symposium on the Optimality of Competitive Capital Markets" in the
Spring 1974 issue of the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (7. 11, 17. 191.
S Under uncertainty, examples of incomplete markets are numerous also outside the capital
markets model. Probabilities of shortage are an interesting case (especially for countries that do not
produce oil), early recognized in connection with electricity supply. See Boiteux (21 and Dreze (41.
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1.2
Except for recent contributions by Rosen [20]. Leland [12]. and Lancaster [9].
which explore some aspects of optimal product differentiation in a context
similar to ours, the problem of efficient supply of commodities with multiple
hedonic characteristics has received little attention in the literature on consumer
demand and hedonic price indexes. On the other hand, the properties of demand
functions for commodities with multiple characteristics are hardly explored in
the literature on competitive capital markets. The present paper will hopefully
contribute to both streams of literature, by using some properties of demand
functions in an attempt to assess the conditions under which prices in the
commodity markets guide efficiently the choices of product qualities by firms
motivated by profit incentives."
The main issue to be investigated is the following. Consider a system of C
characteristics and J commodities, C and J being given. Assume that com-
modities are produced by firms endowed with production sets that allow for
substitution among characteristics in the production of commodities. Will profit
maximization lead firms to choose for each commodity the combination of
characteristics which is most desirable from the standpoint of consumer welfare?
In Section 2 below, we define the model. In Section 3, we discuss the problem
of optimal product differentiation in a general equilibrium context and we derive
necessary conditions for optimal product variety in terms of characteristics. In
Section 4, we discuss profit maximizing choices of product quality under mono-
polistic and competitive pricing of commodities. Using some useful properties of
demand functions for commodities with multiple hedonic characteristics. which
are investigated in the Appendix. we give necessary and sufficient conditions for
local optimality of the profit maximizing choices of product quality. In Section 5,
we investigate briefly the possibility of computing prices for chafacteristics from
commodity prices and we relate our results to the "unanimity theorem" in
capital market theory.
We conclude this introduction by noting that we could easily invert the roles of
input and outputs so as to apply the analysis in this paper to the problem of
choosing working conditions, viewed as the characteristics of the input com-
modity labor. The results in Section 4 also provide an answer to the question
whether profit maximization williead capitalistic firms to adopt working condi-
tions that are efficient from the viewpoint of workers' preferences. That question
is discussed in a recent paper by Dreze [6].
2. mE MODEL
The model considered in this paper consists of H households,' indexed
h == 1 ... H. and J firms, indexed i= l ... J. Each firm j produces a single
6 We shall not be concerned with the problem of existence of equilibria in economies with product
differentiation in this paper. We may, however, refer to a recent paper by Mas-Colell (16) where the
characteristics framework is used to introduce product differentiation in a pure exchange economy
(with infinitely many traders). Mas-Colell proves that the set of equilibria is non-empty and equal to
the core.
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consumption good, also indexed by j, in quantity Xj' Each consumption good
embodies some or all of C characteristics, indexed c = l ... C, and bie measures
the quantity of characteristic c embodied in one unit of commodity j. B denotes
the I x C (variable) "technology matrix" with typical element bje. Each firm j
uses a single input indexed zero, in quantity :Cia, and chooses a (C + 2)-dimen-
sional vector Y/=(:CjO, xi> bil' .. biC)' in its production set Yj s; RCc;2. The inter-
pretation of Y; is discussed in a remark below.
The input is common to all firins and it is also used as a numeraire, In
alternative interpretations of the model, the input may be labor, capital, foreign
exchange, a composite commodity (money?) summarizing non-consumption
goods, a good identified with a C + 1st characteristic, etc.
To distinguish between changes in output levels x, and changes in charac-
teristics embodied per unit output, we need a definition of unit sizes of com-
modities in terms of characteristics. To that effect, we assume that every com-
modity j contains at least one given characteristic in positive amount," to be
indexed i', and we set bli' = l for size normalization. Hence, the characteristics of
commodity i, bie, are measured per unit of characteristic j'. Of course, the index
j' may be different for different j.
This normalization procedure may seem natural in some cases (as in cases
where bli' measures weight and commodity i is sold by weight), but in other cases
it may seem rather artificial. Also, this procedure has the undesirable property
that all characteristics are not treated symmetrically. Symmetry would call for
normalizing unit sizes to the unit sphere or the unit simplex in the characteristics
space. This would, however, render the analysis more cumbersome without
changing the results.
Each household h has a consumption set z" in the space R C~l of charac-
teristics and the numeraire. The initial resources of household h are defined by a
non-negative vector wit = (w3, w~ ... w~)' in R:H. The reason for introducing
initial quantities (possibly zero) of the characteristics will become clear later
when we shall derive a Slutsky equation for quality changes (Appendix). The
consumption of commodities by household h is denoted x" = (:c~ ... x~)' ER~.
The purchase or sale of the numeraire by household h is x3. The consumption of
household h in the space of characteristics and the numeraire is
(O) zlt=(z3,z~.,.Z~)'_Wk+(x3,Xk'B)'
and is constrained to be an element of z:
An allocation for this economy is a (I +2H}tuple of vectors {Yi}, {Xk, zit},
hereafter denoted a. An allocation a is feasible if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(1)
(2)
'fli,
'flh,
7 In the capilal market context this amounts to assuming thaI there is al least one given stale in
which firm i never goes bankrupt.
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(4) "li, 2:x~-xi~O,
It
(Uh It "ltb It5) v ,c, Z l: - ... X i jc ~ Wc'
i
The set of feasible allocations is denoted A.
The interpretation of conditions (1~(4) is standard: (1) technical feasibility in
production, (2) consumers' survival (technical feasibility in consumption), (3)
availability of input, (4) availability of output.
The set of conditions (5) (He conditions altogether) is specific to the model
with many characteristics; it relates the consumption of characteristics to the
allocation of commodities. Technically, it implies free disposal of characteristics
separately from commodities, which is sometimes unrealistic. Under the mono-
tonicity of Assumption l this restriction is immaterial.
The model. (lH5) is analogous to that used in the literature on production
decisions under uncertainty, with Xiodenoting investment by firm j at time o and
X;b'l: output of firm j at time l in state c; see, e.g., Dreze [Sl or Radner [19].
The "single input" assumption is made here for simplicity and convenience.
The generalization to many inputs (with fixed or variable characteristics) is
immediate and does not modify the results. The "single output per firm"
assumption is more important but entails no loss of generality. Like the single
input simplification, it is standard in the literature on production under
uncertainty, where it corresponds to equity financing. (Several commodities per
firm would correspond to several, diversified, financial assets, say preferred
stock, common stock, mortgaged bonds, etc .... ). In the general demand
context, outputs of different firms must be treated as different commodities.
since firms may combine the characteristics differently. With several outputs per
firm, the results below remain valid at the local equilibrium level (the level
adopted anyhow in this paper).
3. P~CESANOEF:RcæNCY
A price system for the economy (lH5), using the input as a numeraire, is a
vector p = (Pl ... PI)' e R~. An income distribution is a vector v = (v 1 ... vH)' e
RH• A feasible allocation a, a price system P, and an income distribution v define
a budgeted allocation provided
(6) uh It I It Itv , Xo +p x ~ v .
Clearly I;(P,xi-Xio);a:IIt (xS+p'xlt) and one could thus let the income dis-
tribution correspond to private ownership of the firms with vit = Ii 8~(P;Xi - XiO)'
Ik 8~ = 1, with 87 denoting the fraction of firm i owned by household h,
The following assumptions are used throughout the paper:
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ASSUMPTION 1: 'flh, Zit is closed, convex, and completely ordered by a quasi.
concave, twice continuously differentiable utility function. o:(z h), with
aUltjaz3 >0, ault/az~ >0 for ail c and for ail zit «z':
ASSUMPTION 2: vi. Yi is closed and convex.
A competitive products equilibrium relative to a given technology matrix E, is a
budgeted allocation (a, p, v) such that:
(7) 'fIh,. UIt(zlt»UIt(Zh) implies X~+p'ih>VIt for all
(i~,ilt) such that zit ~ i~_wit +(i~,ilt, BY,
(8) 'flj, P;Xj - XjO;;a p~; - :itO for all (x(oox;) such that
(X;o, Xi' bil ... biC) e Yi.
Conditions (7) are a natural extension of the traditional concept of utility
maximization, and say that if there exists a feasible bundle z" which is strictly
preferred by h to the equilibrium bundle zit, then it must cost more," while (8)
says that Yimaximizes profits over 11;.• In this definition of a competitive products
equilibrium the technology matrix is taken as given and firms are assumed to
choose quantities of input and output so as to maximize profits at given prices.
The set of Pareto optima for the economy (1)-{5), denoted A", is defined by:
(9) A" = {ala eA, 3d sA, trir:» Uk(ZhWh. L trir; L UIt(Zh)}.
It It
In (9), the technology matrix is allowed to vary over the set of feasible
allocations. It is instructive to consider a zrore restrictive concept. For a given
technology matrix B, define the set of feasible allocations with technology B.
denoted A(B), by:
(10) A(E) = {a e AlB =B} = {a eAIYi = (X;o> Xi> ~l ••• Ftc)', j = 1... I}.
The set of Pareto optima relative to (the technology) B, denoted A" (B), is
defined by:
(11) A"(E)={ala eA(E), 3d eA(B), Ult(iit)
;;a ult (zlt)'Vh, L Uit(ik» LUIt(zit)}.
it It
The following results are classic:
Paososrrrcx 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for every B such that A (S);i:ø:
(a)'A(B) is convex; (b) if (a eA(E), p, v) define a competitive products equilib-
8 (7) could have been written alternativety as follows:
U(w"+(i~ il"BYJ> U(wk +(x3. xk• BY) implies i~+p' i" >vk•
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num relative to B, then a eAP(B); (c) if a eAP(B), then there exist (p, v) such
that (a, p, v) is a competitive products equilibrium relative toB.
As an immediate corollary we have:
PRoposmON 2: Under Assumptions l and 2, if a eAP, there exist (p, v) such
that (a, p, v) is a competitive products equilibrium.
PROOF: Follows from Proposition l (c) since B is kept fixed in the definition of
a competitive products equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Of course, the above results are rather obvious because when the technology
matrix B is kept fixed, we are back to the classical model with fixed quality of
goods. The following proposition is perhaps less widely appreciated."
PRoposmON 3: Assumptions l and 2 are not sufficient for either of the
foilowing two conditions to hold: (a) A is convex; (b) if (a, p, v) defines a
competitive products equilibrium (relative to B), then a e AP.
PROOF: (a) follows from the bilinear fonn of constraint (S) in the definition of
the set of feasible allocations.
(b) Assume AP (",AP(B)= ø (an example, satisfying Assumptions l and 2,
is given below). By Proposition l(c), any a eAP(B) will provide the desired
counterexample. Q.E.D.
EXAMPLE: Let J =H ::2, c = 3, !k w~= 2, r"w; = 0, c = l, 2, 3, Zit = R!,
h=l, 2, and Yl={Yllxl~X10~1, bu=l, btl+b12+btJ~2}, Yl=
{Yllx2~x20~ 1, bn= l, bl1 +b22 +b23 ~2}.
Let the allocation a be as follows:
Xl =X10= 1, bu = bu = l, bu =0, xi = l, x; =0;
X2 =.%20= 1, bl1 = b22 = 1, b23 = O, xi= 1, x~ =0;
consequently, Zl = (0,2,2, oy and Z2 = (0, O,0, oy.
Let the allocation li be defined as follows:
il = ilO = 1, bu = bu= 1, bt2=0, ii = 0, ir = 1;
X2 =X20= 1, bz.2= b23= l, b-zl = 0, xi=o, x~ = 1.
9 See also Lemma 2.3 in Dreze. (5].
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Consequently, i1==(0,0,0,OY and iZ==(0,1,1,2)'. A does not contain the
allocation a ==(a +å)/2. Indeed, let Yi = (Yi +Yi)/2, j = 1, 2; Xio = (X lo +ilo)/2,
h == 1, 2; then il = (0, t t, ty = iZ and i" ~ (z" +ilo)/2, h == 1, 2. Conversely, let
ilo = (z" +ilo)/2, so that i 1= (0, 1, 1, oy and iZ = (0, to t.1Y. Although il + i1.=
il+iz, there do not exist _tk and Bi such that i~=_t~Gte +_t~GZe,h == l, 2; c == l,
2,3.
In this example, two pairs of consumption vectors in the space of charac-
teristics, {z"} and {ik}, are obtained by varying simultaneously the technology
matrix and the consumption' vectors in the commodity space. Intermediate
consumption vectors in the space of characteristics are consistent with the
constraints (4), but not with the constraints (5): The required total output of each
characteristic is feasible but cannot be allocated properly among households,
because there are only two goods to allocate three characteristics.
In the same example, let the utility functions of both households be Uk =
h~+z~+tzt+z~. The allocation a together with prices Pt=P? (==pi)==1.5
(say) and incomes such that W6+vt=3, W5+vz=0, define a competitive pro-
ducts equilibrium. This competitive products equilibrium is not efficient because
characteristics 1 and 3 could be substiruted one-to-one (in production) for
characteristic 2, which is less preferred. That is, the technology matrix
B ==[110J
110
associated with the allocation a is Pareto dominated by the technology matrix
B = [101J
011
associated with allocation å. Allocation Ii is Pareto optimal and sustained by
. - 1- 8 - >" d i l l ° Z Z 7_prices p?=="Pt, >Pt 3, an incomes wo+v = , wo+v =='4Pt.
REMARK CONCERNING THE PRODUCTION SET Yi: The convexity assumption
on Yj means non-increasing marginal returns both with respect to output levels
Xi and characteristics per unit output bie.
In the above example Yi is defined as the Cartesian product of a convex set in
the space RZ of (X;o. Xi) and a convex set in the space Re of (bit ... bid. Thus
the feasible combinations of characteristics are independent of input and output
levels. It may be more realistic to assume that the total feasible quantity of a
given characteristic is determined by the input level. In such a case the convexity
assumption on Yj is rather restrictive. For example, if-the total feasible quantity
of characteristic c were given by a bilinear constraint of the type Xibfe Ei {3;cXio.
then Yi would clearly not be convex in Xio. Xi. and bie.
3.2
We are now ready to approach the central problem raised in this paper,
namely Pareto efficiency in the supply of characteristics. In view of Proposition
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3(a), sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality must be of a global nature since a
local optimum is not necessarily an overall optimum, in the absence of convexity.
No satisfactory approach to the global problem is currently available. There
remains only to define necessary conditions for Pareto optima, that is, conditions
for Pareto stationary points.1o
To focus on the characteristics of firm j's product, let d e A be a given allocation
and define ~(d) by:
(12) ~(d)={ala eA, xit =ilt Vh. Yle= YleVk '" i, x, =ii}'
That is, ~(å) is the set of feasible allocations which can be obtained by varying
the characteristics of commodity i and the consumptions of the numeraire for a
given production level in firm i, for given production plans of firms other than j
and for a given allocation of commodities over consumers.
The set of Pareto optima in ~(d), denoted Fr (d), is defined in the usual way as:
(13) Fr(d)={ala eF;(å), 3å eF;(d), trir:
sa ult (zlt)Vh, L Ult(ilt» L ult (zit)}.
It It
Accordingly, the quality of firm j's product as given by the vector of charac-
teristics Bi = (bil' .. biC)' will be said to be a qualiry optimum for firm i relative (O
d if and only if a eFHd).
We can then define a Pareto stationary point as follows: An allocation a e A is
a Pareto stationary point if and only if
(i)
(ii)
aeA'(B),
Vi, a eFHa).
Hence, a is Pareto optimal relative to B, and B is such that for every i,B, is a
relative quality optimum given Xi' Yle,k '" i, and {xlt}. Clearly, (i) and (ii) cor-
respond to necessary conditions for a Pareto optimum. Given a Pareto-sta-
tionary point a e A, there may exist feasible, simultaneous, marginal changes in
{xlt} and B such that the resulting allocation Pareto dominates a, which reflects
the fact that a Pareto stationary point may be a saddlepoint.
We are here interested in the price implications of relative quality optima for
firms. To that effect, we note that ~(å) is the set of feasible allocations for an
economy, say Et(d), with preferences given by: 11
(14) Ult( It " -Itb- + -Itb ~ -Itb- _Itb)z o. t.. :c Ic Icl :c i fl··· t.. X Ic icC +x i te
/cJ"; Ic .. ;
(h = 1... H)
10 We do not use the tenn "loc:a1 Pareto optimum" here since a stationary point may be a
saddlepoint and not a local maximum.
11 See Dreze (Sl for a similar approach to the theory of investment under uncertainty.
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and with constraints on production and distriburion given by
(15)
(16)
(17)
(XiO. Xi>bjl ... biC)' e }j,!
Zk «z: 'fIh.
With this reformulation. the economy Ei(il) can be considered as formally
equivalent to an economy with one private good z: and C local, or regional,
public goods bil ... bie. where bit: is the amount of public good c produced per
unit of time in region (club) j and where production decisions in regions other
than j are given. x7 may be interpreted as the time spent by consumer h in
region j so that x7bic can be considered as the amount of public good c
consumed by consumer h in region j.
We define no~=: def oo:/az~)/(aUk;az3)'fIc. h: no~is household h's marginal
rate of substitution between characteristic c and the numeraire, that is, h 's
implicit price for characteristic c in terms of the numeraire. We can then define a
Lindahl equilibrium L2 for the economy E;(d) by an allocation a e Fj(d) and a set
of implicit individual price vectors for characteristics, noloeRf, such that:
(18) >.Jh, Ok> Uk . l' ~h ,~ k_it~ > lo+~. lo-hb'I impnes ZO"1"'l...nocxi0it: Zo I...noexi it:;
(19)
In (18) Oh and Uk are the utility functions, as defined by (14), evaluated at
(z~,Bf) and (z3. Bi), respectively. From monotoniciry of the utility functions we
may set:
'fie. h.
The conditions (18) in the definition of a Lindahl equilibrium can then be
rewritten as:
(20) >.Jh, ir (ZAk).> UIt{z.") . l' ~Io" kAIo lo ~ It lo'I unp les z o+c: nocZ c>Z o + !.. nocz c'
" c
From the literature on economies with public goods it is well-known (see, e.g.,
Milleron (18]) that under Assumptions 1and 2, every Lindahl equilibrium for Ei
(il) is an element of Fr (il), and with every allocation a EF~ (il), one can associate
implicit prices no"e R~, h = 1, ... ,H, such that {a, nolo} is a Lindahl equilibrium
for Ej(il).
We summarize this in a proposition.
Il Sometimes called a "pseudo-equilibrium", as in Mallnvaud (14). The name of Lindahl bas the
mnemonic advantage of being associated with public goods.
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PRoPosmON 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any a e A, B; is a quality
optimum for firm j relative to ti if and only if the 'conditions (19) and (20) are
satisfied.
We now combine the concept of a products equilibrium for given product
qualities (for given B) with that of Lindahl equilibria for the conomies E;(a),
j = l ... J. Accordingly, an allocation a e A will be said to be a competitive
Lindahl equilibrium if and only if there exist a commodity price vector peR 1.
and a set of individual price vectors Trlt eR;, with the input as a riumeraire, such
that: (i) (a, p, v) is a competitive products equilibrium relative to B; (ii) Vj,
(a, Trlt, h = 1 ... H) is a Lindahl equilibrium for the economy E;(a).
As a eA is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation for the economy E;(a) if and only
if B, is a quality optimum for firm j relative to a, we have the immediate result:
Paososrrrow 5: Under Assumptions l and 2 (a) a competitive Lindahl equil-
ibrium is a Pareto stationary point; (b) with every Pareto stationary point a e A,
one can associate (p, v) and 'Tr", h == l ...H, such that a is a competitive Lindahl
equilibrium.
For applications in Section 4, it will be convenient to allow for continuous
substitution between characteristics in the production sets. To that effect we
need the following strengthening of Assumption 2:
ASSUMPTION 2 BIS: Vj, Y; is convex with relative interior points and defined by
Øf( y;):si O~Yi;' 0, where <Pi is twice continuously differentiable with aø;/ ax,;" <0,
d<Pl/ ax; >0, a<Pl/ abie >O Vc ;o: j'. Moreover, x, >O implies Xjo > 0, and Vr e R ...,
{Yil<p/{Yf):si 0, Xjo :$i r} is compact.
In that case we have the following corollary to Proposition 5.
COROLI..ARY 5.1:
(21) Vj, c w]',
are necessary conditions for Pareto optimal product quality in terms of charac-
teristics (Pareto stationary point). 13
PROOF: Conditions (21) are the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficienr'"
conditions for maximizing the maximand in (19) with respect to xjo, Bi over the
convex set
Q.E.D.
13The necessary conditions (21) characterize Pareto stationary quality choices for any given
quantities and may thus be understood as necessary conditions for second-best optimality (under
monopoly pricing for instance).
14 Under Assumption 2 bis. the constraint qualification is automatically satisfied.
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The conditions (21) are a natural extension of the "Samuelson conditions" for
Pareto optimal production of public goods (Samuelson [21]) and can be inter-
preted as saying that if it is at all optimal to include characteristic c in product j,
the amount of characteristic c per unit output should be increased until marginal
social value in terms of the numeraire equals marginal cost, where marginal
social value is the sum of the individual evaluations of the marginal change in
characteristic c. .
The public goods aspect of product quality is due to the fact that the feasible
range of choice in the space of characteristics is determined by the row space of B
so that (i) the same range of choice is imposed on ail consumers and (ii) if the jth
row of B is changed, this common range of choice will in general be modified.
4. PROFlTMAXIMIZATION AND CONSUMERS' WELFARE
4.1
In this section we shall investigate to what extent profits will provide adequate
signals for efficient choices of products qualities by firms guided by the profit
motive. In order to do so, we must define more precisely profit maximization
under-variable product quality.
Traditionally, product differentiation and quality choice have been studied in
the context of monopolistic competition. Clearly, the monopoly power of every
single firm is limited by the existence of substitutabiliry relations among com-
modities and there is a close connection between the presence of many close
substitutes and the presence of many commodities relative to the number of
characteristics. Indeed, if there were as many commodities as characteristics.
then there could exist perfect substitutes in the market for any new combination
of characteristics. On the other hand, if commodity j does not lie in the row
space of B, it seems reasonable that firm j perceives that it has some market
power. The firm can influence the demand for its product through manipulating
both price and product quality in terms of characteristics.
We· assume that monopolistic firms are facing continuously differentiable
demand functions of the form
(22) (j = 1. .. J),
and that they use price and product quality (in terms of characteristics) as
decision variables."
Accordingly, an allocation a e A will be said to be a monopolistic Nash
equilibrium if and only if p and B are such that Vj, P;Xi(P, B)- x;o;;'
P;X;(p,B)- i;o for all p, B, i;o such that Pic = Pic, BIc = BIc, Vk ;:f: i, and
(i;o. x;(p, B), B;) e Yl.
l~ The firm's opportuniry set will remain convex in terms of Xf... p" 8f if the demand function is
convex in Pf' 8f. For our purposes. it is convenient to use the demand function 1:,(p, B) rather chan
the inverse demand function Pf(X. 8).
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Under the differentiability Assumption 2 bis, the necessary'" conditions for
monopolistic profits maxima are given by
(23) {l) ox,PI -+1 =~,
Tli OXi .
( OX;o) oXi oX;o [( OXi
O) aXi aXioJb OPi--- -Ei-, Pi-- --- je= ,
aXi abjc abjc ax; obie obje
where Tli in (23) is the price elasticity of the demand for commodity j. Combining
(23) and (24), we get
(24) 'ric;: l',
(25) [Pi aXf OX;oJb O--+- ~='Tlf able able e , 'rIc;:j'.
4.2
It is not clear how one should define a competitive equilibrium when firms
choose simultaneously the quantity and the qualitative characteristics of their
output. To the best of our knowledge, no clear definition has been-given in the
literature to date, The difficulty is the following. On the one hand we wish to
assume that firms act as price takers and. for given quality, choose the output
which maximizes profits ;u given prices. Thus. we wish to assume that firms act as
if prices were insensitive to their quantity decisions. On the other hand, we do
not wish to assume that firms act as if prices were insensitive to their quality
decisions. Indeed. if that were the ease, each firm would produce the quality
variant in its production set with the lowest production cost. Thus, one must
assume that firms are aware of a relationship between price and quality. If there
were as many commodities as characteristics. then each characteristic could
have its implicit market price, and firms could be assumed to maximize profits at
given prices for the characteristics. More generally, we will assume here (for lack
of a more convincing alternative) that firms know how their quality choices affect
the price at which a given output can be sold, and choose quality so as to
maximize profits at given output. This leads to the definition of a competitive
profits equilibrium; this term is meant to indicate that prices. but not necessarily
quality choices. are "competitive". An allocation a e A is a competitive profits
equilibrium if and only if P and B are such that 'rij,
(i) PJXI- X;o Ølt P;Xi - Xjo for all (x/O. Xi' BI) e Yj.
(ii) PJXi - X;o Ølt PJXj - Xjo, for all (X;o. Xi, Bi) e Yj and Pi
such that xi = Xi (p, B), Pic = PTc, BIc = BTc, k;: j.
Condition (i) says that x, maximizes firm j's profits over Yj for given price and
given product quality, while (ii) says that for given output level Xi> Bi and Pi are
such that finn j's competitive profits are maximized.
16 Sufficiency would require monopoly profits to be strictly concave in price and commodity
characteristics.
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Under Assumption 2 bis, the necessary conditions for maximization of
competitive profits with respect to product quality can be written as:
(26) 'Vc":j',
for all dbic• dpi such that
ox, sx.
_I dbl't: +_1 dp, = O.
obic OPI
(27)
Solving for dp, in (27) and substituting into (26) gives
Pi OXi oXic---=!iii-
11' abie abi~
where (28) must hold as an equality for an c such that bic > O.
Comparing (25) and (28), one sees that the necessary conditions for competi-
tive profits equilibria are formally the same as those for monopolistic Nash
equilibria, except for the fact that at any given product quality, a monopolist will
charge a higher price and operate at a lower output level than a competitive firm.
Hence, the monopolist extracts the monopoly profits through monopoly pricing.
As to choices of product quality, he will behave as a competitive firm maximizing
competitive profits. This does not imply that a monopolist will choose the same
product quality as would an otherwise identical competitive firm. Indeed, prices
and output levels will be different, so that marginal costs with respect to charac-
teristics may also be different.
(28) 'Ve;': j',
4.3
We shall now investigate under what circumstances the necessary conditions
(21) for Pareto optimal choices of product quality are compatible with conditions
(25) and (28) for profit maximization under rnonopolistic and competitive pricing
of commodities, respectively.
Profit maximizing choices of product qualities will clearly depend on the
properties of demand functions for commodities with multiple hedonic charac-
teristics. To investigate some of these properties, we need two additional assump-
tions to ensure single-valued demand functions.
ASSUMPTION 1 SIS: Ult is strictly quasi-concave for ail h,
AsUMPTION 3: B has full row rank.17
As shown in the Appendix (AS), under Assumptions 1 bis and 3, the effect on
household h's demand for commodity i of an increase in the quantity of charac-
teristic c contained in one unit of Xi can be written as
It It It It
oX i It ax i (OX i It ax i) It
-=X i --It - -_-+X r;-;; 71'c·
abic oW c ap! OWo
(29)
11 Assumption 3 ensures that for fixed commodity characteristics. the utility functions are strict1y
quasi-concave in terms of (:c~. xk).
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(29) is in the nature of a Slutsky equation for quality changes and decomposes
the demand effect of a quality change into an income effect x7 dx7/aw: and a
substitution effect. The income effect is specific to characteristic c, being pro-
portional to the effect of an increase in the initial endowment of characteristic
C.
18 The substitution effect is specific to commodity j, being proportional to the
substitution effect of a decrease in the price of commodity j and hence always
positive. The factors of proportionality relate the units of bie to those of w~, and
those of Pi' respectively.
In the sequel it will be convenient to use an alternative statement of (29):
It "It "dX ; ,,( AX i dX i It) dX i "--x,7/i-7/i1Te --1Te
d~ aWe dWo d~
(30)
expressing the effect of an increase in bje as proportional to the effect of a decrease
in Pi up to a correction for the possible differences between two income effects.
These two income variations cancel each other in terms of utility, but not
necessarily in terms of demand for commodity j. For later reference, the first
term on the right-hand side of (30) will be called the specific income effect with
respect to characteristic c.
The sign of the specific income effect will depend on how effective commodity
j is in providing characteristic c, and on whether it is a superior or inferior good.
Assume that ax~/ow3 >0. Then, if commodity j were purchased primarily to
procure characteristic c, one would expect aX7/dW~<O. Conversely, if com-
modity j were richer in most characteristics other than c. one would expect
dx7/dW~ > O and even ox7/dw~ > 1T~aX~/aw~. Loosely speaking, one would
expect the specific income effect to be negative (positive) when commodity j is
more (less) effective than the average basket in procuring characteristic c.
Aggregating (30) over households and substituting into (25) and (28), we get
after some simple manipulations
It" 1Pi ~ ,,( ax j aX j It) ~ "It ~"It "OXjo-- ... x , 7/i-7/i1Te +L,Xj1Te+-",Xj(77,-77j}Trc:ei-,
77i It oW c dWO It 77, " abje(31)
"Ic;=j',
where 777 is the price elasticity of household h's demand for commodity j.
Observing that 77, - Ik X7777/Ik x;, i.e., a weighted average over households of
the price elasticities of the individual demand functions, the last term on the
left-hand side of (31) can be interpreted as X;/77; times the covariance over
households between the marginal rates of substitution, 1T:. and the individual
price elasticities 777.
In view of Corollary 5.1, conditions (31) provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for efficiency of quality choices guided by profit motives, when
efficiency must here be understood in the sense of Pareto stationarity. It is left
for the reader to decide whether he wants to regard these necessary conditions as
18 If cllara"cteristic c of commodity i is changed by db,,,, consumer It will enjoy an increase in his
endowment of characteristic c by dw: a::7 db;e-
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quite restricnve;" pointing to likely inefficiencies of the market mechanism,
even when competitive, or whether he wants to regard the sufficient conditions
as apt to be approximately satisfied,20 pointing to the opposite conclusion.
THEOREM l: In order for profit maximizing firms to choose a Pareto stationary
amount of characteristic c per unit of output:
(i) it is sufficient that the specific income effect uanishes, for each individual.
and that the individual marginal rates of substitution 7T~ be uncorrelated with the
individual price elasticities;
(ii) it is necessary that the covariance between the individual price elasticities
and marginal rates of substitution be equal to the average specific income effect,
weighted by the expenditures p;x7.
Let dEf = (dbfl ... dbfC)' denote a vector of marginal variations of the charac-
teristics embodied in commodity j. From Theorem l, we have the following
corollaries.
COROLLARY 1.1: A sufficient condition under which the marginal quality
variation dBf will increase the (monopoly or competitive) profits of firm j only if this
variation is consistent with the interests of the consumers, is that the variation dBf
lie in the space of rows of B other than row j.
PROOF: Suppose dBf is in the row space of B. Then there exists a vector
a=(at ... a,)' such that dB,=a.'B. In that case !.e1T~dbic=a'Br.;'=a.'p, by
(A2) (Appendix), so that the covariance term vanishes. Moreover, from (AS),
h It
xlt \' (ax i_ ax i 7Th) db.
1 c: ;-li" ;-;; t: Tt:
C vW c oWo
since [ _7TIt, I]E' = (- p, BJ' in view of (A2).
Hence, if aj =O, then
Q.E.D ..
COROLLARY 1.2: If, vt. all feasible variations dBf are contained in the space of
rows of B other than row j, then the competitive profits equilibrium is a Pareto
stationary point.
19 Very restrictive assumptions on individual preferences are required to guarantee that specific
income effects vanish (for instance linearity in both numeraire and characteristics).
20 Some may claim that specific income effects are in the nature of second-order effects and may
therefore be ignored as a first approximation.
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PROOF: Under the conditions stated in the corollary, the competitive profits
equilibrium is a competitive Lindahl equilibrium. Q.E.D.
REMARKS: (i) Under monopolistic pricing of commodities, Theorem 1must
be understood to be relative to a given output level. That is, given the output level
Xj, monopolist j will choose a Pareto stationary amount of characteristic c per
unit output if he is equating marginal social value to marginal-cost with respect to
characteristics.
(ii) The efficiency of profit maximizing choices of product quality has been
explored in a partial equilibrium context by Spence [23, 24] and Sheshinski [22]
among others. Their main point is that profit maximizing firms will respond to
the market's marginal valuation of product quality while the average valuation
of product quality (at the margin) is relevant for welfare judgements and they
present necessary conditions for efficiency of market choices of product quality
in terms of properties of the inverse demand function. Theorem 1deals with the
same problem in a general equilibrium framework and presents necessary
conditions for market efficiency with respect to productquality in terms of
properties of the individual and aggregate demand functions.
(iii) There is quite an extensive literature on product durability under
different market structures which is closely related to the problem of quality
choice and product differentiation. In that literature some authors have argued
that a monopoly is likely to supply a good of a lower quality than would a
competitive firm with the same cost structure." while others have argued that
monopoly exploitation is best achieved by manipulating price rather than pro-
duct quality. 2l The preceding analysis reveals that market imperfections in the
quantitative supply of commodities can be separated from market imperfections
in the choices of product qualities. As for choices of product quality, both
monopolistic and price-taking firms will take into account the demand effects of
different product designs and if the marginal variations in the quality of a given
product do not lie in the space of rows of B other than the row corresponding to
the product concerned, an element of market imperfection enters the picture
and profit maximizing choices of product quality will not be conducive to
maximal consumer welfare.
5. COMPUTABLE UNDAHL EQUILIBRIAAND CONSUMERS' UNANIMITY
5.1
As stated in Proposition 5, Pareto stationary choices of product qualities
require knowledge of the implicit prices for characteristics for all households and
these prices are typically not revealed in the market. One might, however, ask
whether these prices can be computed from available market data such as
commodity prices and the technology matrix.
21 See Levhari and Srinivasan (131.
II See Swan (25J.
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From the necessary conditions (A2) for interior consumer optima in the
commodity space we have that equilibrium commodity prices and implicit prices
for characteristics are related by p = B7rIt• Hence, if B were non-singular, the
implicit prices could be computed from7rk = B-1p and they would in equili-
brium be the same for all consumers. In that case, the firms could check the
necessary conditions (21) for Pareto optimality if they cared to do so.
More generally, let dBI = (dbjl ••• dbic)' be in the row space of B. In that case,
Ic'1T'~ dbjc =«s«: = a'p for all h, so that the marginal social value of the quality
variation dBI could be computed from Ic Ilt x77r: db/c= x~'p which only
requires knowledge of commodity prices and the technological relationship
a = (al ... aJ )'. Stated alternatively, one would in this case only need to know
the implicit prices of one (arbitrary) consumer in order to check the necessary
conditions (21).
In the general case where dBi does not lie in the row space of B, consumers
will evaluate the marginal variation dB, differently and these individual evalua-
tions can no longer be obtained from available market data (commodity prices
and the technology matrix). This reveals that if variations of product quality
change the range of choice for consumers in the characteristics space, there will
110t exist any natural market substirute for aggregation of consumer preferences.
5.2
The case where quality changes lie in the row space of B has received
substantial attention in the literature on competitive capital markets (Ekern and
Wilson [7], Leland [12] and Radner (19]). One has there emphasized the
so-called "unanimity theorem" staring that all consumers agree in their evalua-
tion Ie 7r: dbic = a'p of the proposed marginal variation in the jth row of B. It
has been verified here that this common evaluation does not have the same sign
as the resulting effect on firms' profits under either monopolistic or competitive
pricing of commodities, unless the specific income effect vanishes. Consumers'
unanimity in evaluating a proposed variation is not always consistent with profit
maximization, a point already emphasized in Ekern and Wilson (7] and Leland
(12]. The interpretation given there is that consumers' unanimity departs from
profit maximization when commodity markets are not perfectly competitive.
However, market imperfections in the qualitative supply of characteristics,
created by the specific income effect, are distinct from market imperfections in
the quantitative supply of commodities and the inefficiency of profit maximizing
choices of product quality arises both under monopolistic and competitive pric-
ing of commodities. Moreover, profit maximizing choices of product qualities
would be consistent with the interests of the consumers both under monopolistic
and competitive supply of commodities if the conditions of Theorem l are
fulfilled, a case which has not been considered in the literature referred to above.
CORE
Manuscript received March. 1976; final revision received May. 1977.
109.
PRODUCT QUALITY 511
APPENDIX
We shall here derive the Slutsky equation (29) for an arbitrary household h whose superscript is
omitted for ease of notation.
First we introduce some notation. If M is any matrix. Mt will denote its kth row and MI its [th
column. If.t and y are column vectors. a.t/ay' will denote the matrix with element ".tt/ay, in the kth
row and the Ith column. St denotes the Kronecker delta vector whose kth element is equal to one. all
other elements being equal to zero,
Starting from the twice differentiable, strictly quasi-concave utility function U(z)-
U(Zo.Zl •.. zd. we shall denote by Æ! the (C + l)-dimensional vector (aU/azo. aUjazl ... aU/ard'
and by Q'the (C + l)x (C.;. 1) matrix with elements alu/aZt ar,. k, [". O. l ... C; the C.;. 1 rows and
columns of U will be numbered from O to C (thus. Uo is the first row of Q'. Ut its k + 1st row now
with entries -; Ul art ar" 1-O. l ... C). - -
Using (O) and (6), but ignoring the distinction between Wo and v, and denoting by OW the
C-dimensional vector (Wi'" we], the utility function may be written as
(Al) U(r)- U(wo-p'x,ow' +.t'B). U{xlw. P. B}.
a formulation that incorporates both the budget constraint (6) and the tecanological relationships
between commodities and characteristics (5). At an interior solution the first order conditions are
aU
(Al) a;-r-p.BI.Æ!=O
where ( - P. Bl is the B-matrix augmented by the neganve of the price vector as the first column. The
(J x I) matrix of seeeed order derivatives of U with respect to x (for given w, p. B)
alu
(AJ) --"(-p, BIQI-p. BI'ax ax'
is negative dednite by Assumptions 1 bis and 3. The second-order conditions are thus satisfied.
Differentiation of (A2) yields
alu alu
O---dx+ (-dp,.dB,)'
axaz' axa(-p. BI,
.. (-p, BJQf-p. B]' dx + {Xj (-p, BI.Ll+c5eOC-dp,.dB,)'
and hence,
(A4) { axBI .. -{[-p,'BJQ[-p, Bn-I{x,(-p, BI.Ll+S~'},
a -p, I
alu alu
O.. -dJ:+--dw"(-p, Blm-p,B]' dJ:+[-p, BIQ'dw,ax ax' axaw'
and hence.
(A5) aa;,.. -{(-P. BIUf-p. Bn-I(-p, BIU·
The invariance of the demand functions with respect to monotonic transformations of the utility
functions is readily verified. Indeed. let V-FeU). Then av/ar =F'(aU/az), (alv/ar ar')-
F'(alu/az ar')+ F"(au/az}(au/ar') where F' and F" denote derivatives of V with respect to U.Then
av/ax" F'(au/ax)- O, by (A2), and
alv . alu auau) alu
--af-p, Bl(F'--+F"-- (-P. B)' -F'--,
ax ax' ar ar' az sz' axax'
by (AJ). since F"(aUlaz)(aU/az') (-p.B]'=O, by (A2). Then, in (A4) and (AS) the scalar F'
cancels out between the inverse matrix and its multiplicand.
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Upon combining (A4) and (AS), we get:
ax -x.~==-{[-p BjU'-p Bj,}-la.u
a(-p,E)1 'aw' ' _1-' ...
== -{ (.!:!:!...)-I}/U'
ax ax' -'
(A6)
(A7)
ax ax ( alU )-1-+-x' .. __ o Uoap' owo ax ax' -,
where ~ has a "marginal utilityof income" interpretation, Looking at a particular element of (A6),
we can write:
(A8)
(k,. l ...J)
where "!I';'• ~!!Q.
Under the assuUll'rion that E is a square matrix and hence non-singular by Assumption 3, we can
rake another step, writing from (A2) and (AS):
(A9) ax ( II' -l ax ax ,- -'11" =--B' =----"!I'
aw" aow' awo .
ax" (B-1) ax" (B-1)-= -x; cic-- cP·ab,., apl
Finally, if B were an identity matrix. each commodity being identified with a single characteristic,
then:
(AlO)
(Al})
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ENVIROID1ENTAL EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEMAND AND SOHE ASPECTS OF THE. PROBLEM
OF OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN T.]ITH. SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CHOICE
OF PRODUCT QUALITY.
/
l. Introduction
Apart from prices and incomes, consumer demand functions will clearly
depend on the consumer's environment. Broadly speaking, the consumer's
environment may be considered as being made up of all welfare-relevant
phenomena which are beyond the control of the individual consumer. More
specificallY, in the present paper the consumer's environment will be
defined in such a way as to consist of all non-market goods affecting the
consumer's welfare, i.e., goods which are not exchangeable through commodi-
ty markets. The supply of public goods and various types of externalities
may clearly be considered as part of the consumer's environment. Pre-
allocated goods and goods subject to straight rationing will also fall
under this category. l) Even certain aspects of market goods which the con-
sumers value but are beyond the control of the individual consumer such as
product quality, may be thought of as environmental parameters determining
the environment under which consumption of market goods takes place.
The economic consequences of. changing the envir~nment are. not priced in
the market. The market responses to changes in the environment are indi-
rect in the sense that they will change the consumers' demand pattern for
market goods. In some cases the produce.r can control certain aspects of
the environment under which the consumption of his products takes place.
In that case it se.ems natural to ask whether the producer's profits will
adequately reflect the consumers' evaluation of those aspects of the
environmental design which are under the producer's control such that
profit maximization will guide the producer to choose an environmental
design in the best interests of the consumers.
l)See Pollak [7].
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Effects of environmental changes on consumption behaviour and some aspects
of optimal design of the environment will be discussed in the present
paper. The problem of optimal environmental design will be discussed
in the context of optimal choice of product quality. For this purpose
we shall adopt the consumption activity approach to consumer demand
theoryas formulated by Lancaster [4) and Muth [6]. This approach assumes
that market goods are inputs into consumption activities producing more
basic or final goods over which preferences are defined. These final goods
are in some contexts called characteristics (see Lancaster [4]) and are
supposed to be the ultimate objects of consumer satisfaction. Thus,
preferences over market goods are indirect or derived from preferences
over final goods and properties of the household consumption technology.
Efficiency of market choices of product quality has been studied by
Spence [9, 10] and Sheshinski [81 in a partial equilibrium context and
by Dreze and Hagen [2] in a general equilibrium context but with a
linear consumption technology. Spence and Sheshinski have emphasized
that average valuation of product quality is relevant from an efficiency
point of view while profit maximizing firms will respond to the market's
marginal valuation of product quality. Dreze and Hagen have stressed
that whatever the pricing of commodities, efficiency ~ill generally
not obtain if a profit maximizing producer explores his demand curve
through his choice of product quality. In the present paper the results
of Spence and Sheshinski and those of Dreze and Hagen will be reconciled
in a general equilibrium framework and we show that in the Lancaster-
Muth framework, deviation between consumers' average and marginal
valuations of product quality may occur if the consumption technologies
are non-linear.
2. Effects of environmental changes on consumer demand.
We shall assume a finite number J of market goods indexed j and C
different final goods indexed c. Each consumer is endowed with a con-
sumption technology ~hich relates feasible output vectors of final
goods to input vectors of.market goods. It will be assumed that each
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final good is producible ~n one and only one activity and by obvious
notation final good c is produced in activity c.
It is assumed that market goods are all joint inputs into the production
of final goods.l) We let x. denote the·amount the consumer2) uses of
J
market ...good j and z his consumption ot'final good c.c
For a g~ven household production technology the production of final goods
will depend on the input vector of market goods and the environmental
setting under which the production takes place. We shall assume that the
environment can be completely described by a finite-dimensional vector of
environmental parameters. We do not loose in generality by assuming that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between environmental parameters and
consumption activities and the environmental parameteres) pertaining to
the production of final good c will be denoted by E which will here bec
taken to be a scalar. More general cases where some environmental para-
meters affect a subset of consumption activities, possibly different sub-
sets for different consumers, would not present any further difficulty.
We let ~ denote the consumer's production function for final good c.c
Thus, we have
(l) c=L, .• ,C.
Hence, from the standpoint of the individual consumer the environmental
parameters will be in the nature of public goods or bads according as
increases in the quantities representing these parameters will cause
positive or negative shifts in the household production functions.
It will be assumed that there exists a market good which is present in
final form. This commodity is indexed zero and used as a numeraire good.
l)Extending the analysis to the' case where the inputs of market goods are
specific to activities would be straight-forward.
2)In the present section devoted to comparative statics analysis of the
individual consumer, the consumer index is omitted.
ll5.
The consumer's ranking of bundles of final goods is represented by a
quasi-concave utility function
(2)
where z ~s given by (l). It is assumed that au/az = U > O,c c c
c = O, l, "', C.
For a given environment, (2) induces a preference ordering over market
commodity bundles (zO' xl' "', xJ) through the derived utility function
(3)
If the environment changes, the consumer's preferences over market CO!IlI!lO-
dities will change since his consumption technology is changed.
For reasons to become clear below, we assume that the consumer has initial
stocks of the numeraire good and final goods given by the endowment
vector l) w = (Wo' wi, ..., we)' where the initial stocks of final goods
may be thought of as given by initial inputs of market goods. The budget
constraint is given by Lp.x. + zo = Wo and substituting into (2) thej J J
consumer optimum is determined by maximizing
where X = (xl' •.•, xJ)'. This expression contains both the budget
constraint and the technological relationships between market goods and
final goods.2)
The first-order conditions for an interior optimum are
(4) au ~c-'"I - = -UOPJ' + LU -'"I - = aox. c ox.J c J
j = 1, "', J.
I)In this paper untransposed vectors mean column vectors.
2)The initial stocks of final goods may be viewed as additive shift para-
meters in the household production functions.
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d2UThe (J X J)-matrix dXdX' of second-order derivatives with typical entry
a2u/aXjdXk in the j-th row and k-th column will be assumed to be negative
definite so that the second-order maximum conditions are satisfied. With
U(-) quasi-concave and strictly increasing in all final goods, it is suffi-
cient for U(·) to be strictly quasi-con~ave in the decision variables
(zO' xl' •.•, xJ) that the household production functions ~ Cx,K l arec· c
strictly concave in the inputs of market goods.
We may rewrite (4) as
d<,O
(S) E'lT C l, Jp. = dX. J = ~,.,J cc J
where 'lTc= Uc/UO is the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between
final good c and the numeraire, that is, the consumer's implicit price
for final good c in terms of the numeraire. Hence, at the consumer optimum,
the consumer's demand price for market good j equals the sum of the values
of the marginal products of market·good j in the production of final goods
valuated at the consumer's implicit prices for final goods,
Differentiating the k-th equation in (4) with respect to p. gives
J
(6)
d~
= UOOPkXj - ~Uco aX:·Xj - °kjUO'
k=l, ..• ,J
j=l, ..• ,J
2where Ucd denotes the second-order partial derivative d u/dzcazd,
c, d = 0,1, "', C, and 0kj denotes the Kronecker delta. Differen-
tiating (4) with respect to Ed' Wo and wd' respectively, gives
(7) k=l, .,.,J
(9)
a2u dtp
dXkdWO
= -UOOPk + EU _cc cO dXk
d2U d<,O
-UOdPk + EUcd
c
dXkdwd
= dXkc
k=l, .•. ,J(8)
k=l, .•. ,J
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Taking the total differential of (4) with respect to the input vector
x = (xl' ..•, xJ)' and the price Pj gives
(10)
where dx = (dx1, ... ,
aXJ ,•.., ap.)
J
Solving (10) with respect to
gives
(11)
where the inverse matrix exists by the negative definiteness assumption.
The k-th component of the column vector ax/ap. is given by
J
(12)
a~
-- =-ap.
J
The (J x J)-matrix of pr~ce derivatives of the consumption vector x is
consequently given by
(13)
Differentiating (4) with respect to x and UlO and solving for aX/aUlO yields
(14) ax a
2u -1 a2u
aUlO= - (aXdX' ) aXaUlO
where the k-th component of (14) is
Combining (12) and (15) and using (6) and (8) gives
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(16)
lnmatrix form we then have
(17) dX + dX ,ap'" aOl
O
x
The left-hand side of (17) is the Slutsky substitution matrix
(dxldp')U t with negative diagonal entries by the negative definite-=cons .
ness of d2U/dXdX'.
Taking the total differential of (4) with respect to x and Ed and then
with respect to x and Oldand solving gives
(18) .
(19)
d~ 2 d2U-=- 2:( dU)-ldEd t d~dXt dXtdEd
d~ 2 d2U2:( dU)-l-'=- dXtdU:daOld t a~aXt
Combining (18) and (19) and using (7) and (9) gives
(20)
= -
From (16) we.have
(21) a
2u -l l a~ a~
(')x. ')x
t
) = -U (-" - + -') - x )O 1<0 O OPt oOlO t
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and substituting into (20) gives
(22)
a~ a~
}:(-....- + ~ x )1Td' ap aW_ tt t O
Equation (22) is 1n the nature of a Slutsky equationl) for the effects
on demand for commodity k caused by a change in the environmental para-
meter Ed' To see this, we observe that for given implicit prices of
final goods, i.e., omitting second-otclerterms involving a1Tc/aEd,
1Tda2~d/aXtaEd represents the change in the consumer's demand price for
commodity t caused by a change in Ed' Hence, the last term on the right-
hand side of (22) is'in the nature of a substitution effect from the
(first-order) changes in demand prices caused by the change in Ed' while
the first term has the interpretation of an income effect and is specific
to final good d.
With independent market commodities and omitting the income effect
specific to final good d, we see that market good kand non-market good
d will be substitutes (complements) according as an increase in Ed will
decrease (increase) the marginal productivity of market good k in the
production of final good d which is rem1n1scent of the cardinal Edge-
worth-Pareto definition of substitutability and complementarity.2)
For later use it will be useful to rewrite the equation (22) as
(23)
Hence, up to a correction term, the effect on the demand for commodity
k caused by a change in the environmental parameter Ed' will be equal to
a weighted sum of the uncompensated price derivat i.ve.sof demand for good
k with weights given by the (first-order) changes in the consumer demand
prices.
l)See [2] for a similar result in the case of a linear consumption
technology.
2)See Chipman [l].
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The correction term is a difference between two income effects: The
first one is caused by the fact that an increase in Ed will increase
the consumer's initial endowment of final good d, and the second one by
the fact that a change ln demand prices will change the (perceived) value
of the consumer's initial endowments. This correction term, which for
later reference will be called the specific income effect, will vanish ln
terms of utility but not necessarily in terms of consumer demand.
3. Choice of product quality.
The consumption activity framework lends itself naturally to the analysis
of firms' decisions on product quality and problems related to efficient
choices of product quality. Indeed, from the standpoint of the individual
consumer the quality of market goods will be in the nature of environmental
characteristi.cs determining the relationships between quantities of inputs
of market goods and the output of final goods produced.
To get a simple parameterization of product quality, we assume that the
quality of a unit of a given commodity is objectively determined by a
finite set of product attributes (the product design). Without loss ln
generality we assume that there is a one-to-one relationship between
final goods and product attributes and the quality of product j can then
be represented by a vector E. = (E'l' •.., E.C) where E. is the amountJ J J JC
of attribute c embodied in a unit of commodity j.
The household's production of final good c is then given by the input of
market goods into consumption activity c and the amount of attribute c
embodied per unit of the various inputs. This production relation is
assumed to be glven by
(24) h h hz = <.::> (Xl'c c c = 1, .•., C
where the superscript h refers to consumer h. We may note that the
"hedonic" characteristics approach of Lancaster [4] with a linear con-
sumption technology is a special case of (24) where zh = rx~E..
c j J JC
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Commodity j is produced by firm j in the quantity of x .• We assume that
J
the numeraire good is a single common input to all firms and xjO denotes
the amount of the numeraire good used by firm j (this input may for
example be labor).
The attributes of commodity j can be controlled by firm j and the firm
selects a production plan (x·O' x., E'l' ••., E·C)C+2 J.. J J JY. c R We assume that the efficiency frontier
J - +
implicit production function
in its production set
of Y. is given by the
J
~.(x·O' x., E'l' •••, E·C) = OJ J J J J j=l, •.• ,J.
A feasible allocation in such
h hvectors (zO' x ) and a set of
satisfying
an economy is a set of consumption
production plans (xjO' x. ,J ...,
(27)
h
+ L:x·O
< L;whL:zO =. J h Oh J
h <L:x. = x. ,
h J J
~. (x·O' x. , Ejl' ..., Ejc) = OJ J J
J=l, ••. ,J
(25)
(26)
j=l, ••• ,J.
A Pareto optimal allocation is a feasible allocation maximizing
,\h ~
1\ - O for all h
where zh
c
The first-order maximum conditions can be written asl)
f
l}From strict monoton~c~ty of the utility functions condition (25) and
(26) will hold as strict equalities at a Pareto optimum. Also, we have
assumed that possible sign restrictions on commodities and attributes
are not binding.
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(28)
h
h d<.Dc dx·O['IT __ = _J
c '" h dx.c ox. J
J
for all hand j
(29) for all d and j.
The condition (28) determines optimal output level of commodity j for
given product attributes while (29) determines optimal product attributes
for given output level.
We shall now examine whether profit maximization will lead firms to choose
production plans, and in particular, product attributes, which maximize
consumers' welfare. From (5) and (28) we see immediately that marginal
cost pricing of commodities is necessary for the market choices of product
quantities to be efficient.
As to profit maximizing choices of product quality, it must be the case that
for any quantity supplied, the firm believes that it can influence the price
for its product through manipulating the product quality: Otherwise, firms'
quality decisions would be independent of the demand side in the sense that
for any output level they would choose product qualities such as to minimize
costs which does not seem to be a very plausible assumption for an economy
with product differentiation.
We assume that attribute d of firm j's product is changed whilst the quantity
supplied is kept unchanged. Then, ceteris paribus, the firm will expect
the price for its product to change such thatl)
Bx . ap. ax.
__J _J_ + _J_ = O
ap. dE'd aE'dJ J J
and hence,
ap.
_J_=aEjd
l aXj
ax./ap. aE.d'J J J
Thus, marginal revenue with respect to product quality for given quantity
will be
(30)
ap.
x . _.::.1. =
J aEjd
for all d ,
l)'With this behavioural assumption the resulting equilibrium will be of the
Nash "type.
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We write the specific income effect in (23) as
h h h a2 h
h ax. a<.pd aXj h h tOdIjd
= J _ r h xt 'lTd- a h~ hwd J t awo aXtaEjd
and for given implicit prices, we write the (first-order) change in con-
sumer hIs demand price for commodity t caused by marginal changes in
attribute d of commodity j as
Substituting (23) into (30) and using these definitions, firm j's marginal
revenue with respect to Ejd for given xj' can after some manipulations
be written as
(31)
ap.
x . _:..J.. =
J aEjd
p. h
- _l r I
J
'd + znj h h
hh hap.
x . (n.-n·)aEL +
J J J jd
ap.
x . _J z r
J aXj h uj
h hax. ap
J t
apt aEjd
hwhere n. is the own price elasticity of consumer hIs demand.
J
Comparing (29) and (31) we see that for given product quantity, firms'
marginal revenue with respect to a change in product quality may deviate
from the marginal social value of this change because of
(i) the specific income effects on consumer demand from quality changes
(the second term on the right-hand side (RRS) of (31)),
(ii) for some consumers the marginal value of a quality change as given
by the (first-order) change in the demand price for commodity j
may be different from the true average value to the consumer of this
change in product quality evaluated per unit of commodity j con-
sumed (the third term on the RHS of (31)),
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(iii) h h han aggregation effect which in view of n. = ~x.n./~x., takes
J h J J h J
the form of a covariance over consumers between individual pr~ce
elasticities of demand and changes in individual demand prices
(the fourth term on the RHS of (31»,
(iv) an indirect effect which is due to the fact that a change in
the attributes of commodity j may change the marginal producti-
vities of commodities other than j in the production of final
goods and hence consumers' demand prices for those commodities
may change which in turn may affect the demand and equilibrium
price for commodity j (the last term on the RES of (31»).
Clearly, for any given X., a profit-maximizing firm will equate marginal
J
revenue with respect to product quality to marginal cost axjO/3Ejd. Thus,
we have the following result:
Prooosition L.
~ sufficient condition for a profit-maximizing firm to choose a
locallyl) efficient product d~sign is that the aggregate specific
lncome effect, the aggregation effect (covariance term) and the in-
direct effect all vanish and that for each consumer, his marginal
valuation of a quality change as expressed through the (first-order)
change in his demand price, is equal to the true average value of
this change to the consumer per unit consumed.
Since, the right-hand side of (312 expresses marginal revenue of product
quality for any given X., the above sources of inefficiency of market
J
choices of product quality will be present both under monopolistic and
marginal cost pricing of commodities, The actual product qualities chosen
under these two market regimes will however be different since prices and
marginal costs will differ.
With a linear (Lancasterian) consumption
h(Kronecker delta2 and moreover, a~d!aEjd
2 h. htechnology, 3 ~d!axt3Ejd =
h= x.. Hence, we have the
J
l)Local efficiency means here a stationary point satisfying the first-
order conditions for a Pareto optimum.
, 125.
following immediate result:
Proposition 2.
A linear consumption technology is a sufficient condition for the
indirect effect to vanish. and for tlie consumer's marginal valuation
of a quality change (for given implicit prices) to equal the true
average value to the consumer of that change.
Thus, in the linear case the only sources of inefficiency of profit maxi-
mizing choices of product quality will be the specific income effects and
the aggregation effect as shown by Dreze and Hagen [2J. However, with
non-linear consumption technologies two additional inefficiency terms
mayenter the picture because marginal and average valuations of product
quality may differ for some consumers and because of the indirect effect
caused by the fact that a quality change of product j may affect the
marginal productivities of commodities other than j in the production
of final goods which again may affect the equilibrium price of product j.
The reason why marginal valuations of a quality change of product j as
expressed through the (first-order) changes in demand prices p~, may
J
differ from the true average values to the consumers of that change under
a non-linear consumption technology, is partly due to the non-linearity
in itself and partly to an externality effect caused by the·fact that
marginal productivities of commodities other than j may change and hence
part of the market's marginal valuation of a quality change of product
j may spillover to other producers and will therefore not be captured
by firm j.
To make the above point clear, it may be appropriate to look at a parti-
cular example. Assume an economy with a single differentiated commodity
and a single quality attribute. There is a single consumer with a
utility function U(zo' zl) = Zo + ITIZ1, where ITl > a is the constant
implicit price for final good zl' The consumption technology is given
by zl = wl + (xlEl)Y, O < Y < 1, ~here El > O is the quality index.
In this example income, aggregation and indirect effects clearly vanish
so that the only source of inefficiency in the market choice of product
quality will be the difference between average and marginal valuations
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due to non-linearity of the consumption technology, To see this we observe
y-l ythat utility maximization implies the inverse demand function Pl = ~lyxl El'
Thus the consumer's marginal valuation of a quality change is given by the
change in his demand price dPl/dE1 = ~ly2(x1El)Y-l while the true average
value to the consumer of this change is !l ~ld~1/dE1 = ~ly(xlEl)Y-l so that
,
the marginal valuation will in this particular case be smaller than the
averagevalue causing the marginal revenue to be smaller than the marginal
·social vaiue and hence the market will undersupply the product quality for
any given price Pl'
We now extend the above example slightly by assuming two differentiated
commodities supplied in quantities xl and x2 with quality indexes El and E2,
The household production function is now assumed to be
~1(x1' xz' El' EZ) = (xlE1)Y+(xZEZE1)y, O < y < l; in other respects the
example remains unchanged, The two inverse demand functions are given by
y-l Y y-l Y .PI = ~lyx1 El and P2 = ~1YxZ (E2E1), respect~vely. Clearly, income and
aggregation effects still vanish and so does the indirect effect since
dX1/dPZ = O. For any given xl' marginal revenue for firm l with respect to
the quality of the first commodity is x1dPI/dE1 = ~lyZXrEi-l while the
marginal social value of this change is ~ld~1/dEI = ~1y[xiEi-l+(x2EZ)YEi-I].
The difference between marginal revenue and marginal social value is here
partly caused by an externality effect as an increase in the quality of the
first commodity will make the second commodity more productive in producing
z1 and the marginal social value of this externality is given by
~lY(XZE2)YEi-l, If the two commodities were produced by the same producer,
the externality effect would have been internalized, Marginal revenue with
respect to El would in that case be x1dPl/dEl + x23PZ/3El =2 Y y-l Y y-l~lY [xlE1 + (xZE2) El ] and the deviation between marginal revenue and
marginal social value has now the same explanation as in the former example,
We finally alter the above example to allow for an indirect effect and to
that effect we take the household production function to be
- Yl Y2~1(xl,xZ,E1,E2) - (xlEl) (xZE2) , Yl'Y2 > O, Yl+Y2 < 1.
Yl-l Yl Y2This implies the inve~se demand functions PI = ~lYlxl El (x2E2) and
Y2-l Yl Y2P2 = ~lY2x2 (xIEI) E2, As ~ncome and aggregation effects vanish, we
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have from (31) that for given xl' the marginal revenue with respect to
product quality for producer l ~s given by
while the marginal social value of this change ~s
The difference between marginal revenue and marginal social value is here
partly explained by the indirect effect since dXI/dP2 * O as can be
seen from the inverse demand functions.
In two recent contributions Spence [9] and Sheshinski [8] have examined
the efficiency of market choices of product quality in a partial equili-
brium context based on a consumer surplus measure of social benefits
(and hence assuming away income effects) and they conclude that the
market choice of product quality is likely to be biased away from the
social optimum because of possible differences between marginal and
average valuations of product quality by consumers. It follows, however,
from (3.1)that (even in the case of vanishing income effects) if indi-
vidual demand elasticities and changes in individual demand prices
differ among consumers, then an aggregation effect mayenter the picture
as a separate reason why firms' marginal revenues with respect to product
quality do not equal the marginal social benefits.· This aggregation
bias in the market substitute for aggregation of consumer preferences
is due to the fact that in their decisions on product quality firms
respond to connnodity prices rather than implicit prices for final goods.
Furthermore, if there are many differentiated commodities, a change
~n the design of connnodity j may reduce or increase the applicability
of commodities other than j and apart from the externality effect of
this which is reflected in the difference between changes in demand
prices and true average values, it may affect the demand and equili~
brium price for commodity j which will be another reason why marginal
revenue and marginal social value differ.
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4. Concluding remarks.
In the present paper we have suggested the consumption activity approach
to consumer demand theory in studying effects on consumer demand from
changes in the consumers' environment. The problem of optimal design of
the environment was discussed in the cont-ext of choosing product quality
and it wasshown that profit-maximizing choices of product quality are
generally not in the interests of the consumers and this conclusion is
valid both under marginal cost pricing and mark up pricing of market goods.
Depending on the sign and magnitude of the various terms on the right-
hand side of (31), quality choices under the pressure of market forces
may lead to both underprovision and overprovision of product attributes
as compare~ with a social optimum.
Although the above proposition is stated in terms of product quality,
it clearly applies to all cases in which some aspects of the consumers'
environment can be controlled by the producer. Location and spatial compe-
tition is one such example which comes to mind, and ~s is well known, it
was already intimated by Rotelling [3] that profit maximization may not
bring about the socially optimal localization pattern of firms.
To the extent that the environment is controllable, optimal environmental
design will generally require aggregation of consumer preferences. We may
note, however, that with a sufficiently differentiated supply of market goods,
. . >or more prec~sely, ~f J = C, then the planner only needs to know the house-
hold consumption technologies. The implicit prices for final goods, rrh, canc
in this case be inferred from market prices and demand patterns for market
goods. If all consumers have access to the same consumption technology,
these implicit prices will in equilibrium be the same for all consumers
and if, in addition, this technology were linear, competitive behaviour
with respect to these implicit prices would in this special case lead profit
maximizing firms to choose environmental parameters in such a way that the
necessary conditions for Pareto optimality were satisfied.l) In general,
however, a public goods problem must be solved fbr efficiency to obtain.
l)See Leland [5].
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